

**URBAN FORM AND STATE**  
**AN APPROACH TO INVESTIGATE CITIES' SPATIAL CONCEPTS**  
**WITH REFERENCE TO IRAN**

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY  
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# DECLARATION

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This book is my original work. No part of it has been copied or derived from any other source.  
Mohammad Tarek Farooqi



**IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, MOST GRACIOUS, MOST MERCIFUL**



# DECLARATION

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This thesis is my original work and has been composed solely by myself.

**Mohammad Taghi Pirbabaee**

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# ABSTRACT

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This research offers an understanding of the Iranian historic process and dramatic modern changes in urban spaces and patterns. It studies people's minimal sense of commitment to urban development process and their contrasting attachment to their home, whether traditional and inward looking or modern and extroverted. This shows that people feel alienated by urban public spaces and correlates to the social organisation of state as a despotic system dominating the people.

Theoretical and historical analyses of Middle Eastern societies suggest that the state operates as a system above that of society, and clarify its effect on the morphology of social and physical contexts. The study follows a case-oriented qualitative comparative strategy in investigating the historically significant phenomenon of state in forming urban spaces in Iran. The conceptual and analytical model of space and its production processes as a *socio-spatial construct*, and the special historic concept of the state in Iran and political attribute of the cities leads to a fusion of some paradigms into the *state-oriented socio-spatial structure* of urban form in Iran. The historical stagnation of society in the pre-modern era through the long despotic mode of ruling and its effects on urban space and changes in the structure of state resulting in spatial segregation in modern Iranian cities is argued. This is supported by a mixed qualitative research on people's perceptions of urban spaces in Tabriz. The research outcomes reveal that people's attitudes to urban spaces are strongly influenced by state and indicate the superiority of the political dimension of urban spaces in Iranian cities. The concept of state as a despotic system historically separated and opposed to society, is the most important factor in their lack of sense of belonging to these spaces

This dissertation sees that social space is politically oriented. It concludes that people's attachment to and constructive participation in urban spaces is only achievable through active collaboration in politico-social life.

# CONTENTS

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DECLARATION .....	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	IV
ABSTRACT .....	VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	VII
LIST OF FIGURES .....	XII
LIST OF TABLES .....	XIV
LIST OF DIAGRAMS .....	XVI

## INTRODUCTION

Propounding the Subject .....	2
Identification of the Problem .....	6
Objectives .....	7
Research Strategy .....	8
Structure of the Research .....	10

## PART ONE: IDENTIFYING THE SUBJECT

### CHAPTER ONE: INQUIRIES INTO THE PROCESS OF URBAN SPACES

Introduction to Chapter one .....	17
1.1. Spatial Philosophising .....	17
1.1.1. Substantive View and Spatial Approach to Space .....	18
1.1.2. Epistemological View and Social (Aspatial) Approach to Space .....	19
1.1.3. Relational View and Socio-Spatial (Non-Spatial) Approach to Space .....	20
1.2. Developing an Approach towards Researching Urban Spaces .....	23
1.2.1. Cultural Theories on Urban Space .....	23
1.2.2. Politico-Economic Theories on Urban Space .....	25
1.2.3. Non-Spatial Sociological Theories .....	26
1.3. Socio-Spatial Approach to Urban Form .....	27
1.3.1. Political Process of Social Space .....	29
1.3.2. Social Organisation of Urban Space .....	31
1.4. Urban Form and Planning Theories .....	33
1.4.1. Spatial and Aspatial Theories .....	34
1.4.2. Organisation Structures of the Planning Process .....	35
1.4.3. Communicative Community Planning .....	37
1.5. Conclusion .....	39



## CHAPTER TWO: STATE AND SOCIO-SPATIAL STRUCTURING

Introduction to Chapter Two .....	43
<b>2.1. The Nature of State .....</b>	<b>43</b>
2.1.1. The Origin of a State .....	45
2.1.2. State in the Islamic Era .....	48
2.1.3. The Modern State .....	49
<b>2.2. State and Social Formation in the Middle East .....</b>	<b>49</b>
2.2.1. Social Stratification in the Middle East .....	49
2.2.2. Power and Class Analysis in the Middle East .....	52
<b>2.3. State and Space Structuring in the Middle East .....</b>	<b>55</b>
2.3.1. State and Urbanisation in the Middle East .....	55
2.3.2. Urban Spaces Forming in the Middle East .....	57
2.3.3. Concepts of Urban Spaces in the Middle East .....	59
<b>2.4. Politico-Economic Analysis of Historical Urban Concept Change in Iran .....</b>	<b>64</b>
2.4.1. Political Economy of Iran .....	65
2.4.2. Feudalism and Capitalism Concepts .....	67
2.4.2.1. Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities .....	67
2.4.2.2. Assessment of Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities .....	68
2.4.3. Exogenous Development Concepts .....	70
2.4.3.1. Exogenous Urban Development Theories .....	70
2.4.3.2. Analysis of Exogenous Urban Development Theories .....	72
2.4.4. Rent Capitalism Concept in Iranian Urbanism .....	74
2.4.4.1. Rent Capitalism Theory and Urban Development .....	74
2.4.4.2. Analysis of the Rent Capitalism Theory on Urban Development .....	75
2.4.5. Urban Region Model .....	76
2.4.5.1. Urban Region Theory of Urbanisation .....	76
2.4.5.2. Analysis of the Urban Region Theory .....	77
<b>2.5. State-Oriented Socio-Spatial Structure of Urban Form .....</b>	<b>79</b>

## PART TWO: SPECIFYING THE HYPOTHESIS

### CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (*shahr*): SEAT OF STATE

Introduction to Chapter Three .....	84
<b>3.1. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Ancient Iran .....</b>	<b>85</b>
3.1.1. Emergence of State and City ( <i>shahr</i> ) Concepts: Country - City - of Iran ( <i>Iranshahr</i> ) .....	85
3.1.1.1. Concept of Ancient State of Iran .....	86
3.1.1.2. Concept of the Iranian City ( <i>shahr</i> ) .....	87
3.1.2. Social Construction and Politico-economy in Ancient Iran .....	87
3.1.3. Spatial Organisation of Ancient Cities .....	90
3.1.3.1. Medes and Achaemenian Times: Early Camping Cities .....	90
3.1.3.2. Seleucids Time: Hellenic Cities .....	92
3.1.3.3. Ashkanian and Sassanian Times: Organised Cities .....	93

<b>3.2. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Islamic Iran</b>	<b>95</b>
3.2.1. The Forming of Early Islamic States: Restoration of the Old Iranian Concepts of State and City ( <i>shahr</i> )	96
3.2.2. Social Structure and State in Pre-Modern Iran	99
3.2.2.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin	102
3.2.2.2. Tribal States of Western Origin	107
3.2.3. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Pre-Modern Iran	110
3.2.4. Qajars and Urban Spatial Concepts	116
3.2.4.1. Social Structure in Qajar Iran	119
3.2.4.2. Urban Change and Concepts in Qajar Iran	121
<b>3.3. Pre-Modern State and Urban Form in Iran</b>	<b>124</b>
3.3.1. Mahalleh (District / Quarter)	124
3.3.2. Mosque	126
3.3.3. Bazaar	128
3.3.4. Access and Square	130
<b>3.4. Conclusion: Pre-Modern Iranian City (<i>Shahr</i>) as Seat of State</b>	<b>131</b>

## CHAPTER FOUR: MODERN IRANIAN CITY: SPATIAL SEGREGATION

Introduction to Chapter Four	137
<b>4.1. Constitutional Revolution: Emergence of the Modern Era in Iran</b>	<b>138</b>
4.1.1. Social Construction, Politico-economy and Revolution	141
4.1.2. Popular Organisations and Municipal Management	144
<b>4.2. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Social Structuring</b>	<b>145</b>
4.2.1. Visions and the Pahlavis Sovereignty	147
4.2.1.1. Nationalism in Iran	148
4.2.1.2. Pseudo-Modernism in Iran	151
4.2.2. State and Social Structure in Modern Iran	152
4.2.2.1. Oil, the State and the Social Classes	152
4.2.2.2. Politico-Economy of Iran in Reza Shah Pahlavi Period	154
4.2.2.3. Politico-Economy of Iran in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi period	158
4.2.2.4. Social Construction in Modern Iran	162
<b>4.3. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Urban Change in Modern Iran</b>	<b>165</b>
4.3.1. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Modern Iran	166
4.3.2. Urban Development Planning Systems and Execution	167
4.3.2.1. The Executive: National, Regional and Local Levels	169
4.3.2.2. Planning Systems and Urban Development	170
<b>4.4. Modern Concepts and Forms of State, Cities and Urban Spaces</b>	<b>173</b>
4.4.1. Modern State Concept	174
4.4.2. Modern City Concept	175
4.4.3. Modern Urban Forms and Concepts	176
4.4.3.1. District ( <i>mahalleh</i> )	177
4.4.3.2. Street	178
4.4.3.3. Square	180
<b>4.5. Conclusion: Modern Iranian City (<i>Shahr</i>): Spatial Segregation</b>	<b>181</b>

## PART THREE: DEFINING THE SUBJECT THROUGH CASE STUDY

### CHAPTER FIVE: STATE AND STRUCTURING THE URBAN SPACES IN TABRIZ

Introduction to Chapter Five .....	187
<b>5.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin in Tabriz .....</b>	<b>189</b>
5.1.1. The Saljuqs and Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	190
5.1.2. The Mongols and Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	193
5.1.3. The Timurs, Chupanis, Jalaieris and Tabriz .....	197
<b>5.2. Tribal States of Western Origin in Tabriz .....</b>	<b>198</b>
5.2.1. The Qara-qoyunlu Turkmen and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	199
5.2.2. The Aq-qoyunlu Turkmen and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	201
5.2.3. The Safavis and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	205
<b>5.3. Tabriz in the Period of the States under the Influence of the West and the Constitutional (<i>Mashruteh</i>) Revolution .....</b>	<b>207</b>
5.3.1. The Qajar, Western Semi-Colonisation and Tabriz .....	208
5.3.2. The Qajar and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz .....	211
5.3.3. The Constitutional Revolution ( <i>Mashruteh</i> ) in Tabriz .....	217
<b>5.4. Pseudo-Modernist State and Modern Development of Tabriz .....</b>	<b>219</b>
5.4.1. The Pahlavi State .....	220
5.4.2. Contemporary Urban Changes in Tabriz .....	222
5.4.2.1. State and Emergence of New Social Classes in <i>Shahr</i> .....	223
5.4.2.2. State and Emergence of Modern Urban Development in Tabriz .....	224
<b>5.5. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>229</b>
5.5.1. The Historic City of Tabriz; a <i>Shahr</i> as Seat of State .....	231
5.5.2. The Modern development of Tabriz; Change as Spatial Segregation .....	233

### CHAPTER SIX: READINGS OF TABRIZ'S CITIZENS INTO THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction to Chapter Six .....	237
<b>6.1. Methodological Review of Survey .....</b>	<b>238</b>
6.1.1. PCT and People's Constructs Classification .....	240
6.1.2. The Method of PCT in Practice .....	242
6.1.3. Mass Questionnairng .....	243
<b>6.2. The Survey (Questionnaire) .....</b>	<b>244</b>
6.2.1. Surveying: Phase I .....	244
6.2.1.1. Interview .....	244
6.2.1.2. Element Elicitation .....	245
6.2.1.3. Construct Elicitation, Rating and Laddering .....	248
6.2.1.4. Analysis .....	248



6.2.2. Surveying: Phase II .....	251
6.2.2.1. Questionnaire .....	252
6.2.2.2. The Characteristics of Interviewers .....	254
6.2.2.3. The Characteristics of Respondents .....	254
<b>6.3. Components and Attributes of Urban Development .....</b>	<b>256</b>
6.3.1. Urban Spaces .....	257
6.3.1.1. Streets .....	257
6.3.1.2. Squares .....	260
6.3.1.3. Districts .....	263
6.3.2. City Authorities .....	264
6.3.2.1. Activities .....	264
6.3.2.2. Public Relations .....	266
6.3.2.3. Tendencies .....	268
6.3.3. People's Attitudes .....	271
6.3.3.1. Urban Culture .....	271
6.3.3.2. Environmental Behaviour .....	273
6.3.3.3. Paying City Costs .....	273
<b>6.4. Correlation between Constructs .....</b>	<b>274</b>
6.4.1. Correlation between Dimensions of Urban Spaces and City Authorities' Tendencies .....	274
6.4.1.1. Correlation between Street Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies .....	275
6.4.1.2. Correlation between Square Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies .....	276
6.4.1.3. Correlation between District Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies .....	277
6.4.2. Correlation between Rates of Citizen's Attitudes and City Authorities' Activities .....	278
6.4.3. Correlation between Rates of Citizen's Attitudes and City Authorities' Public Relations .....	279
<b>6.5. Conclusion .....</b>	<b>280</b>
6.5.1. State and Urban Spaces .....	281
6.5.2. State and Citizens' Attitudes .....	283
6.5.3. State, People and Urban Development .....	284
 <b>CONCLUSION</b>	
<b>Findings of the Approach of the Study:</b>	
Urban Spaces Concepts and Change in Iran .....	290
<b>Research Methodological Outcomes .....</b>	<b>294</b>
<b>Case Study Outcomes .....</b>	<b>296</b>
<b>Final Words:</b>	
The City ( <i>Shahr</i> ) as Social and Civil Life .....	297
 BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	301
<b>APPENDIX</b>	
Questionnaire .....	316

# LIST OF FIGURES

---

## Introduction

Figure (1)	A Pre-Modern Residential Cluster, Ameriha, Kashan	3
Figure (2)	Pre-Modern urban pattern of city of Shushtar, Iran .....	4
Figure (3)	Old urban pattern of the historic city of Yazd, Iran .....	5
Figure (4)	Old urban pattern of the historic city of Shiraz, Iran .....	5
Figure (5)	The Organisation of the Study .....	13

## Chapter Two

Figure (2. 1)	Representation of Carneiro's Theory on the Origin of States .....	46
Figure (2. 2)	The Moslem city as a collection of homogeneous areas .....	59
Figure (2. 3)	Public spaces in an Islamic city .....	60
Figure (2. 4a)	The Roman gridded city (colony) plan .....	62
Figure (2. 4b)	Intervention of Muslim dwellers .....	62
Figure (2. 4c)	Ultimate converted plan of the former Roman city .....	62
Figure (2.5)	Encroachments on the street, city of Tunis .....	63

## Chapter Three

Figure (3.1)	The Parthian City of Koi-Krylgan-Kala, in Kharazm, 400-100 BC, Reconstruction .....	93
Figure (3.2)	Plan of the Sassanian Ardashir-Khurreh (Firuzabad) City ....	95
Figure (3.3)	Diagram of a Ancient (Sassanian) Iranian City .....	111
Figure (3. 4)	Reconstruction of Baghdad, Iraq, at the time of al-Mansur. A.D. 762-7 .....	112
Figure (3.5)	Main Structure of Tehran after Building the New Wall in 1860-70s .....	123
Figure (3.6)	Plan of the Great Mosque of Isfahan .....	128
Figure (3.7)	Plan of the bazaar of Kashan .....	129
Figure (3.8)	Naqsh-i Jihan Square of Isfahan .....	131
Figure (3.9)	The pre-modernIranian city as seat of state .....	134

## Chapter Four

Figure (4.1)	Pre-modern urban pattern of city of Shushtar, Iran, and modern interferences .....	179
Figure (4.2)	Pre-modern fabric of the city of Hamadan and modern plan, 1930s .....	180
Figure (4.3)	Modern Central Square of the city of Hamadan .....	180

## Chapter Five

Figure (5.1)	Map of Northwest of Iran and Tabriz, its the most important city in this area .....	187
Figure (5.2a)	A <i>rasteh</i> (straight covered ways with shops along both sides) in the Bazaar of Tabriz .....	192
Figure (5.2b)	A <i>timcheh</i> (like <i>rasteh</i> but not as long as that; some wider and higher and for a more specific goods) in the Bazaar of Tabriz .....	192

Figure (5.3)	Tabriz Bazaar General Map	192
Figure (5.4):	Alishah Mosque, Tabriz .....	195
Figure (5.5):	Alishah Mosque from afar .....	196
Figure (5.6)	A Drawing of Tabriz by a Turk Traveller, 14th Century AD .....	196
Figure (5.7)	North Facade and Entrance of Blue Mosque, Tabriz .....	200
Figure (5.8)	North Facade and Entrance of Blue Mosque, Tabriz .....	200
Figure (5.9)	Plans of Four Main Mosques in Bursa, the Ottomans' first Capital .....	201
Figure (5.10)	Plan of Blue Mosque in Tabriz (1465) .....	201
Figure (5.11)	Sahib al-Amr <i>Maidan</i> (square), Tabriz, 15th century .....	202
Figure (5.12)	The Bazaar on the Bridge, Tabriz .....	204
Figure (5.13)	Map of Tabriz in the 18th Century, the final years of the Safavis .....	206
Figure (5.14)	Map of Tabriz, Dar al-Saltaneh, in 1880, Qajars time, drafted by Mohammad Reza Mohandess and Colonel Qaracheh-Daghi .....	213
Figure (5.15)	Maqsudie Quarter, Tabriz .....	214
Figure (5.16)	House of Amir Nezam, Tabriz .....	214
Figure (5.17)	<i>Kolah-Farangi</i> (villa) of Bagh-i Shomal, Tabriz .....	215
Figure (5.18)	Plan of Shah-Goli Palace .....	216
Figure (5.19)	Shah-Goli, Tabriz .....	216
Figure (5.20)	A house in the South of Tabriz .....	216
Figure (5.21)	A house in the Maqsudie quarter, Tabriz .....	217
Figure (5.22)	House of. Kouzekanani, Tabriz .....	218
Figure (5.23)	The Municipality Building of Tabriz, from the inside .....	225
Figure (5.24)	Perspective of Municipality Building of Tabriz .....	225
Figure (5.25)	Railway Station, a huge modern building .....	226
Figure (5.26)	Map of the historic core of Tabriz and modern interventions .....	226
Figure (5.27)	Map of the East part of Tabriz .....	227
Figure (5.28)	Main Square of a Modern Quarter, Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr) .....	228
Figure (5.29)	Main Square of the Modern Quarter, Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr); view of one of its streets .....	228
Figure (5.30)	A modern street in Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr) .....	228
Figure (5.31)	North view of Sahib al-Amr Square .....	231
Figure (5.32)	East view of Sahib al-Amr Square .....	231
Figure (5.33a)	Encroachments on the Sahib al-Amr Square, Tabriz .....	232
Figure (5.33b)	Encroachments on the Sahib al-Amr Square, Tabriz .....	232
Figure (5.33c)	Encroachments on the Sahib al-Amr Square, Tabriz .....	232
Figure (5.34)	Map of a part of the old fabric of Tabriz and modern interference .....	234
Figure (5.35)	Map of modern fabric of Tabriz, <i>Kuy-i Vali-Ahd</i> (Vali-i -Asr) quarter .....	234
<b>Chapter Six</b>		
Figure (6.1)	Emam Khomeini Street in the modern extended part of the city .....	258
Figure (6.2)	Emam Khomeini Street in the historic part of the city .....	258
Figure (6.3)	Shahrdari Square, Tabriz .....	261

# LIST OF TABLES

---

## Chapter One

Table (1.1)	Classifying the main philosophic approaches to space According to philosophers and theorists .....	23
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## Chapter Five

Table (5.1)	The estimated Population of Tabriz between 1000 and 1900 .....	211
Table (5.2)	Population growth in Tabriz compared to the other Largest cities in Iran (1900-1976) .....	223

## Chapter Six

Table (6.1)	General Characteristics of Respondents in the First Phase of Survey .....	244
Table (6.2)	Number of responses on people's favourite urban Elements .....	246
Table (6.3)	Some of the common constructs gained in the Phase I Interview (with 6 persons) .....	249
Table (6.4)	The mean of responses on rating Favourite and Non-favourite Elements of five urban subjects with elicited constructs .....	250
Table (6.5)	General Characteristics of Interviewers .....	254
Table (6.6)	Different Age Groups of Respondents .....	255
Table (6.7)	Different Educational Status Groups of Respondents .....	256
Table (6.8)	Different Occupation Groups of Respondents .....	256
Table (6.9)	Main street name and three reasons .....	258
Table (6.10)	Frequency of main city street reasons .....	259
Table (6.11)	The number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces attributes - streets .....	259
Table (6.12)	Main square name and three reason .....	260
Table (6.13)	Frequency of main city square reasons .....	262
Table (6.14)	Number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces attributes - squares .....	262
Table (6.15)	Three most important reasons for distinction of a city-district .....	263
Table (6.16)	The number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces attributes - districts .....	264
Table (6.17)	Responses on rating of people's views to the city Authorities activities .....	265
Table (6.18)	Number of responses on three kind of relations Between citizens and city authorities .....	266
Table (6.19)	Frequency and percent of reasons for people, not to object over the performance of city authorities .....	267



Table	(6.20)	Frequency and percent of reasons for 'non-appreciation' by people over the performance of city authorities .....	268
Table	(6.21)	City areas in which city authorities are seen to invest more and reasons for these choices .....	269
Table	(6.22)	Reasons of city governors' concentrations of Investment in the city .....	270
Table	(6.23)	Number of responses with the dimensions of city authorities tendencies .....	271
Table	(6.24)	The number of responses on agreement and Disagreement with people preferring their Interest for well-being of the city .....	272
Table	(6.25)	Number of responses on rating of peoples view and favourite with people urbanity vulture .....	272
Table	(6.26)	Number of responses on rating of people's views and favourites with people's participation in maintenance and cleanliness of the city .....	273
Table	(6.27)	Responses on rating of peoples' view and evaluation with the paying of city-costs .....	273
Table	(6.28)	Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities Investment patterns with dimensions of reasons for choice of street .....	275
Table	(6.29)	Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities' Investment patterns with dimensions of reasons for choice of square .....	276
Table	(6.30)	Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities' Investment patterns whit dimensions of reasons for concept of district .....	277
Table	(6.31)	Correlation (Pearson Coefficient) of attributes of Citizens' attitudes whit attributes of city authorities' Activities in Tabriz .....	278
Table	(6.32)	Correlation (Spearman Coefficient) of attributes of Citizens' attitudes with attribute of city authorities' public relations in Tabriz .....	280
Table	(6.33)	The number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces' components .....	281
Table	(6.34):	The number and percent of responses with the Dimensions of urban spaces' components .....	282
Table	(6.35)	The number of responses on agreement and Disagreement with the statement that urban Spaces belong to the state .....	282
Table	(6.36)	Number of responses on agreement and disagreement with the state realises city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs .....	286
Table	(6.37)	Number of responses on agreement and disagreement with the city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city .....	286

# LIST OF DIAGRAMS

---

## Chapter Three

Diagram (3.1)	The Social Formation of Pre-Modern Iran .....	100
Diagram (3.2)	The Iranian Social Formation in Qajar Time .....	121

## Chapter Four

Diagram (4.1)	The Iranian Social Formation Under Pahlavi up to 1941 .....	163
Diagram (4.2)	The Iranian Social Formation Under Pahlavi up to 1977 .....	165

## Chapter Six

Diagram (6.1)	The Comparison between the mean responses on rating Favourite and Non-favourite Elements of five urban subjects with elicited constructs .....	250
Diagram (6.2)	Components of People's Readings to Urban Development .....	251
Diagram (6.3)	Relations between dimensions of constructs attributes of people's reading and attitudes to urban development .....	285

# INTRODUCTION

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**Propounding the Subject**

**Identification of the Problem**

**Objectives**

**Research Strategy**

**Structure of the Research**

## Propounding the Subject:

In the modern era in Iran dramatic changes took place in the built environment in the typologies both of houses and public urban spaces. People now have different attitudes in these two main parts of their built environment, contrasting private spaces against public spaces. That this phenomenon is so widespread suggests that its underlying causes are layered in the historic process and that these have polarised between people, as lords of their houses, and the state, the lord of the city. The author realises this case is the historical outcome of the great impression of the state, as a historical system above the system of society in Iran, in structuring socio-spatial spaces.

The author believes that this shows that cities in Iran now are settlements in which cultural and social values are declining and whose people are becoming passive and irresponsible<sup>1</sup>. In this regard the authorities of almost all the cities increasingly advertise using the slogan: '*shahr-i ma khaneh-i ma*'<sup>2</sup>, 'our city as our home', without any tangible results. It seems that in Iran, the city is *not* home yet. These attitudes of people have, in the past decades, become the main focus of most research on Iranian architecture and urbanism. The author suggests that one important aspect of passiveness and irresponsibility might be the lack of any sense of belonging with urban spaces.

This research offers an understanding of the historic process and dramatic modern changes in urban spaces and patterns, such as establishing wide streets and huge traffic squares instead of narrow winding accesses and cul-de-sacs and constructing isolated


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<sup>1</sup> 'Responsible' means 'liable to be called to account as being in charge or control: answerable (for something)' (see Kirkpatrick, 1983), so responsibility relates to given rights and granted authorities and a sense of belonging might be the outcome of the responsibility. 'Irresponsible', therefore, implies a lack of rights that are the foundation for a feeling of belonging.

<sup>2</sup> '*Shahr*' (city) in Persian language means territory and *khaneh* (home) means 'world'. In Iranian culture, *khaneh* has an important position and people, rich or poor, pay great attention to their homes.



and open forms in contrast to pre-modern compact and enclosed forms. These changes have occurred in the house forming too. Historically, the inward looking style of Iranian architecture and consequent typology of the cities has had some influence (figure 1).



A- Entrance	C- Vestibule	E- Room	G- Main Room-Hall
B- Courtyard	D- Lobby	F- Veranda	H- Bath

Figure (1): A Pre-Modern Residential Cluster, Ameriha, in Kashan, Iran.

The traditional cluster with centripetal courtyard houses, the basic residential unit which comprises a group of houses around a cul-de-sac for security and facilitating social interaction between people of the cluster.

The hierarchy of accesses were: (A) small alley, the semi-public transitional space between the cluster and the city; (C) vestibule, the semi-private transitional space between the cluster and the alley; (D) lobby, the private transitional space between the house and cluster.

Enclosed, inward looking houses with extreme privacy was the prevailing typology of Iranian architecture in the pre-modern era.

Source: Based on Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, 1993: 38.

In the pre-modern era street and square design, compared to building design in Iran generally, was never a matter of great concern (e.g. see Tavassoli, 1992; Burchhart, 1976; Pope, 1965; and Pirbabaei, 1997). Thus one can find the inside of historic and traditional houses to be very complex, richly decorated and impressive, but from the outside, the *kucheh* (alley) and street, it is very simple and artless, lacking any sense of architectural celebration even at any opening bar the entrance doors. In many cases these entrances are not to a main, 'public' street as, for accessing some houses, the owners make use of narrow *kuchehs* as semi-public spaces, and their entrances are via these (see figures 1 and 2).



Figure (2): Pre-Modern urban pattern of city of Shushtar, Iran.

The traditional pattern of residential cul-de-sacs and sinuous, infrequent through-streets, bordered by the walls of inward looking courtyards houses.

Source: Kostof, 1992: 221.

This complex of the accesses, compact urban patterns and an inward looking architectural style is common throughout the many different types of climate in Iran: hot arid zones (e.g. see figure 3), hot humid zones, cold and alpine (mountainous) zones (e.g. see figure 4) and so on, and the evolution of this approach to building in Iran goes back to long before the Islamic era<sup>1</sup>.




Figure (3): Old urban pattern of the historic city of Yazd, Iran.

The city of Yazd is located in the hot arid zone and surrounded by a salt desert. Its religious background was Zoroastrian and the most important Holy Fire Place of this religion is located in this city.

Source: Tavassoli, 1989: 20.



Figure (4): Old urban pattern of the historic city of Shiraz, Iran.

The city of Shiraz is located in a mountainous zone and surrounded by gardens. Its religious background was Islam and one of the important holy Shi'ite shrines, Shah Cheragh, is located in this city.

Source: Tavassoli and Bonyadi, 1992: 71.

<sup>1</sup> There do exist some exceptions to an inward looking architecture. There are a few small towns such as Abyaneh in remote and isolated areas which have developed in their own ways, isolated from and free of influence of other parts of Iran. In these places people have developed their own unique mores, culture, architecture and urban image.

## Identification of the Problem

People's attitudes in the spaces offered by the built environment in the urban areas in Iran are irresponsible and they have become increasingly passive and negligent of their built environments. This is causing many problems in developing and governing these cities.

Ujam (1987) mentions that roots of the problem in such a case lie in the nature of the relationship between man and the ecological environment. Altman and Chemers (1980) argue that the phenomena of people, culture and the physical environment form a trio and can not be understood separately. People's carelessness to public urban spaces can also be related as an outcome of a historic process. Iranian architecture historically was an inward looking style architecture with meandering lines and accesses, a style adopted in various climatic zones and over ancient Zoroastrian to Islamic religion and culture. Almost by definition this neglected the design and visual formation of the exteriors of houses in preference to their interiors. Many researchers have located these origin phenomena of the inward looking architecture of Iran in their own specific field, be it ecology, culture, religion and so on.

Another important factor in the historical urban development of Iran has been the lack of stability and security in civil life. The capital of the country has been changed more than 30 times (see Kiani, 1995) and, in these shifts of power-centre, the rapid rise and development of a new capital and equally rapid and dramatic decline of the old one is a fact of Iranian history. The mechanisms of these discontinuities and changes influence people's attitudes on urban spaces.



Glancing at the history of Iran, it appears that one factor for the perseverance of an inward looking style of architecture is a politico-economic factor, as the power structure in Iran - one of despotic centralisation - has also been an historical constant, while the other factors such as religions, culture and even the climate remain variable. Even as rulers and dynasties have repeatedly changed, they have invariably ruled by this ancient and traditional system.

## Objectives

The author aims to explain the comparative historical stagnation of society and to analyse urban changes from this angle. The two main objectives of this thesis are **theoretical analysis of state influences on structuring and forming of urban spaces in Iran** and **examining people's perceptions and their attitudes to urban spaces**.

These serve to outline an approach to investigating **the meanings and changes of urban spaces in Iran**. Through this approach emerge models for:

- Analysing the historical obstacles to urban form development and change in pre-modern Iran;
- Analysing the instability and disruption wrought upon the evolution of urban form by changing the capital of the country, and by rapidly constructing and abandoning capital cities over different historic periods;
- Analysing the discontinuity of Iranian architecture and urbanism;
- Analysing the people's lack of the sense of belonging to urban spaces and commitment to development process in modern Iran;
- Exploring the meanings of main urban spaces for people and their attitudes to built environment development in modern Iran; and,

- Attempting to discover mechanisms of urban development based on the roles of both the state and the people in order to achieve desirable and continuous development in the urban areas. In other words to increase the role of people in the development of urban areas through public participation.

## Research Strategy

A research strategy is best understood as the pairing of a primary *research objective* and a specific *research method*. The three research strategies are: 'qualitative research' on the commonalties that exist across a relatively small number cases; 'comparative research' on the diversity that exist across a moderate number of cases; and, 'quantitative research' on the correspondence between two or more attributes across a large number of cases - *covariation* (Ragin, 1994).

The research objective is the interpretation of historically significant phenomena of state in forming urban spaces in Iran and the research method is qualitative comparative with case-oriented approach. This strategy is neither as fluid as qualitative research nor as fixed as quantitative research, but lies halfway between these two approaches and benefits from their different techniques in relevant circumstances.

Comparative analysis sharpens the author's understanding of the contexts in which more detailed causal inferences can be drawn. Without a knowledge of contexts, causal inference may pretend to a level of generality to which it is not entitled (see Skocpol, 1984). Comparative researchers focus explicitly on patterns of similarities and differences across a range of cases that are clearly bounded in time and space. This focus on circumscribed categories makes the comparative strategy well suited for the

goal of interpreting historically phenomena. Because this focuses on differences and similarities between cases and types, it facilitates historical interpretation (Ragin, 1994).

In comparative research the examination of diversity - patterns of similarities and differences - goes hand in hand with the study of causes. Generally, researchers expect different causal conditions to be linked to divergent outcomes in interpretable ways. Thus, the goal of the researcher's examination of patterns of similarities and differences is to identify casual links - how different *configurations* of causes produce different outcomes across the range of cases included in a study. The specification of different patterns of causation is the primary basis for the differentiation of types (Ragin, 1994). The comparative methods emphasis in examining causes and effects are on the analysis of configurations of causal conditions (Drass et al., 1989).

The subject of the thesis is complex and variant, so a qualitative comparative strategy with a case-oriented approach is applied to its investigation. The case-oriented approach uses theory to aid historical interpretation and to guide the identification of important causal factors; the variable-oriented approach, by contrast, usually tests hypotheses derived from theory. The history of urban change and the concepts and meanings of urban spaces in Iran, as the context, is given a reinterpretation using an approach concerned on the thesis subject, across historic and modern categories.

As a means of confirming the appropriateness of the approach and making contemporary inferences, a field case study, which focuses on people's perceptions and interpretations of the issues related to the research subject, is used. In theoretical induction, the interpretation and the facts are 'double fitted'. There is an interplay between the researcher's interpretation and the facts, an interaction that moves either

toward some sort of fit or toward a stalemate (see Ragin, 1994). Case study, ground work, interplay between evidence-based images and theoretical ideas expressed through analytic frames that leads to a progressive refinement of both. The case study was located in the city of Tabriz, a place which has been a capital city of the country in some historic periods of the empires in Iran (or Persia) and was the point of origin, and centre, of the Iranian Revolution of 1906. This city bears heavily the effects of history on its urban development, both in the pre-modern and modern periods, and therefore is a good case for the research subject.

A mixed methodology with two phases is used:

- Phase One: A repertory grid technique dependent upon Kelly's Personal Construct Theory approach (PCT) is used to gain the constructs of a group of six persons who live in the case study city (Tabriz); and,
- Phase Two: A questionnaire comprises some open-ended questions and two sub-sections using a semantic differential techniques on issues based on phase one. This is carried out on a large scale, involving 312 valid respondents.

## Structure of the Research

The layout of this thesis with case-oriented approach and the researcher as participant observer of the case in his life and his academic experience, consists of the introduction and three parts followed by the conclusion. This layout, the process of the research and its organisation, model of research are as follows:

**Part One**, in constructing analytical frameworks, is dedicated to a discussion of the theoretical perspectives of the research in order to identify its subject. Analytical



frameworks help the researcher see aspects of cases that might otherwise be overlooked, and direct his attention away from other aspects.

This part is presented in two chapters. Chapter One reviews the inquiries into the processes of structuring of urban spaces. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the various theoretic approaches on space from a philosophical point of view, and the influences of them on theories of urban space. The second chapter is dedicated to a theoretical explanation of the role of state in socio-spatial structuring. This is achieved through the review of the nature of state and its influence in social formation, in relation to spatial structuring in the Middle East. Historical changes to Iranian urban concepts are analysed from a politico-economic point of view and finally the theoretic approach of the research, **state-oriented socio-spatial structure of urban form**, is introduced.

**Part Two**, analytic induction of research, is dedicated to interpreting historically significant phenomena of state in forming socio-spatial patterns in Iran, to formulating and specifying the hypothetical statements of the research for defining in Part Three. This is based on the theoretical approach constructed in Part One such that the influence and role of the state in forming social structures - from the class and ethical point of view - and, as a result, social and urban spaces, is analysed.

To this end the historic concepts of state and urbanism in ancient and Islamic Iran are investigated in Chapter Three. The emergence of the pseudo-modernist state in modern Iran is reviewed in Chapter Four. In this chapter the modern concept of state and its influence on city forms and urban spaces concepts in modern Iran are studied.

**Part Three**, refinement of both theoretical approaches and analytic induction, is dedicated to define and examine the hypothesis of the research through the case study city of Tabriz. It develops a research design (historical review and questionnaire for contemporary analysing), data collection and it analyses the survey in a way dictated by the hypothesis.

The structuring of the urban spaces in Tabriz, the case study, is investigated using the theoretical approach developed in Chapter Five. Tabriz's citizens' readings into their urban environment was elicited through conducting a two-phase survey are explored in Chapter Six. Information on the constructs that used to perceive the built environment was gathered in the first phase then, in the second phase, this was used in a questionnaire addressed to a large scale sample.

**Conclusion**, as a theoretical and hypothetical reprise, looks at the consequences of history of urban change in Iran, reviews the methodological and theoretical findings of the research and looks at the efficacy of the approaches used in this investigation. The outcomes of groundwork, case study, reprises to form the basis for presenting the final finding of the thesis, recommendations, to achieving desirable and continuous development in the urban areas.

The **organisation** and process of the study and the method of the structuring of its parts and chapters are modelled in figure (5). The direction of the research is from *subject* (Part One) to *hypothesis* (Part Two) examining them in *case study* (Part Three) and reflecting again upon Part Two to clarify the *outcomes* of the thesis (Conclusion).

This organisation is based on the approach of the research, case-oriented approach, and the focus is on the context, case. It is possible to do analysing journey of the context through the theoretical approach, or doing this journey through the practical approach. The Conclusion contains the outcome of the whole of these perspectives of the study.




Figure (5): The Organisation of the Study.

Part One, identification of the subject, is analysing frame of the research; Part Two, specification of the hypothesis, is the context of the research; Part Three, definition the subject in groundwork, is the study of a specific case of the context; and, Conclusion is the synthesis of the research.

Source: The author

# PART ONE: IDENTIFYING THE SUBJECT

## **CHAPTER ONE: INQUIRIES INTO THE PROCESS OF URBAN SPACES**

- 1.1. Spatial Philosophising
- 1.2. Developing an Approach towards Researching Urban Spaces
- 1.3. Socio-Spatial Approach to Urban Form
- 1.4. Urban Form and Planning Theories
- 1.5. Conclusion

## **CHAPTER TWO: STATE AND SOCIO-SPATIAL STRUCTURING**

- 2.1. The Nature of State
- 2.2. State and Social Formation in the Middle East
- 2.3. State and Space Structuring in the Middle East
- 2.4. Politico-Economic Analysis of Historical Urban Concept Change in Iran
- 2.5. State-Oriented Socio-Spatial Structure of Urban Form

# 1

## INQUIRIES INTO THE PROCESS OF URBAN SPACES

### Introduction to Chapter One

#### 1.1. Spatial Philosophy

##### 1.1.1. Substantive View and Spatial Approach to Space

##### 1.1.2. Representational View and Spatial Representational Approach to Space

##### 1.1.3. Relational View and Relational / Non-Spatial Approach to Space

#### 1.2. Developing an Approach to Understanding Urban Spaces

##### 1.2.1. A Three-Step Approach

##### 1.2.2. Point

##### 1.2.3. Map

## CHAPTER ONE

### INQUIRIES INTO THE PROCESS OF URBAN SPACES


#### 1.3. Urban Form and Planning Process

##### 1.3.1. Spatial and Physical Form

##### 1.3.2. Organizational Structure and Planning Policy

##### 1.3.3. Urban Land Use and Urban Form

#### 1.4. Conclusion



# 1

## INQUIRIES INTO THE PROCESS OF URBAN SPACES

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### Introduction to Chapter One

- 1.1. Spatial Philosophising
  - 1.1.1. Substantive View and Spatial Approach to Space
  - 1.1.2. Epistemological View and Social (Aspatial) Approach to Space
  - 1.1.3. Relational View and Socio-Spatial (Non-Spatial) Approach to Space
- 1.2. Developing an Approach towards Researching Urban Spaces
  - 1.2.1. Cultural Theories on Urban Space
  - 1.2.2. Politico-Economic Theories on Urban Space
  - 1.2.3. Non-Spatial Sociological Theories
- 1.3. Socio-Spatial Approach to Urban Form
  - 1.3.1. Political Process of Social Space
  - 1.3.2. Social Organisation of Urban Space
- 1.4. Urban Form and Planning Theories
  - 1.4.1. Spatial and Aspatial Theories
  - 1.4.2. Organisation Structures and Planning Process
  - 1.4.3. Communicative Community Planning
- 1.5. Conclusion



## **Introduction to Chapter One**

This chapter focuses on space as the context in which urban forming takes place and explores some of the main approaches associated with the concept of that for understanding how urban spaces are structured. In this case various disciplines who concern with space by different perspectives including seeing space as a physical phenomenon, a condition of mind and a product of social processes are studied briefly.

Spatial philosophising is a response to the nature and condition of space. This debate, which is a theoretical and fundamental deliberation, while elucidating urban theories, helps to explain major questions of the research and the role of government in urban form. Here the philosopher's ideas in three approaches, including epistemology, relative and essential approaches are discussed, and urban theories from cultural and political economy to non-spatial sociology are examined.

A socio-spatial approach in this research is used to analyse urban formation and city form. This approach is used to examine the research subject matter, the state and urban form, through considering Lefebvre's notion of the political processes of social space forming and Giddens and Hillier's ideas on social organisation and social logic of urban space. Finally the planning and designing process as a constituent part of urban space production is discussed.

### **1.1. Spatial Philosophising**

Space is a complex concept. Keith and Pile suggest that it is rarely clear whether space is true, thoughtful, typical, metaphorical or something else (Keith and Pile, 1993: 1). And

Andru Sayer points out to mysterious aspect of space (Sayer, 1992: 147). Beside the philosophical, mental and psychological aspects of this concept, its relationship and linkage with other social and objective concepts only serves to add to this complexity and mysteriousness. In order to clarify the concept of space, the author first reviews the philosophical views and considers their effects on approaches to space.

Among various philosophical ideas about space, three approaches enjoy more reputation and importance. These three approaches, besides inspiring the thinkers and researchers of space and spatiality, also prepare the way for their criticism and, in some aspects, are a source for new conceptual frameworks. Afroogh (1998) classifies philosophical views into spatial, aspatial and non-spatial views and in this research these views are called spatial, social and socio-spatial approaches respectively.

### **1.1.1 Substantive Views and Spatial Approach on Space.**

One of the long-lasting philosophical debates has been that of the independent and substantive entity of space. The absolute position of space is mainly related to Descartes, father of modern philosophy and, to some extent, to Newton in the 17th century. In Newton's thought, space is limitless and antecedent, that is, an empirical evidence for an omnipresent God. From a Newtonian classical view point, time and space (like other things) are objective entities. These things are prior to evolution and their effects on each other are through force.

Substantive dualism is among the most significant philosophical legacies of Descartes. He believed that, because we recognise substance through two relatively different attributes, that is, thought and expansion, naturally there should be two different substances as well:



spiritual and material. Descartes assumed the dual substances to be independent from each other and the cognition of each one to be bound by its own special rules. The separation of theology and science is one of the consequences of this dualism in Descartes' thought. Science can examine the physical nature of objects. The special attribute which separates spiritual and material substances, is expansion and spatial expansion is also the same expansion of other material properties (Stumpf, 1989: 236-46).

In general, an absolute concept of space assumes the space as continuous, quantitative, penetrable and stable, independent from other subjects and possessing an independent existence. In this position, space is a passive territory, an environment or context for things and interactions among them (Massey, 1993: 151). This space can be empty and other subjects repose in it (Keith et al., 1993: 2). In science, space is inherently an independent variable that can play an important role in shaping attitudes, behaviours and social processes. Substantive contact with space takes the position that the space has a determinative content and can autonomously be the cause for specific events. Space is independent and possesses a causal force. On the base of this approach, all biological, geographical, sexual, racial, and behaviouralistic determinism, and to some extent, socio-biological explanations are subject to spatial reasoning (Afroogh, 1998).

### **1.1.2. Epistemological View and Social (Aspatial) Approach to Space**

In the epistemological view, space and time have neither substantive nor adventitious existence. Kant points out that space is prior or antecedent to cognition, a subjective matters which enables cognition (Urry, 1987: 21). Space and time are instruments for classifying phenomena and are completely separated from empirical territory. Space and time along with other concepts, like reasoning, necessity, unity and plurality, are subjective forms,

which have been existed in advance in our mind. The special activity or role of the mind is the unification of experience. The mind gains this unification by first imposing special forms of intuition, that is space and time, to different experiences. We therefore inevitably understand phenomena in a way so that they exist in space and time. But space and time are neither the concepts, nor the ideas, which have resulted from experience. Space and time can be compared to lenses through which we witness empirical subjects (Stumpf, 1989: 308).

In a social/aspatial approach, depending on epistemological approach, the effects of space are rejected and mental, cultural, social, political and economic factors are considered as the important ones. In this approach, space is not something outside and prior to society, but is something caused by the society, and all spatial relations and processes are indeed social relations. Castells believes that space is one of the major and material dimensions of any society. Spatial forms, at least on the earth, are produced by human action (Castells, 1983: 27).

### **1.1.3. Relational View and Socio-Spatial (Non-Spatial) Approach to Space.**

Space in relational thought is a relative issue and a way of knowing the relationships among elements of physical world. Space can only exist as a relation among things. This relative approach of space is mainly related to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the philosopher of 17th century (see Blackburn, 1996: 216 and Benjamin, 2000: 108). Leibniz does not consider a reality for time space or any other dimensions and argues that space and time are abstractive and creations of the human mind. Space is the existent order and arrangement of objects to each other, an order of succession and time is the sequential arrangement of being existent. In other words, when one sees the object, Leibniz asserts that one is also aware of the space

that the object occupies. Thus, the dimension or space is an image that comes to ones mind, and the time as also a relational issue that the origin of its abstraction, as existence and non existence of the objects and their properties. Therefore, space and time are the result and effect of substance and not the prior cause to substance, just as a number is the result of units and has no reality by itself.

Space without units has no reality by itself and space without objects is nothing. It only comes into existence as a possibility to place the objects and if some statements denote certain attributes to space, logically these attributes could be diminished to merely being the relations between things (Urry, 1987: 21).

Realists and dialecticians offer some fascinating views in this regard. Saunders (1981: 275), a realist theoretician, suggests that things possess causal forces whose fulfilment is dependent upon interrelationships with other things and with other attributes and other causal forces. From this angle, space is not a container of social relations and not a subject which interacts with other social processes but an expression of the conditional relationships among social affairs. In other words, space is the conditional dimension of social organisation.

Duncan (1989: 230) defends the relational situation logic on space in this regard. According to this logic, space is not a thing or a substance, but can only be present as a relationship among things (trees, people, cities and etc.). Without these things there is no spatial relationship, and equally no independent space can be present. But although space comes into existence through physical and social things, it does not mean that the effects of this spatial relation can be simply changed to causal effects among these things. As spatial

relations resulting from things can affect the position and the method of relation among these things conditional spatial relations are vital to manifest these forces and the location of this manifestation among other conditions (ibid.: 230). So, as Saunders points out, space should be sought in empirical researches as a conditional factor, and not as a factor upon whose causal forces and generalisations can theorisation be possible (Saunders, 1981: 287).

Urry (1987: 24), another realist thinker, while rejecting substantive position and the views of individuals who believe in the interaction of society and space, suggests that space is a set of relations among different entities and not a substance. Therefore it is a mistake that say that society and space have similarities. Society is a substance with a set of relations, while the same is not true with space. Time and space occupy variable and complex relations in analysis. They recognise complex relations in analysis. They recognise empirical events, the structure of causal productive entities, and the interrelationships among these entities (ibid.: 26).

Doreen Massey, inspired by relationships between the time and space in Einstein's Theory of General Relativity, suggests that there is no absolute dimension of space. Spatial existence depends on the inter relationships of things. To actualise the space, at least two components need to exist. In other words, space is not absolute, but relational. It is not the interrelationship among things that accrue in time and space, but the relations cause and define time and space themselves (Massey, 1993: 152). In table (1.1) the main approaches discussed above are classified and according to philosophers and theoreticians are presented.

Table 1.1: Classifying the main philosophic approaches to space according to philosophers and theorists

	<i>Philosophy</i>	<i>Philosophers</i>	<i>Space Theories</i>	<i>Theorists</i>
1	Substantive	Descartes, Newton, etc.	<b>Spatial</b>	Berry, Bartels, etc.
2	Epistemological	Kant, Marx, etc.	<b>Social (Aspatial)</b>	Castells, Harvey, etc.
3	Contingtive	Leibnitz, ....., etc.	<b>Socio-Spatial (Non-Spatial)</b>	Sayer, Lefebvre, Saunders, Soja, etc.

Source: Based on Afroogh 1998

In this study as a basic theory on analysing the forming of urban spaces the author chooses the socio-spatial view as mentioned above for the purpose of examining the thesis's hypothesis. The socio-spatial view is a genuine category of research, not a joining of two existing categories, spatial and social views of space.

1.2. Developing an Approach towards Researching Urban Spaces

For defining a proper theoretical approach to searching the research problem the main philosophical approaches to space in three categories examined above. Urban theories analyse different aspects and complex characterises of urban spaces, and the way that the relations of spatial matters with social processes are presented mainly in the form of specific approaches and attitudes which depend on a physical view on space. In this regard, different divisions and paradigms have been brought up that, regarding the method of this research, the author considers more comprehensive theories concerned with urban spaces in their general contexts as well. In the approach of ‘spatialism’ the author takes the ‘culturalist’ approach, in a ‘social’ approach also considers the ‘political economy’ and finally the ‘socio-spatial’ approach, which in this field can be regarded as ‘non-spatial



sociology', is assessed. These approaches help the author in defining the socio-spatial research approach to respond to the way relations exist between spatial matters and social processes.

### **1.2.1. Cultural Theories on Urban Space**

In cultural approach the city is considered as a cultural mould, and the population as an independent variable and a key in urban discussions. It believes that the personality of urban residents and their mode of social relations is arisen from the city, and considers the city or urban structure as the creator of values, attitudes and specific behaviours or in other words a mode of life, or a special cultural form. This special mode of life can include the nature of experiences and human awareness and behaviour, or new forms of social organisation (Flanagan, 1999: 342). In this point of view the city is seen as a collection of symbolic artefacts arranged in space and this influences and maintains its specific society. This is therefore a substantive spatial viewpoint.

Siemmler (quoted by Afroogh, 1998), one of the culturalistic scientists, assumes that the evolutionary characteristic of modern culture is the dominance of the objective spirit over the subjective one. He emphasises the impacts of the metropolis as an independent variable which goes beyond the physical territory of the city and influence the psychological foundations of individual and human culture. He also says that in some circumstances we aware of some backwardness in individualistic culture from the spiritual point of view elegance and idealism. Because the division of labour demands ever greater achievement in the individual and the most progress unilaterally in an occupation, the weakness and poorness of the individual personality is caused. In any rate the individual can less and less encounter with objective culture and he converts to an unimportant quantity. The individual

changes to a nut and screw in the great organisation of things and power, which ravish all the progress spirituality and value from his hand to convert them from their subjective form to a complete objective mode of life. Here, the buildings, educational institutions and social formations like government institutions appear in the form of an immovable general spirit so terrible and comprising that the personality can not stand against its influence (see Afroogh, 1998).

Louis Wirth also assumes the city to be a mode of life and, with some reforms to Siemml's approach, he points to three important landscapes of the city: the human ecological landscape; the organisational landscape related social relations; and the socio-psychological landscape, which witnesses the personality of individuals. In his belief, these three landscapes fulfil each other. Also from his point of view, the city can be defined as a large settlement densely populated comprising of heterogeneous people (Wirth, 1938).

### **1.2.2. Politico -Economic Theories on Urban Space**

In the political economy approach, following the epistemological point of view to the analysis of urban problems, wider discussions which refer to the political and economic dimensions and the relation resulting from it become relevant. This approach was brought up in the school of thought of structuralism, and recognises cities and urban phenomena as a parts of a more expansive society and as manifestation of wider political and economic relations. Thus for a deep and more logical recognition of urban problems, the whole society that is part of the city should be examined. In this approach the city is the focal point of wealth and social status and a product of capital accumulation.

On the thinkers on the political economy of space, Saunders (1981) points to two schools of thought that is, humanism and determinism. He puts Henry Lefebvre as a humanist and Castles and Harvey as determinists. The humanistic approach looks at urban problems from the angle of urban community limitations for freedom and self-actualisation and considers urban crises, referred to developed capitalism, as basic and fundamental. The deterministic approach rejects looking at man as a metaphysical existence and considers urban crises in relation to class struggles in industry as secondary importance. While the first one emphasises on the production of space (a way in which capitalist organisation expands and overshadows all aspects of social life) and naturally on the need for the expansion of new forms of struggle against the dominance of spatial capitalism, the latter considers the urban problems as important when urban crises stimulate movements against capitalist industrial production.

The political and strategic approach of Lefebvre in relation to space and also his attitude to the city as an ideological unit is also so called politico-economic but, not as the same as the pure epistemological point of view, therefore it is analysed with other socio-spatial theories.

### **1.2.3. Non-Spatial Sociological Theories**

The non-spatial view on urban sociology, by presenting a half-way approach, gives a reliable answer to theoretical questions on the way spatial matters are related to social processes. According to Saunders (1981: 242), two lines of thought, separate but related to each other, about the axis of the role of space in social analyses can be brought up. The first approach reveals the theoretical status of the role of space in the process of accumulation and circulation of capital and the reconstruction of capitalism, and the other tries to deal with space as an element resulting from social interactions.

In non-spatial theories, space is neither a container for social relations nor a subject that interacts with social processes, but is a conditional expression among social subjects. Although space has inherently no independent impact, the spatial arrangement of social things can affect social relations (Taylor, 1989: 263). That is, the fulfilment of inherent causal attributes of things is conditioned. According to this approach space is the conditional dimension of social organisation. The inherent tendencies of things urban merely put in specific spatial relations and connections to each other are matured and reach fulfilment.

### 1.3. Socio-Spatial Approach to Urban Form

This section intends to specify a socio-spatial approach to analyse urban form. There is a sociological problem associated with the question of spatial forms, and this concerns the effects of moral density on patterns of social relationships. The spatial structure of the city articulated with its social organisation. In this regard Park maintains that: "The structure of the city has its basis in human nature, of which it is an expression" (Park, 1952: 16). Madanipour mentioned that "only a combination of social and physical dimensions of space, of objects and people, will offer us a balanced view of the structures of urban space, despite the complexity that such a combined view asks for. A socio-spatial viewpoint, in which these two dimensions with their complexities are intermeshed, will allow us to see how spatial structures express the social formations as well as affecting them" (Madanipour 1996: 62).

Soja describes his theoretical model of *Thirdspace* as "a creative recombination and extension, one that builds on a Firstspace perspective that is focused on the 'real' material world and a Secondspace perspective that interprets this reality through 'imagined' representations of spatiality" and the *Thirdspace* perspective as a "multiplicity of *real-and-*

*imagined place*” (Soja 1996: 6). In Beno Werlen’s explanation, space is neither a thing nor a prior concept, but is a framework and a reference for material aspects of social actions and a formal concept which implies a sort of classification to enable us to describe specific orders of material things with reference to their particular dimensions (Werlen 1993). Beno Werlen influenced by three world's theory of Karl Popper (objective world, subjective world and symbolic world) found his theory. According to this theory, every human action has a material, a subjective and a socio-cultural element (Afroogh, 1998). Therefore considering one element as the determinative factor is misleading and irrelevant.

The principal issue of socio-spatial approach is connecting the notion of human action with structural explanation in which socio-spatial systems are produced and reproduced in interaction. As Giddens (1979) argues: “The major theme in order to show the interdependence of action and structure is the necessity to grasp the space-time relations inherent the constitution of all social interaction” (ibid.: 3). Such an involving of social systems as situated in space-time can be effected by regarding structure as non-spatial and non-temporal as a virtual order of differences produced and reproduced in social interaction.

In case of the link between parts and whole, local and global, or meaning and social practice, Giddens (1979: 69) mentions that this relates to the “fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency”, in other words the structural properties of socio-spatial systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems. All social actors have some discursive penetration of the socio-spatial to whose reproduction they contribute in their socio-spatial practices.



Human societies build their spatial environments in order to construct a spatial structure. The most fundamental properties of cities are their ordering of space into programmed systems with shifting relations in time and space and embodying social purposes. Thus a city is, after all, so much more than a material artefact. It is social relations, psychological states, cultural milieu and its material form become an epiphenomenon, or a by-product of these dynamic processes (Hillier, 1989). In fact, an ordered spatial milieu is a constructed spatial structure. It produces and reproduces not only *actual* social relations but also *the principles for ordering social relations* (ibid.). Hence space is not simply a function of the principles of the social reorganisation but an intrinsic aspect of it. It seems that **the best key to the spatial structure of the city might be the generative rules underlying the material form, rather than simply the form itself** (see Islami, 1998).

### 1.3.1. Political Process of Social Space

In 'The Production of Space' Henri Lefebvre, the French theoretician pursues putting together subjective, physical and social space. In other words he seeks the combination of theory and practice, social and mental, and philosophy and reality (see Lefebvre 1991). On the importance of spatial dimension he writes: "Social relations of production have just social existence, when exists from a spatial point of view. This relationship, shows it off in space, encircles itself in the space which has already produced, because, if not, it remains in a pure abstraction" (Lefebvre, 1991: 152).

The production of space tells that, as soon as is produced, it divulges effects and reasons. Lefebvre considers the space as having neither a subjective nor an objective existence, but as a social reality. In his explanation space is a set of relations and social forms, a social production (ibid.: 116). Any mode of production possesses its own special space and the

transmission from one mode of production to another requires the production of a new space. As soon as it is possible, this new space becomes the messenger of the mode of production of its own.

Lefebvre, further claims that the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action, that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, hence of domination. Social space contains - and assigns (more or less) appropriate places to - 1) the social relations of reproduction, such as bio-physiological relations between the sexes and between age groups, along with the specific organisation of the family; and 2) the relations of production, i.e. the division of labour and its organisation in the form of hierarchical social functions. The two sets of relations of production and reproduction are inextricably bound up with one another (ibid.: 26, 32).

Edvard Soja, inspired by Lefebvre, considers spatiality as a social product. In his explanation spatiality is an inseparable element of material structure and structuration of social life. This means that space can be understood and theorised in abstraction from the society and social relations (Soja, 1987: 92).

Doreen Massey, while accepting the view that space is a social factor, responds that the community is a spatial factor, as well. Space has a role and spatial organisation of the society plays a role in functional position of the society. In her interpretation, if spatial organisation plays a role in the way of functioning of the society and its evolution, space and territory of residency would have a role in production of history and potentially in politics (Massey, 1993:145). She conceptualises space at the end as an outcome of social relations, and adds that, therefore, space is naturally full of power and symbolism, a

complex network of the relations between the winner and the loser, co-operation and unity. In Massey's (1993: 156) interpretation, this aspect of space has been remind as power geometry.

According to Lefebvre space, is a social and political product (Lefebvre, 1978: 341) and "every society produces a space, it own space" (Lefebvre, 1991: 31). He maintains that space is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been political and strategic. Space has been shaped and moulded from historical and natural elements, but this has been a political process; it is *political* and *ideological*. It is a product literally filled with ideologies. 'What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space that it describes? ... What would remain of a religious ideology - the Judaeo-Christian one, say - if it were not based on places and their names: church, confessional, altar, sanctuary, tabernacle? ... What we call ideology only achieves consistency by intervening in social space and in its production, and by thus taking on body therein (Lefebvre, 1978: 44). In this regard Braunfels says: "Cities designed themselves as reflection of forms of government and ideals of order" (Braunfels 1988). Bruno Zevi, the twentieth century Italian architect, tells us that the physical structure of the city is an indicator of its political status (French, 1983: 1).

### 1.3.2. Social Organisation of Urban Space

Madanipour (1996) says that Giddens argues that social structures, as recursively organised sets of rules and resources, refer to structural properties of social systems. The structures, whose transmutation or continuity leads to reproduction of social systems, are not external to individuals and exert constraining as well as enabling powers upon them. There is a process of 'double involvement' of individuals and institutions: "we create society at the same time as we are created by it" (Giddens, 1982: 14). Spatial form can be seen to be the result of deeper

concerns, as Siegfried Kracauer (1998: 60) acknowledges spatial images are the dreams of society. Wherever the hieroglyphics of any spatial image are deciphered, there the basis of social reality presents itself.

Bill Hillier (1989) describes the city or the built environment as a number of relationships between its spaces. Generally, our environment consists of a series of relationships between the various elements and human beings. These relationships in the physical environment are primarily spatial, as well as being orderly. Basically, objects and people are related through separation in and by, space. Further more, psychological, social and cultural characteristics are often expressed among people in spatial terms. Space, in fact, can be experienced as having three dimensions: the relationships, links and distances between people; between things; and between people and things. In other words, spatial organisation is a fundamental aspect of environmental design.

Hillier et al. (1984: X-XI) about his theory mention that: "The aim of the social logic of space is outlining a new theory and method for the investigation of the society-space relation which takes account of these underlying difficulties. First, it attempts to build a conceptual model within which the relation can be investigated on the basis of the social content of spatial patterning and the spatial content of social patterning. Second, it tries to establish, via a new definition of spatial order as restrictions on a random process, a method of analysis of spatial pattern, with emphasis on the relation between local morphological relations and global patterns. On this basis, it establishes a descriptive theory of how spatial pattern can, and does, in itself carry social information and content".

Hillier's work philosophically concerns the influence of different socio-economic systems on urban form. Hillier believes that designers have a conceptual problem, in that they lack the techniques and concepts to describe and investigate the varieties of spatial order found in cities. Since they can not understand an area's spatial logic they can not understand its 'social logic' (Hillier et al., 1984: 9). Space is not simply a *function* of the *principles of the social reorganisation*, but an *intrinsic aspect* of it, a *necessary part of the social programming* (Hillier, 1989). There is no doubt that cities do express *social meaning* through their *appearances*. The ordering of space in built forms is really about the ordering of relations between people: "Architecture is not a 'social art' simply because buildings are important visual symbols of society, but also because, through the ways in which buildings, individually and collectively, create and order space, we are able to recognise society, that it exists and has a certain form" (Hillier et al., 1984: 1).

Hillier et al. (1984: 8) argue: "The semiologists for the most part are attempting to show how buildings represent society as signs and symbols, not how they help to constitute it through the way in which the configuration of buildings organise space. They are in effect dealing with social meaning as something is added to the surface appearance of an object, rather than something that structures its very form".

#### **1.4. Urban Form and Planning Theories**

Lynch defines urban form as the "spatial arrangement of physical structures and spaces, and of localised activities and flows at the scale of the community or urban region" (Lynch 1990: 458). He argues that "Size, density, grain, outline, pattern - all are basic aspects of the city's physical form" (ibid.: 46) and that city form must be significantly relevant to the attainment of these objectives (ibid.: 433). Lozano (1990) argues that: "Community form is the result of a



process in which different urban elements are combined into coherent patterns. Thus, it is possible to identify both the urban elements that combine to form communities and their laws of aggregation. From this point of view, community design can be interpreted as dealing with decisions at two levels: at the level of urban elements and at the level of aggregation” (Lozano 1990: 68).

Urban planning has been evolving as an art and a science for almost 6000 years from the city-states of Assyria to the redevelopment of today's central cities (Catanese, 1980: 3). Planning is part of the process of the production of space and also shaping and managing community environments. Lefebvre criticises the standard science of urban planning that looks at space as a pure subject matter and gives it an objectivity using mathematical paradigms, and ignores the inherently political and ideological nature of it (Saunders, 1981). In this regard Lozano (1990: 78) argues that: “urban planning and community design are internal factors in the urban system; they are intrinsic to the social, political, and economic subsystems of the city”. This point of view is extremely important, because it locates planners and designers, mentally, within the system, not outside of it.

#### **1.4.1. Spatial and Aspatial Theories**

From the theoretical approach of the research presented above it may be accepted that urban planning theory divides into spatial and aspatial categories which, although interdependent, are different. McConnel (1980: 64) mentions that spatial theories were about spaces and what happened within them; that is they were concerned, usually implicitly, with land, buildings, transport routes and their use and relationships. But he emphasises human beings and their activity systems do not behave in predictable patterns, like chemicals. Thus it is

that most aspatial theories *in* (rather than for planning, as emphasised by McConnell) planning are explanatory rather than predict-normative (McConnell, 1980: 65).

In other words as Feldt (1988: 43) says, there are two major types of planning theories: those which attempt to explain how social systems operate and those which seek to provide tools and techniques for controlling and changing social systems. The first type, *theories of system operation*, draws heavily upon a number of the traditional academic disciplines, for no single discipline is broad enough to encompass all important aspects of a social system. The second type, *theories of system change*, derives much of its background and techniques from applied disciplines, such as public administration and engineering, as well as from some of the more traditional disciplines (Feldt, 1988: 43).

#### **1.4.2. Organisation Structures of the Planning Process**

The city is generally understood as a dynamic process and a structure in continuous change, which is shaped by many forces. Even those aspects that are influenced by a human agency derived that influence from a great variety of sources: clients, designers, investors, local authorities, government controls and different professional bodies. This is apparent whether it is the design of a building that is being considered, or the design of a region. There should, therefore, be no surprise in learning that, within the plethora of pushes and pulls out of which places are formed, it is not uncommon for the views and experiences of the people who will eventually live and work in those places to be ignored (Canter, 1988).

Society has been disturbed by many factors imposed on its system of communication with the environment. An approach based on strengthening the communication between people and

their environment may help to enhance environmental communication through participation (Assi, 1998).

The experience of advocacy planning in the 1969s and the discovery of the limits of rational, long-range, allocative planning highlighted the need to elicit community and citizen participation from those to be affected by its results. Subsequent, and growing, attention to planning processes and to organisational structures and their functioning definitively established by the 1980s the need to involve people in various aspects of the planning process including decision making, analysis, and policy formulation.

Some theories also suggest that participation may have psychological benefits for the individual participant. The claim is that participation, by providing a mechanism for citizen input into policy formulation, promotes a feeling of control (Peatie, 1986; and Zimmerman et al., 1988). The people themselves are sensitive to an increasing necessity to influence the formulation and carrying out of plans that before were made on their behalf, and to do so they have to intervene with the planning process. "Freire's work on education (1981), Friedmann's writing on transactive planning (1981), and Forester's work (1982) established some of the theoretical bases for this. Korten's discussion (1980) of learning-process approach provided some methods, as does Schoen's work (1983) on reflection in practice" (Dandekar 1988: 79).

Stringer (1977) identifies three style of participation, which are related to the theory of personal constructs. In the first, the role of the user is limited to accepting the idea which the expert has of the design. In the second, the user takes on a more active role and tries to impose his own point of view on the designers. In the third, the idea of the user and the designer form an active part of the finished product, both being modified in the process. To Stringer (1982)

and Lawrence (1982), however, true participation is characterised by this last ‘interactive’ style.

### 1.4.3. Communicative Community Planning

Communicative community planning emphasises local planning through the collaboration of its members, stakeholders of the community. Participants in this seek to give each other respect and to follow routines which give space for everyone.

Human consciousness is socially constructed and formed in interaction with others. Through these interactions, people develop ideas of responsibilities towards others, as part of their constitution of themselves (Jurgen Habermas in Healey, 1997: 50). People should be considered as the main part of the process of urban evolution. Giddens (1997) believes, that they are culturally made or socially constructed, and at the same time makers of cultures and social structures. But this is by no means a passive process. Without their active work, the structuring forces and the abstract systems of their lives would not exist. People themselves make them.

Healey (1997) mentions that we must construct our ways of validating claims, identifying priorities, and developing strategies for collective action *through interaction*, through debate. These debates too are social constructions. It is this idea that underpins Habermas' *theory of communicative action* with its *communicative ethics*. This focuses on how political communities communicate in public arenas, how participants exchange ideas, sort out what is valid, work out what is important, and assess proposed courses of action. In this conception, planning becomes a process of interactive collective reasoning, carried out in

the medium of language, in discourse. Habermas argues that it is through communicative efforts that cultures and structures are formed and transformed (see Healey, 1997: 53).

Planning activity may be seen as providing a locale within which people act in constrained situations. They may merely play out well-established organisational routines. But they may seek to change them, shifting policies, or altering processes. When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contributions in the design, construction, or management of their housing, both this process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being. When people, on the other hand, have no control over, nor responsibility for, key decisions in the housing process dwelling environments may instead become a barrier to personal fulfilment and a burden on the economy (Turner, 1972: 250).

People might be different individually and in their resources and opportunities, but they are assumed to inhabit a common moral and perceptual world, a common *habitus*, nevertheless co-exist in shared spaces, in which ‘everyone knew their place’. The word ‘community’ is not merely synonymous for ‘the people who live in an area’. It brings with it firstly the image of an integrated place-based social world. Secondly, it carries connotations of community in opposition to business or government. The discourse community can be said by this by this time to have collaboratively chosen a strategy, over which they are then likely to have some sense of ‘ownership’. A new ‘cultural community’ has been formed around the strategy (Healey, 1997: 279).



### 1.5. Conclusion

The conceptual analysis of space and its production process, although it occupies all parts of our lives encounters immediate complexities and difficulties. In addition to the philosophical, mental and psychological dimensions of space, its relation and linkage to other objective, social, and ideological concepts only increases this intricacy.

According to relational approach, space can only exist as a relation among things; without different things there would be no spatial relation. Taking inspiration from this approach the author considers space as conditional, additional and empirical aspect of social organisation and adopts the socio-spatial approach in this research. Understanding of urban space will need to take into account its physical, social and symbolic simultaneously. All the different social forms and processes, from the spatial point of view, are distinguished from each other and possess their own location emergence; different social behaviours at various levels require their own specific space. It is not possible in each spatial context to be assured of any behaviour and it is equally impossible to understand spatial structure and context without its social relations and processes. This brings the social space into existence and, in turn, affects the consequences and way of functioning of social relations and processes through carrying social relations and processes.

Space is a refereed framework for material aspects of social actions, by which related material entities which have impacts on actions, can be reconstructed and locationally be reasoned. Action framework which is made from social point of view, is not a spatial cause, as this framework is the product of the action and finds its meaning through special motivations and under specific social and mental circumstances. Thus regarding the importance of social interactions in producing and reproducing social space, and bearing in


mind the arguments of Werlen (1993: 147), social space can be oriented around actions, which have three elements of material, mental and socio-cultural. Author has examined confluent way of these elements and relative importance of each one by referring to different paradigms.

The author's conceptualisation of space in a dynamic urban settlement is as an *action-oriented social construct* that is not independent from either substantive nor epistemological influences. It is intend a fusion of these two paradigms. In the context of the relationship between state and people it is now possible to assess how social patterns give rise to specific urban patterns and how these, in turn, influential to society. In the case of Iran in particular this allows the author to analyse and investigate urban form and cities spatial concepts.

# STATE AND SOCIO-SPATIAL STRUCTURING

## CHAPTER TWO

### STATE AND SOCIO-SPATIAL STRUCTURING



# 2

## STATE and SOCIO-SPATIAL STRUCTURING

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### Introduction to Chapter Two

#### 2.1. The Nature of State

##### 2.1.1. The Origin of the States

##### 2.1.2. State in the Islamic Era

##### 2.1.3. The Modern State

#### 2.2. State and Social Formation in the Middle East

##### 2.2.1. Social Stratification in the Middle East

##### 2.2.2. Power and Class Analysis in the Middle East

#### 2.3. State and Space Structuring in the Middle East

##### 2.3.1. State and Urbanisation in the Middle East

##### 2.3.2. Urban Spaces Forming in the Middle East

##### 2.3.3. Concepts of Urban Spaces in the Middle East

#### 2.4. Politico-Economic Analysis of Historical Urban Concept Change in Iran

##### 2.4.1. Political Economy of Iran

##### 2.4.2. Feudalism and Capitalism Concepts

###### 2.4.2.1. Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities

###### 2.4.2.2. Assessment of Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities

##### 2.4.3. Exogenous Development Concepts

###### 2.4.3.1. Exogenous Urban Development Theories

###### 2.4.3.2. Analysis of Exogenous Urban Development Theories

##### 2.4.4. Rent Capitalism Concept in Iranian Urbanism

###### 2.4.4.1. Rent Capitalism Theory and Urban Development

###### 2.4.4.2. Analysis of the Rent Capitalism Theory on Urban Development

##### 2.4.5. Urban Region Model

###### 2.4.5.1. Urban Region Theory of Urbanisation

###### 2.4.5.2. Analysis of the Urban Region Theory

#### 2.5. State-Oriented Socio-Spatial Structure of Urban Form

## **Introduction to Chapter Two**

In the Middle East and Iran in particular, the concepts of urban spaces and state have unusual, defining characteristics. In this regard, the role of the state in the social construction and therefore, spatial reorganisation is hugely significant. The history of Iranian cities has been heavily involved with political issues to the extent that the growth or the decline of a city has had a direct relationship to political decisions. For defining this relationship a conceptual and analytical model of space and its production processes formulated in chapter one that focused on linkages to other objectives, social and ideological concepts. This chapter investigates the relationship between 'urban spaces', 'social forms' and 'state' as a basic cause in forming and shaping the both social and physical contexts in Iran.

### **2.1. The Nature of the State**

There are a number of reasons for the importance of the state in social life. On a very practical level, it is difficult to imagine of life without state. Vincent (1987: 2) mentions that statehood not only represents a set of institutions but also a body of attitudes, practices and codes of behaviour, in short civility, which are associated with civilisation. Social life begins and ends within its confines. State is neither a neutral institution which one can afford to ignore nor has it arisen out of pure chance or accident. Concepts of society, community, nation, government law, rights and so on, are interrelated by nature of the state. Thus it would be an essential preliminary to any study of such concepts to gain some familiarity with concepts of state. However, much of the state's form and structure can only be understood by studying the political contexts of societies. It is the most problematic concept in politics.



The word politics derives from the Greek word *polis*, basically standing for 'city', and to Aristotle the task of political science was to examine the *polis*. It was virtually impossible to conceive of civilised and free life outside the *polis*, therefore it was perfectly reasonable to conceive of politics as being about existence in a city (Vincent, 1987: 5). Raphael comments that the "political is whatever concerns the state" (Raphael 1990: 27), or Barry mentions that "the history of political theory has mainly concerned with state" (Barry 1981: 46). All the problems of politics, including justice, freedom and rights, are, in the end, state-related.

In explaining etymology of the word state Vincent (1987: 16) mentions that it derives from the Latin *stare* (to stand), and more specifically from *status* (a standing or condition). The word status is still used in approximately the same sense as the Latin, referring to the condition or situation. Some rough criteria of such standing, specifically in the medieval period, are property, family and sex, class or position and one's occupation or profession. Property, especially land, was the most fundamental determinant of status and of one's 'estate'. Dyson comments that "in English state was a contraction from the word estate" (Dyson, 1980: 1), and Ernest Barker says that "The words 'State' and 'estate', which are etymologically the same word, flow easily into one another" (Barker, 1967: 91). Generally the highest estate was the ruling group, family or monarch. The highest status (state or estate) had potentially the greatest authority and power.

With rise of sociology as a method of study - via such writers as Marx, Durkheim, Duguit and MacIver - the State was viewed increasingly as a subsystem of society (Vincent, 1987: 22). However, it was used during the middle ages to describe political organisations and was convenient to describe the whole of a political grouping as an agreements or contracts.

### 2.1.1. The Origin of a State

Poulantzas analyses the function of the state and its role in regulating the articulation of the different levels of the system as a whole: 'Inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven development, the state has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation' (Poulantzas, 1973: 44). Giddens (1997) calls all social life episodic, and intends the notion episode, like most of the concepts of structuration theory, to apply to the whole range of social activity. To treat the formation of a state as an episode means analytically cutting into its 'history', that is, identifying certain elements as marking the opening of a sequence of institutional transmutation (Giddens, 1997: 244). Thus the accumulation of surplus production on the part of spatiality may be one type of pattern leading to the emergence of a state combining those communities under a single order of administration. In many cases the co-ordination of military power used coercively to establish a rudimentary state apparatus is the most important factor. 'State' is refer to governmental institutions of a definite type within a society. (ibid.: 245) Following Nadel, Giddens mentions that a state exists when the following conditions are found: (a) centralised organs of government, associated with (b) claims to legitimate territorial control and (c) a distinct dominant elite or class, having definite modes of training, recruitment and status attributes (ibid.: 246-247)

There are some theories for the origin of states and the 'warfare theory' (see Giddens, 1997) has attracted many adherents because aspect of agrarian and industrialised states which is, more or less, chronic is participation in war. War is commonly involved in the formation and the disintegration of states. Demographic theories offer alternative theories on the origin of states. They usually suggest that increases in populations whose available living

space is relatively confined creates pressure leading to the centralisation of authority and differentiation of power. Adopting some inspiration from each of the theories mentioned above, Giddens (1997: 252) mentions Claessen and Skalník as listing the following elements as relevant to explaining state formation, although these are not always found and their relative importance may vary from instance to instance:

- (1) population growth or pressure;
- (2) war, conquest or their threat;
- (3) technological progress or the production of surplus;
- (4) ideology and legitimation;
- (5) the influence of already existing states.

It follows that, while there is no bar to speculating about the modes of development of primal states, it may be quite misleading to treat what is known about them as a basis for theorising about processes of state formation in general. This does not mean that generalisations about state formation as a type of episode are without value.




Figure (2. 1): Representation of Carneiro's Theory on the Origin of States.  
Source: Giddens (1997: 254)

A formal representation of Carneiro's theory can be given as in figure (2. 1). Carneiro emphasises the importance of warfare in the origin of states and his discussion is offered as a theory of the 'origin of the state' (Giddens, 1997: 254-5).

The city, is 'crucible of power' upon which the formation of class-divided societies depends. Mumford summarises this an exemplary way:

"The first beginning of urban life, the first time the city proper becomes visible, was marked by a sudden increase in power in every department and by magnification of the role of power itself in the affairs of men. A variety of institutions had hitherto existed separately, bringing their numbers together in a common, the sacred monument or shrine, the Palaeolithic ritual cave, the Neolithic agricultural village- all of these coalesced in a bigger meeting place, the city .... The original form of this container lasted for some six thousand years; only a few centuries ago did it begin to break up" (Mumford, 1975: 54).

At the centre of political theory lies the effort to establish a relationship between human nature, however that is conceived, and the state (Duncan, cited in Vincent, 1987: 43). Vincent classified the basic State theories as:

- the Absolutist Theory, in the sense of having unlimited rights over persons and property;
- the Constitutional Theory with limited and conditioned power;
- the Ethical Theory, believing that state is the march of God in the world;
- the Class Theory, in which state is a sub-system of the society; and,
- the Pluralist Theory of the State (See Vincent, 1987).

### 2.1.2. State in the Islamic Era

Muddathir Abdel-Rahim (1980), discussing the legal institutions in the Islamic era, says: “those who were in charge of the legal and administrative institutions of Islamic cities were, on the contrary, representatives of the Sovereign Caliph or Sultan. From him they received their appointments - whether directly or indirectly. And it was on his behalf and under his supervision (or that of his lieutenants) that they proceeded to administer the city and fulfil their other functions therein” (Abdel-Rahim, 1980: 42). It is important to remember that those who were entrusted with the working of the legal and administrative institutions of Islamic cities were, in no sense the personal agents or servants of the ruler. For he, his appointees and all other members of the Muslim community were equally, and without exception, subject to the one and same system of *shariah* (based on Islam) laws (Abdel-Rahim, 1980: 43).

The principal institutions under the Caliph or Sultan concerned with the interpretation and implementation of laws in traditional Muslim cities have been: (a) *al-Wali* or *al-Amil* (the Provincial Governor), generally assisted by *al-Shurtah* (or police); (b) *al-Qadi* (the judge), assisted by a panel of approved witnesses or notaries (*Shuhud* or *Udul*); (c) *al-Muhtasib* or *Sahib al-Suq* (i.e. the supervisor of markets and public morality), assisted by the heads of the various professions (*arifs* or *amins*) and by the *arifs* of city quarters (*harat*); and (d) the leaders of the Protected Communities (*al-Dhimmiyyun*) i.e. the Jews and the Christians who, in accordance with the precepts of the *shariah*, enjoyed a kind of autonomous status in the cities of *Dar al-Islam* and thus constituted a special category in their administration (Abdel-Rahim, 1980: 44).



### 2.1.3. The Modern State

Giddens (1996) mentions that modern states are *nation-states* and all modern societies are *nation-states*. That is, their system of government lays claim to specific territories, possesses formalised codes of law, and is backed by the control of military force. The nation-states main characteristics are:

- *Sovereignty*: All nation-states are sovereign states that a government possesses authority over an area with clear-cut borders, within which it is the supreme power.
- *Citizenship*: In modern societies most people living within the borders of the political system are citizens, having common rights and duties and knowing themselves to be part of a nation.
- *Nationalism*: Nation-states are associated with the rise of nationalism, which can be defined as a set of symbols and beliefs providing the sense of being part of a single political community. Thus, individuals feel a sense of pride and belonging. Nationalism, however, made its appearance only with the development of the modern state. It is the main expression of feelings of identity with a distinct sovereign community (Giddens, 1996: 339-40).

### 2.2. State and Social Formation in the Middle East

One phenomenon which allows researchers to recognise social structure, and which much of the discourse on social structure is built form it, is the structure and formation of class in any society. The concept of class is an essential concept of sociology, and more than any other concept appeared in sociological literature. Some sociologists give importance to the groupings resulting from quantitative desirability (wealth), and among three scarce

commodity and three sources of inequity, the wealth, power and prestige introduce the groupings resulting from qualitative desirability (prestige) and relational desirability (power) as secondary to the first grouping, that is, the class. On the other hand, other sociologists, although do not deny the existence of an objective relationship **social class, esteem group and power groups**, do not consider this relationship a necessary and vital one. Indeed they place undue importance on power itself and model the three as related concepts unequally distributed phenomena of power (see Afroogh, 1998). Some attempt to relate the mechanism of the relationship among class and esteem power groups to the socio-economic structure of the societies. For instance in the feudalistic societies of pre-industrial western countries, esteem groups had an easier accessibility to other scarce resources of wealth and power. In more modern centralised bureaucratic societies the power groups through perpetrating in decision making system access to the other scarce resources. In industrial societies in which the middle classes have been formed and become the 'grassroots' for, and main supports of government, these classes have more accessibility to the other resources (Bottomore, 1989: 1).

### 2.2.1. Social Stratification in the Middle East

Jacobs (1966), while studying the process of development in Iran, considered it more meaningful to divide society not into ranks determined by relative access to income or other material resources, hierarchically arranged into three horizontal layers, but into just two classes differentiated by direct access to or lack of security. Those who are insecure, regardless of wealth or occupation, are the 'followers' who lack the security associated with political authority. A clearly identifiable middle class, in the sense of having common interests and policies, does not exist (Costello 1977: 74).

In the Middle East, political influence, personal skill, religious background and traditional training all play a role in affecting social structure and effectively replace the position of wealth. In the lands which face scarcity and impoverishment, other values become the source of competition and social stratification. The determinative relations require manoeuvre ways than modes of production. This condition creates a higher rate of social mobility which in turn makes traditional Islamic societies more elastic and flexible (see Bill, 1972 and Costello, 1977).

The classes are defined as the largest association of individuals with similar modes of employment and possessing the same power for maintenance, adjustment or displacement of a kind of relation among these associating. Discovering such associations of individuals is an empirical and objective issue. In the Middle East, traditionally, these classes are: ruling class; bureaucratic middle class; bourgeois middle class; clerical middle class; traditional labour class; peasantry; and nomadic class. The 20th century witnessed the emergence of two other classes: specialist middle class and industrial labour class (Bill, 1972).

Middle East societies are mainly comprised of peasants, nomads and the workers who are considered as lower classes. In size of population, the peasant and nomad classes overshadow the labour class at least until 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of the new social forces which challenged this traditional structure, was the arrival of the professional middle class (Hallpern, 1963). This class is a non-bourgeois middle class whose members relate themselves to the others through actions and services rather than by material assets or personal relations. The members of this class are in special, technical, cultural, intellectual

and administrative occupations and include the teachers, university professors, university students, technocrats, engineers, physicians, writers, artists, journalists, bureaucrats and middle-rank army officers. In some countries of the Middle East, the professional middle class have gained the power and started modernisation plans and in the other countries the new class was deprived of political scene. By the way, in all the Middle East, the professional middle class is a newly borne force (see Bill, 1972).

### **2.2.2. Power and Class Analysis in the Middle East**

James Bill is among researchers who proceed to a perceptual and theoretical framework, regarding the characteristics of Middle East societies, in considering their mechanisms of relations among social classes, esteem groups and parties or power groups, the first role for power groups and relation (see Bill, 1972). Class analysis is one of the old and classic theoretical approaches in the study of politics and society. The Marxist class approach which is manifested in all his writings, considers the classes' relation with the means of production as the basis for definition of and attainment of classes. In Marxist opinion, the foundations of classes is settled have, because the economic system is the vital one (see Marx, 1909).

Dahrendorf (1959) on class analysis, believes the difference in class is an analytical concept and strata (social layer) as a descriptive concept as well as substituting authoritative relations for the determinative factor of economy in Marx's theory. In Dahrendorf's opinion, authority is a legislative power which is ultimately and in essence related to harmonised obligatory institutions. Meanwhile, authority itself resides within the positions or social

functions, but the power is basically linked with the individuals' personality. Where as the power is an actual relation, authority is a legislative relation.

Van Grunebaum (1961: 212) one of the great researchers of Islamic society says that political influence, military powers, administrative rank, wealth, birth and education in any possible combination, determine individual status in society and these factors may boost or neutralise each other. Halpern (1963: 46) mentions that **"in the Middle East, economic dimension of stratification hardly ever possessed great importance, and much more than the wealth led to power, power led to wealth"**.

Bill (1972), mentions that the power should be seen through the relations who have different classes to each other from a changeable social structure and the most common power dimensions which are typical for socio-economic patterns of the Middle East are:

1. reciprocal transactions in which one person persuades the others in return of gaining reward surrender themselves;
2. decision making positions, where some one controls the deciding setting and naturally the made decisions;
3. the relations based on making indebted of individuals;
4. respectful behaviour which deserves confidence;
5. in formation transactions which require sending and receiving information with different degrees of importance and correctness; and,
6. bargaining relation which is based on rumour, obscure, and false display of the issues



Class analysis does not prevent the study of groups, because the groups have a deep reaction on class relation and class structure. Binder (1962) in his studies about Iran, focused on groups which possessed minimum organisation and are less obvious. In the Middle East they form the most effective structures. In Iran the society is established on informal personal relations which, in the best form, are revealed in the shape of an integrated chain of groups and these are already complete in formed and known as period circles. It is in these circles that decisions are made and the businesses are performed.

The distinctive characteristic of class relations in Middle East is disharmonious hierarchical but deeply bilateral patterns of power. Patai (1962: 278) suggests that, despite the great inequity in standard of life between a minority - the rich people - and a majority - the poor - there seems a specific balance between these two groups apart from their spatial neighbourhood closeness.

The history of the Middle East is saturated with dramatic examples of social mobility, because the people have learned to enjoy and manipulate less obvious aspects of power. The Ottoman, Safavis, Ziaris, and the Mamluks were all established by the individuals who rose from the lower class. This is the culture in which the grocer and cobbler become Prime Ministers, and the soldiers have been crowned (see Katouzian, 1981). **The dynamics of mobility and aliquot membership have made the Islamic class structure flexible** (Bill, 1972).

### 2.3. State and Space Structuring in the Middle East

Ibn Khaldun, the great Muslim historian of the 15th century, wrote: “Dynasties and royal authority are absolutely necessary for the building of cities and the planning of towns” (quoted in Kostof 1991: 33). Burckhardt (1976) in the role of state in Muslim art says: “The different styles of Muslim art are usually named after the dynasties which reigned during the periods, and over the countries in which these styles appeared, and this implicitly confirms the determining role played in Muslim art by the patronage of sovereigns” (Burckhardt 1976: 101).

#### 2.3.1. State and Urbanisation in the Middle East

In case of Iran the result of fluid social class and political instability on urban development has been and remains very important. Changing more often the capital of country more than 30 times (see Kiani, 1995). Any city or site, that is to be the new capital will see a time of speedy physical development and the former one will decline just as rapidly. Studying the historic Iranian state capitals gives enormous insight into the process of development of urban spaces in Iran and therefore the recent urban problems because, as discussed above, the urban spaces were the reorganisation of the social organisation interaction with state in space. The choosing of such places to be capitals, for example the selection of small settlements like Mashhad in 1729 or Tehran in 1797 by Nader Shah Afshar and Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar respectively, was entirely the will of the State.

In this regard the history of Sultaniyya is very instructive. The vacant pasturelands chosen by Sultan Mohammad Khodabandeh (Oljeitu) for his capital became, in a short time, the biggest and most important city of the Mangol Empire for a brief period. Wilber (1949) says that “In

1306, Oljeitu ordered work began on the city of Sultaniyya. The site was an extensive plain near Qazvin which had been a favourite summer camp of the Ilkhans under the name of 'Qunghurolonge' or 'the falcon's hunting ground'. A citadel 500 *gaz* on a side and protected by a wall and sixteen towers of cut stone was soon finished" (Wilber, 1949: 92-3). By the year 1313 practically all construction was completed (ibid.: 97) Of the magnificent mausoleum of Oljeitu, the highest Islamic dome by more than 50 metres Wilber says: "this monument which, for size, architectural stateliness and grandeur it rivals all creations of other countries and other periods" (Wilber, 1949: 99) was erected with many mosques, hospitals, quarters and so on. A few years after Oljeitu died in 1316, rapid decline set in to the city. A hundred years later only ruins dotted the site while, by the seventeenth century, only crumbling fields of debris marked the location of the city (Wilber 1949: 98).

Morgan (1988) gives another example of such urbanisation in Teimur era: "Teimur was devoted to the construction of architectural masterpieces in his capital, Samarqand. Indeed, the world was plundered for the greater glory of Samarqand" (Morgan 1988: 93). The history of Tabriz, the case study city of this research, is just as heavily involved in political issues as have been the other defunct and abandoned capital cities of the Iranian state. Azimi (1996) mentions that the growth or the decline of the city has been directly related to purely political decisions.

Abdul Aziz Duri (1980), in discussing the governmental structuring of cities in the Middle East argues that: "Following Arab expansion, new cities were initiated as military and administrative centres, and called *dur hijrah* [immigration houses]. Such were Kufah, Basrah, Fustat and Qayrawan. Initially they were planned by the government; the plan followed

military considerations and tribal groups. The Friday Mosque and *dar al-imarah* [governing house] were in the centre, surrounded by a large vacant area from which streets and quarters extended. ... Baghdad was planned to be the capital and the seat of a new Islamic regime” (Duri, 1980: 52, 57).

### 2.3.2 Urban Space Forming in the Middle East

Jaques Berque (quoted by Eslami et al., 1991) mentions that the village in the Islamic Middle East had the same construction of cities and Ahmad Ashraf (1974) mentions that there was no important difference between cities and villages the physical images in Iran.

Muslim cities, compared to those of Western Europe in the same period, show a different and even a contrasting impression. Weber (1966) suggests that there were five distinguishing hallmarks of the city in the full sense: fortifications, markets, a court administering a partly autonomous law, distinctively urban forms of association and, at least, partial autonomy. In this sense, Weber maintained, the city had fully existed in Europe, never in Asia, and only in part and for short periods in the Middle East. Although his definition more or less corresponds to what Europeans would think of as a city, and is therefore moulded by this worldview, his conclusion that Middle Eastern cities are not cities in the full sense should not be dismissed out of hand. Of his five hallmarks two at least are missing in the Islamic city. It would usually have a market and a wall. A seeming paradox emerges: how is it that the ‘Islamic city’ is able to maintain its personality, its power of collective action, throughout Islamic history, when it never possessed municipal institutions in which that personality could be formally embodied, or a municipal law which would at once express and legitimise it? How was it that urban Muslims showed - once more, if Massignon (cited in Hourani, 1981: 23-4) is to be believed -

such a power of corporate organisation in other ways, but were unable to create this kind of institution?

Hourani (1981), describes the 'typical' historic Islamic city, as follows: "First, there would be a citadel ... Secondly, there might be a royal 'city' or 'quarter' which would have grown up in either of two ways ... Thirdly, there would be a central urban complex, which would include the great mosques and religious schools, and the central markets with their *khans* and *qaysariyyas*, and with special places assigned for the main groups of craftsmen or traders... Fourthly, there would be a 'core' of residential quarters, marked by at least two special characteristics: the combination of local with ethnic or religious differentiation, and the relative separateness and autonomy of each quarter... Fifthly and finally, there would be the 'suburbs' and outer quarters, where recent and unstable immigrants would live and certain occupations were carried out" (Hourani, 1981: 31-2).

Burckhardt mentions that "The vital artery of a Muslim town is its market (*suq* or *bazaar*), which spreads out along the road or roads joining the town to other centres of commerce ... dwellings are, for preference, situated well out of reach of the market and traffic roads, and are accessible for the most part only through narrow, winding alley-ways, the function of which is in no way comparable to the streets of European towns, even medieval ones, because Muslim houses take their light and air from their own inner courts and not from the street outside. If one looks at the plan of a Muslim town, one finds, next to the avenues cutting through the city, a series of cul-de-sacs of labyrinthine complexity. These are the alley-ways or corridors giving access to each of the dwellings piled together in a compact mass. Houses lean one against the other at the same time as being insulated from their neighbours, self-contained and




open to sky” (Burckhardt, 1976: 189). Rapoport quotes Brown saying that “while US cities maximise movement and accessibility, traditional Moslem cities limit movement and controlling mobility” (Rapoport, 1980: 21).

Ilbert (cited in Eslami et al., 1991), about the structure of the Islamic cities, says that the Islamic city is a frame with many abilities, it is differentiated and nonproficiency, it is agglomerated but it has no structure. Rapoport, quoting Van Gruenebaum, Lapidus and others, remarks that the separation [areas to quarter, *mahalleh*] were very strong in most Moslem cities that had quarters within which people bound together by ties of language, religion, occupation, family, or common origin lived together (Rapoport, 1980). He visualised the classical Moslem city as shown in figure (2.2).

Fig. (2.2): The Moslem city as a collection of homogeneous areas.

Source: Rapoport, 1980



### 2.3.3. Concepts of Urban Spaces in the Middle East

In the city Islam formed its first government, and ‘al-Medina’- ‘The City’, where the Prophet established His first mosque and layed out the principles of urban life was the prototype of Islamic cities. The city in this era, apart from its administrative position, had a great role in religious position. The Great Mosque (*Masjid-i-jami*) became a main character of a city which, in addition to its religious function, also had social and political capacities

(Barghjelveh, 1998). The open and covered spaces along the networks of communication and accesses developed into cities. The bazaar was part of the road system, as well as the heart of the city, a common centre for economic enterprise, a place where social, religious and cultural activities converged. So, bazaar by its sets therefore, played a decisive and important role in the economic and political fate of the city.

The concepts of urban spaces - the square, street and so on - in the Middle East are quite different from those in the West. Burckhardt (1976: 193) mentions that the Middle East city has, at a general, no great open squares and Kostof (1992) mentions that the *maidan* (square) is not the equivalent of the Roman Forum or the Campo in Sienna. There was no distinct civic arena in an Islamic city, because there was no municipality as such with its own character of privileges and responsibilities. The *maidan* was not politically charged and small *maidans* were nothing more than urban vestibules to monumental public buildings. They “acted as distributing nodes serving the masses moving in and out of the major buildings to and from the neighbouring paths” (Kostof, 1992: 127).




Figure (2.3): Public spaces in an Islamic city.  
Mosque courtyards, and *maidans* associated with mosques and other public buildings.

Source: Kostof, 1992.

In the Persian language of Iranian culture, the main meaning of *maidan* is a field and, commonly, an open space. For example *maidan-i jang* means battle field, *maidan-i bazy*, playground, *maidan-i toopkhaneh*, artillery base, *maidan-i tarebar*, fruit market and so on (see Dehkhoda 1956, Persian dictionary). In many Iranian and Iraqi cities, the *maidan* of the principal mosque was originally a horse-race course and polo field on the city outskirts (Kostof 1992: 131). In cities like Cairo, it has been claimed, *maidans* had distinctive spatial patterns which changed under each dynasty (Kostof, 1992).

In the reorganisation of the blocks of the Roman towns inherited by Islam, Kostof mentioned that "In Roman times the residential structure was of houses of single unrelated families, three or four to a block, and, in the more crowded cities, multi-storey apartment buildings or *insulae*. In Islamic towns, on the other hand, a very different residential structure prevailed. The population grouped itself into neighbourhoods according to kinship, tribe, or ethnicity. The through-streets in this case constituted the dividing lines among these socially exclusive units. The Roman grid is outer-related: the Islamic 'block' is involutioned. So in Roman gridded towns inherited by Islam - Damascus, say, or Merida in Spain - the open space of the streets and public places, which now seemed extravagant, was reduced through progressive infill; through-streets were curtailed; blocks were merged together into solidly built super blocks; and an inward communication system was installed in this dense fabric, the principal element of which was the cul-de-sac serving its immediate occupants" (Kostof 1991: 48-50). Figures 2.4a, 2.4b, and 2.4c) show the gradual transformation of a grided Roman colony into an Islamic city.

Barati (1997), in analysing Iranian historic cities, mentions that, during the pre-modern period, there were no pre-structured town plans and formulae. There was no doubt in public

terms about what kind of criteria should be obeyed and what kind of forms and functions should be considered when a new intervention was required in the built environment. He adds that the urban environment was built by the people with different culture and economic ability. In spite of using different materials associated with relative wealth, and at

Figure (2.4a): The Roman gridded city (colony) plan.

The solidly framed Roman grid is punctuated by an open-air market and an amphitheatre.




Figure (2.4b): Intervention of Muslim dwellers.

The city's new Islamic population appropriates public monuments for private use, and mid-block pathways begin to violate the orthogonal street pattern.




Figure (2.4c): Ultimate converted plan of the former Roman city.

The transformed city has a minimum of open public space. Straight passages along the winding system of narrow lanes offer the merest suggestion of the original layout.

Source: Kostof (1991: 50)



various scales, the same rules were followed and led to a relatively homogeneous built environment. The central government, on the other hand, had no tendency to control the way the urban fabrics were developing (Barati, 1997). Building and maintenance of public urban spaces were ignored by state. In this regard and in the case of the Muslim city, Akbar (1988: 116) mentions that as there was no municipal control over streets, objections from the passers-by were the main means of control. In the case of encroachments on the streets, he shows that actions that benefit members of the community were not objected (Figure, 2. 5).




Figure (2.5): Encroachments on the street, city of Tunis.  
Occupying part of the side-walks and edges of the street changing the street morphology.

Source: Akbar, 1988.



## 2.4. Politico-Economic Analysis of Historical Urban Concept Change in Iran

Urbanisation is a social process and, therefore, knowing the basic foundations of the society's structure regarding its social trends is essential. As mentioned above, physical structures are reflections of socio-economic and political relations and systems of the society, that this frame becomes physical form of that society, and the system too constitutes the content of that frame. Thus, physical structures are affected by socio-economic structures (the political economy) of the society. In this regard, various abstract models and patterns regarding the basic concepts of 'mode of production' and 'social formation' for the analysis of political, social, economic and technological structures - including the spatial links and temporal changes of these structures - are invented. This is done to guarantee that, in all theoretical approaches for the analysis and assessment of the historical trends of the society and the cities (and other social events as well) supporting theories are present.

Here our supporting model is 'Iranian despotism' as suggested by Katouzian, and which is dependent on aridisolatic society. According to Katouzian, the main difficulty with the present theories is their tendency to disregard the nature of despotic governmental power in Iran. The distinctive aspect of the Iranian government is that it possessed not only a monopolistic authority but also the absolute power of legislation and anomaly.

The history of urbanisation is entangled with the political economy of the society and necessitates the analysis of true political, social, economic and technological and locational (spatial) links and temporal changes of these structures as significant factors which impact the physical formation of the settlements in the past and present time (Pirbabaei, 1998). By

this pre-assumption, here, some of various theoretical approaches on urbanisation in Islamic period (middle ages) and modern time of Iran are analysed and assessed, and the author attempt, through comprehension and cognition of the nature and the logic of Iranian urbanisation and urban development, responding the research problem.

### 2.4.1. Political Economy of Iran

Aridity has historically played a basic role in shaping the structure of the Iranian political economy, but in its own peculiar way. It served to create autonomous village units of production, none of which could produce a sufficiently large surplus to support a feudal power base, but all of which, taken together, produced a collective surplus so large that, once appropriated by an organised external (regional or countrywide) force, it could be used to prevent the fragmentation of politico-economic power. This martial force was originally provided by invading *nomadic* tribes, and thereafter both by the existing and by further incoming nomads, who succeeded in setting up various urban states at different stages of history. The size of the direct and indirect collective agricultural surplus was so large as to enable these despotic states to spend on transport, communications, military and bureaucratic organisation and so on, which both maintained their hold on the land and prevented the later emergence of feudal autonomy in agriculture, or bourgeois citizenship in towns. If these amount to the rudiments of a 'model', and it must have a name to be taken seriously, then Katouzian defines it as *Persian despotism*, based on the 'aridisolatic' society (Katouzian, 1981: 300).

State in Persian is *dawlat* and its historic mode of ruling was despotism. In using the term despotism the author sees absolutism as being despotic in the sense of centralising unlimited rights over persons and property (see Mousnier, 1979). This state was dependent on scattered

and isolated village units for the agricultural surplus which if either directly requisitioned or assigned to landlords and tax-farmers.

Poulantzas (1973: 162) characterises the absolutist state by the fact that the holder of state power, normally a monarch, concentrates in his hands a power which is not controllable by the other institutions and whose exercise is not curbed by any limiting law, whether this be a law of the positive or natural/divine order: the holder of power is *legibus solutus*. In the feudal type of state, state power is limited both by divine law (the state being considered as the manifestation of cosmic/divine order) and by the privileges of the various medieval estates, in that feudal ties mark out a hierarchy of exclusive powers of those in fealty over the land which they own and over those tied to that land. This model also ensures a dispersal of power through a series of gradations. In contrast to this, the absolutist state appears as a strongly centralised state.

People in Persian is *mellat*. This does not mean 'the nation', as it is often believed: it means 'the people' as opposed to *dawlat*, the state. The people themselves obviously are classified into different ethnic, linguistic, professional and income groups and classes, but as a whole, a wealthy merchant without links with the state is regarded as *melli*, 'of the people', while a much less wealthy state official is categorised as *dawlati*, 'of the state'. Until a couple of decades ago, a state hospital, school, or whatever, was called *dawlati*, and their private counterparts as *melli*. The Iranian national railway system is still officially described as *dawlati* (Katouzian, 1981). The term *melli* (as opposed to *dawlati*) in economics and politics corresponds to the English term 'private' (as opposed to 'public'), though it means 'of, or for, the people' (as against 'of, or for, the state'). The term *mellat*, meaning the public, not the

nation, is counterpoised to the state; In Iran, 'the public', both as a term and as a concept, can not be interchangeably used for 'the state' and 'the people', as it certainly is in English-speaking countries. Bill (1972) mentions that the Iranian society is established on informal personal relations, which in the best form are revealed in the shape of an integrated considerable chain of groups, completely in format and known as periods circles.

City in Persian is *shahr*, meaning urban centre as well as territory and country. For example *Iranshahr* means the country of Iran and *shahryar* means the ruler of the country (king) and so on. In the European feudal system, economic and political power was concentrated in the rural sector and the term of country in this culture means land away from towns and cities, in the other word 'country' in English is rural sector and in Persian is urban centre. So, historically in Iran urban centres were the basin of the state, despotic state, and analysing the relation between State and urban centres must be done in this regard.

## **2.4.2. Feudalism and Capitalism Concepts**

### **2.4.2.1. Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities**

This theory is the most comprehensive one. According to this theory the Iranian feudal city covers the major part of the Islamic period before the development of capitalism. These cities possessed a certain spatial organisation reflected a feudalistic socio-economic structure in the frame of Islamic system in the city on one hand and the climatic situation on the other. The feudalistic city in this period was dominated by great merchandising. One of the important commentators of this theory, Tavassoli (1981), suggests that, despite numerous historical events in Iran, feudalism existed in nearly all cities in the Islamic period up to the development of capitalism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The

modern socio-economic changes of Iran or, more precisely, the beginning of change in pre-capitalist modes of production and development of capitalist relations, and the start of what is now known as 'bourgeois civilisation', all are simultaneous with Reza Shah's gaining power.

During Reza Shah's reign (1925 to 1941) superstructural and substructural bourgeois institutions were established in Iran. Reza Shah's government took upon itself the responsibility of performing a great deal of actions concerned with conversion to capitalist system because of historical weakness of the bourgeoisie in Iran (Hesamian, 1984). The reflection of the new system in spatial structure of the city was in various forms, such as the appearance of the factories, the establishment of banks, railways, gravelled roads, telegraph communications, urban streets, large administrative military organisations, garrisons and ministries. These actions caused extensive physical changes in the evolution of Iranian cities (Tavassoli, 1981).

#### **2.4.2.2. Assessment of Theories of Feudal and Capitalistic Cities**

The supporting theoretical principle and framework of this theory is the well known theory of social evolution, which understands the socio-economic properties of the society, as being the way of organising social action and possessing the extra work (Pirbabaei, 1998). In the explanation of social systems the author takes assistance from the characteristic mode of production, the relationship between the classes and their relation with the means of production, and their share in the social product.



According to this theory, theory of social evolution, the capitalist system is the result of the evolution in feudalistic system, and that is in turn the outcome of slavery. But Iranian society was never feudal, because a large amount of the land ownership was in the hands of the government, and the other part was granted to the landowners by the government's will. Therefore the landowner had no real rights of ownership other than as a privilege granted by the government and which could be easily rescinded. So not only was the government not the representative and written down for satisfaction and support of such class, like the European counterpart, but the political and economic power of the landowner class depended on the permission and will of government.

It is clear that the government was not the representative of any other class, be it the merchant and businessman to the craftsman and peasant, but these classes, apart from being under dominance of upper classes, were under the rule of the government. Therefore none of the classes had a right against the government. The socio-economic structure of Iran in Middle Ages and in the early Islamic period, did not depend of feudalistic system and the cities were never under the dominance of feudal or merchant hierarchies. In this regard Ashraf (1974) mentions that, in the ancient and Islamic periods the power status existed for a despotic system of administrative organisation and their spatial organisation was a reflection of this dominant despotic system as well. The lack of fundamental change in the physical structure of the cities through the centuries deserves analysis in this regard because the lack of social and financial security prevented capital accumulation and investment, and changes could not be brought upon the physical structure of the human settlements as a result.

After the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906), political unrest and social confusion, poverty and imperialistic intervention caused the spread of riots and banditry all over the country. As a result Reza Khan, an illiterate military soldier, through suppression of the riots and providing security, rose to the upper ranks of the army quickly to become Prime Minister and finally monarch of the country. After gaining the power and establishing the foundations of his authority, he established the new pseudo-modernist and despotic system (Katouzian, 1981).

While the authority of central government expanded and the relative security increased throughout the country, economic mobility started and, at the same time, oil revenues were added to the total revenues of the government. This gave it the means to construct railways, roads and communicational networks, to erect factories and thereby sponsor an increasing industrial capacity, apply modern technology, introduce modern education from high school to higher education, and modernise the cities, among many other projects. In this way “the newly emerged policy of capital cession”, that is oil revenues, to the relatives of the government was substituted for the typical and traditional system of granting the lands to them. The government was yet the monopolistic power of economic and financial resources which granted them to the people and got them back when desired, so it was never capitalism, but pseudo-modernist despotic and petrolic system (Katouzian, 1981).

### **2.4.3. Exogenous Development Concepts**

#### **2.4.3.1. Exogenous Urban Development Theories**

Indigenous development is a process with intimate components and factors and coinciding with the conditions, and environmental, social, economic, political and cultural situation of

the society, and by using the other's experiences and not in the form of blind copying, but regarding the internal conditions of the society. On the other hand exogenous development originates not from inside the society, and the treatment of needs and concerns comes from elsewhere. Exogenous development can be inattentive to the conditions of the society and imposing changes by force, and is just a witness to the needs of capitalist world system. In pre-industrial countries, even those which possessed a long history of urbanisation and urban life, and mostly because of lack of suitable infrastructure and the inherent tendency of capitalism to centralisation on the other hand resulted to the severe concentration in these countries and caused the dominance and priority of one-city in most of them.

The commentators of indigenous and exogenous theory (e.g. Piran, 1990) explain that the tradition of the city and urbanisation is a long-lasting tradition in Iran and the combination of political and military factors on the process of urbanisation of the region, more than any other factor, had a stabilising impact on its cities. The cities were the components of an organic urban network of which, dependent on extent, population and importance, each had its own function and position and far from the necessity of changing and regardless of underdevelopment of social system, which was naturally reflects in the life of the cities, were indigenous sets. In addition to this organic urban network, each city had a sustainable unity inside, and the social and material components of the city were in continuous balance, and physically formed a harmonious whole enjoying the principle of spatial integrity.

The grounds of the invasion of capitalism to Iran occurred in the Qajar period (1779-1925). In this period because of a combination of an internal factor (inability of the third world infrastructure to adopt market capitalism in a compatible manner all over the country) and

external factors (the tendency of capitalism to concentrate wealth and pursue profit in the shortest time and with the lowest cost), the newly established industries of the country settled down in Tehran. The population of this city in 1907 was 155 thousand in 1956, that is less than 50 years increased ten fold and exceeded 1.5 million people (Barati, 1997). The demographic changes of Tehran vividly show the following of the city from the rule of priority and the dominance of one - city in hierarchical urban system of Iran. Especially concentration of population and facilities, Tehran has little in common with the general pace of the country's development and industrial growth. Tehran has grown into a large metropolis, a macrocephaly without any identity, and has acted as the most important transferring station of the capital and wealth of the country to abroad. It can be suggested that the concentration of the population in some restricted and mainly urban areas, and more strongly in Tehran, provides a country open to the impact of exogenous development of the country on the urban network and system.

#### **2.4.3.2. Analysis of Exogenous Urban Development Theories.**

The indigenous and exogenous theory relates urban difficulties of modern Iran to the expansion of a capitalist world system, according to the practices of colonial countries. This process caused the change in the socio-economic system of Iran and as a result its reflection on physical structure of the country caused the interruption of urban network and traditional system, and instead of them brought about an exogenous urban system under the impact of dominancy system, which had no duty except the transference of the wealth of the country to the imperialist countries. In this way the rapid growth of urbanisation was resulted and the appearance of macrencephaly in urban system is justified. Iran has never historically been under the direct control of imperialist countries and, despite numerous interventions of

foreign governments, especially Russia, Britain and lately the U.S and despite gaining some grants, their plots were neutralised by the unity of national and religious leaders maintained the political independence of the country (Pirbabaei, 1998).

The study of the single-productivity of the country and the substitution of exporting oil revenues in national economy for agricultural products, because of insufficient development of this section of economy and the failure of industrial investments, shows that pseudo-modernist despotic attitudes prevailed. Oil revenues were wasted on expensive projects, factories and extensive plantations, etc. The potential of these projects was not realised because there was no underlying culture of planning on such a scale; the country did not develop but led to social and urban disorders and difficulties. As Katouzian (1981) says, the mechanism of exploration, extraction and exporting oil, in spite of its extraordinary added-value, is performed with fairly little investment, a limited operational extent, a minimum of labour and professionals, and that there is no perceived need to establish a large infrastructure.

The basic characteristic of oil production, exporting and revenue is that, except in primary stages, there is almost no native means of production and the contribution of native labour in the production process is highly limited. The increasing oil revenues and abundant foreign currency reserves weakened the government's dependence on Iran's native labour resources and its people.

In countries with exogenous development, investment is mainly brought about by the multinational corporations and even the agriculture becomes trends towards large-scale mono



cultural patterns. These policies cause their own physical structure which have already been discussed, but while pseudo-modernist despotic system prevailed Iran, the historical trend of civilisation of urbanisation and urban development in Iran, along with urban difficulties and the interruption of modern rural-urban network, it is preferable to be analysed in this framework.

#### **2.4.4. Rent Capitalism Concept in Iranian Urbanism**

##### **2.4.4.1. Rent Capitalism Theory and Urban Development:**

According to the theory rent capitalism (see Ehlers, 1983) the growth and development of cities in some societies of the Islamic orient comprises a phase of an independent socio-economic evolution which is between 'manorial organised farm society (class)' and 'mass production capitalism'. Among the various characteristics which are pre-conditional to the phenomenon of a city, and maybe was the main factor behind the emergence of that city, is the presence of an agricultural region which, by its extra production feeds the urban population. At the same time there needs to be a market for semi-finished or finished products made in the city.

The way of receiving properly ownership and the right of the rent from the product in rural arena and its transference to urban centres, that is the place for the life of great land owners, is among the basic characteristic of socio-economic structure of Islamic lands. The physical morphology of these cities include the presence of more or less great stores for cereals, institutions for selling and buying places for the maintenance and sale of machinery for processing agricultural products and cotton and wool markets. The mechanism of trade

concentration and provision of agricultural products is, in various ways, like short selling of cereals and fruit by the producer to the urban merchants and brokers, instead of cash and material credit. This way, known as short selling or selling in advance, and causes a permanent debit of agricultural producers to urban markets, is a method in which the villager who is often indigent, needs to receive urban credits - often at heavy rates of interest - by promising unripe crops. The payment of the loans depends on the highly low valued prices of the crops at the time of harvest.

The outcome of this kind of crediting is a specific socio-economic relationship between the cities and villages. The concentration of trade and marketing of agricultural products in these cities, the accumulation of profit resulting from short selling and the increasingly dependency of rural population to merchants and brokers completely favour urban merchants. The dominance of cities over their hinterlands is perpetuated by their function of providing the rural population's necessities. These functions, in addition to providing and marketing of farm products, include governmental, educational, medical, communication, trade and many other services and their presence brings about a traditional pattern of central cities that enjoy their centrality, based on rent-capitalism. The small and average cities of Iran, as organising centres of their peripheries, are established in the form of socio-economic system with a severe hierarchical structure. This grouping of cities acts as means or connecting bridges metropolitan areas of the country.

#### **2.4.4.2. Analysis of the Rent Capitalism Theory on Urban Development**

As already stated, this theory addresses relationships and transactions between the cities and their peripheries, which formed in 19th century - Qajar period. In other words it

explains the conditions, the relationship by which cities exploit the nearby rural areas. Up to this point, the lands mainly belonged to the government; transferred to individuals for specific times, as grants or '*tiul*'. In the Qajar time, because of financial crises of the court, the lands were sold to the individuals. This transmission of the lands was a means to form great private land ownership in Iran (Ehlers, 1983). This point is important that **rent-capitalism was a practical form of the despotic system in 19th century and the first half of the 20th, and can be likened to previous despotic acts such as the raiding of villages by nomads and tribes in the past.**

#### 2.4.5. Urban Region Model

##### 2.4.5.1. Urban Region Theory of Urbanisation

One of the distinctive features of urbanisation in the Islamic period compared to trends in Europe was the relationship between city and village. Cities in Europe were independent units and places for merchants and craftsmen while the basic centre of power in feudal era was in villages the feudal lord lived. Therefore the city and the village were distinctive units with constant tensions.

The commentators of the urban region concept (e.g. Habbibi, 1996) explain that in the Islamic period cities lack any absolute distinction and tension between city and village. The city was not seen as a competitor of village but conversely, most of the time it was supplementary to the village. For this reason, in long history Iran, no city was never threatened by rural settlers. As a result the most suitable model which can be used in this regard, is the concept of the 'urban region' including the city and its political, economic,

social, religious and cultural areas of influence, which constitute an integrated and intermingled set. Economically, the separation between labour, business transaction and agriculture on one hand, and labour and industrial transaction on the other, was not so evident in urban and rural communities. There are so many historical evidences, which show that the cities had rural functions, and there were some urban functions in many villages as well. This mixing of urban and rural functions in urban regions is still seen in different areas of the country now.

#### **2.4.5.2. Analysis of the Urban Region Theory**

The theory of urban region is based on under development of social division of labour theory, between agricultural and industrial products and transactions and knows the non-existence of urban communities as an independent and integrated community of citizens, which played an important role in social changes of the West, because of the presence of governmental power in the city and the rule of state on urban community. The presence of government in the city can prevent the growth of independent trade communities and so on (Ashraf, 1974).

It could be added that the urban region which, according to the theory of rent-capitalism, is the farming area, has a kind of socially, economically and, as a result, a spatio-physically hierarchical order in which the city, as a place of politico-administrative centrality, possesses higher services as well. The extent of the influential area, and the kind of politico-administrative centrality in it, determines the degree of importance of the central city. What is suggested by the author is that urban development is shaped by the relationships of the city with its periphery and understanding the logic of historical change

in urbanisation should be based on this phenomenon. Urban region theory considers this relationship as a kind of bilateral relation, and rejects the one-sided notion of exploitation of village by the city, which results in the struggles between them. For this reason social division along lines of labour is not evident in Iranian history, leading to the stability of the socio-economic system through the centuries.

The findings of Ehlers (1983) and other commentators of rent-capitalism theory such as Mumeni (see Pirbabaei, 1998) reject the existence of solid bilateral relations between cities and their rural peripheries. However it seems that, the urban region theory considered the city as the village a sufficient geographical point. An examination of the infrastructure factors of cities leads the author to conclude that in a society with the climatic characteristics of the Iranian plateau, and its socio-economic density and demographic agglomeration face to severe physical obstacles, establishing human settlements has been a hard infrastructural task, and needs much investment; in this way agriculture has been the most important resource for governments in providing their various expenditures. As, in Iran, it was only the ruler's sheer might that determined this relation, the cities, their politico-administrative centres, were their places of military force as well, and rural and urban people were exploited by different mechanisms like taxes. By this means there was no reason for the villagers to fight against the urban people who were themselves under suppression, and against the government. Also bearing in mind the organisational weakness and dispersal of villages compared to integrated authority and unity of ruling power, there was no possibility for co-ordinated mass action.



Therefore, it can be said that all human settlements, including rural and urban, were under suppression and exploitation of the despotic ruling power, and this prevented the possibility of capital accumulation and even the improvement to living conditions. Meanwhile it enabled the despotic ruler at during severed historical epochs to create some masterpieces, to convert small villages to the largest imperial cities (like Sultaniyya) and to move the people from one corner of the country to the other.

### 2.5. State-Oriented Socio-Spatial Structure of Urban Form in Iran

The above theories lead to a new theoretical approach in recognising the nature and logic of historical development and change in urbanisation and urban development in the past and contemporary times. Every theory in each specific discipline may not necessarily express the exact realities, but an abstract framework for arranging various and complex facts and analysing their relations.

The nature of state in sociology, as a method of study was viewed as a subsystem of society. In the case of Iran, the state was independent and above the society and society was under influence of that. In this society the *shah* (king) in Islamic period adopted himself, as shadow of God and this term which used hundred years can be understood in this regard. The *khalif*, *sultan* or *shah* possesses the power of God in the society. So the state was a system above the system of society with a significant influence to that.

In the case of Iran, the theory of Iranian despotism by Katouzian is understood by the author to be the most effective theoretical framework for analysing socio-economic, political structure, spatial links and temporal changes of these structures as well, which

form the nature and logic of historical development of urbanisation. It allows one to understand the governments in Iran as despotic ones, which never supposed any right for the individuals. The cities were centres for politico-economic powers of the governments, so there were no nation-states in Iranian history, nor formed slavery or feudalism. The city, from the beginning, was an organisational phenomenon required by the ruling powers. This political attribute of the cities can be seen from repeatedly construction and destruction of cities by increasing and decreasing of powers, and Soltanyeh is the most distinctive of them.

## PART TWO

# SPECIFYING THE HYPOTHESIS

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (AROMATICITY OF STATE)

- 2.1. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Ancient Iran
- 2.2. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Islamic Iran
- 2.3. Pre-Modern State and Urban Form in Iran
- 2.4. Conclusion: Pre-Modern Iranian City (Aromaticity of State)

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE MODERN IRANIAN CITY (SPATIAL SEGREGATION)

- 4.1. Constitutional Period (1906-1911): Emergence of the Modern Iranian City
- 4.2. The Pahlavi Modernisation Plans and Social Structuring
- 4.3. The Pahlavi Modernisation Plans and Urban Change in Iranian City
- 4.4. Modern Concepts and Formation of State, Urban and Urban Spaces
- 4.5. Conclusion: Modern Iranian City (Spatial Segregation)

## PART TWO: SPECIFYING THE HYPOTHESIS

### **CHAPTER THREE:**

#### **HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (*shahr*): SEAT OF STATE**

- 3.1. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Ancient Iran
- 3.2. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Islamic Iran
- 3.3. Pre-Modern State and Urban Form in Iran
- 3.4. Conclusion: Pre-Modern Iranian City (*Shahr*) as Seat of State

### **CHAPTER FOUR:**


#### **THE MODERN IRANIAN CITY: SPATIAL SEGREGATION**

- 4.1. Constitutional Revolution: Emergence of the Modern Era in Iran
- 4.2. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Social Structuring
- 4.3. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Urban Change in Modern Iran
- 4.4. Modern Concepts and Forms of State, Cities and Urban Spaces
- 4.5. Conclusion: Modern Iranian City (*Shahr*): Spatial Segregation

# HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (shahr): SEAT OF STATE

## CHAPTER THREE

### HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (shahr): SEAT OF STATE



# 3

## HISTORICAL IRANIAN CITY (*shahr*): SEAT of STATE

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### Introduction to Chapter Three

- 3.1. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Ancient Iran
  - 3.1.1. Emergence of State and City (*shahr*) Concepts:
    - Country - City - of Iran (*Iranshahr*)
    - 3.1.1.1. Concept of Ancient State of Iran
    - 3.1.1.2. Concept of the Iranian City (*shahr*)
  - 3.1.2. Social Construction and Politico-economy in Ancient Iran
  - 3.1.3. Spatial Organisation of Ancient Cities
    - 3.1.3.1. Medes and Achaemenian Times: Early Camping Cities
    - 3.1.3.2. Seleucids Time: Hellenic Cities
    - 3.1.3.3. Ashkanian and Sassanian Time: Organised Cities
- 3.2. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Islamic Iran
  - 3.2.1. The Forming of Early Islamic States
    - Restoration of Iranian Old Concepts of State and City (*shahr*)
  - 3.2.2. Social Structure and State in Pre-Modern Iran
    - 3.2.2.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin
    - 3.2.2.2. Tribal States of Western Origin
  - 3.2.3. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Pre-Modern Iran
  - 3.2.4. Qajars and Urban Spatial Concepts
    - 3.2.4.1. Social Structure in Qajar Iran
    - 3.2.4.2. Urban Change and Concepts in Qajar Iran
- 3.3. Pre-Modern State and Urban Form in Iran
  - 3.3.1. *Mahalleh* (District / Quarter)
  - 3.3.2. Mosque
  - 3.3.3. Bazaar
  - 3.3.4. Access and Square
- 3.4. Conclusion: Pre-Modern Iranian City (*Shahr*) as Seat of State



### Introduction to Chapter Three

The purpose of the study is to analyse the historic evolution of the cities in Iran, the meaning and significance of the words 'state', 'people' and 'built environment' in Iran to emphasise the role of state and people, their relations and their interactions. These interactions - though not entirely unique to Iran - produce the distinctly Iranian features of urban development. This part of the research is presented in a historical setting because the values, interests and techniques of state and people are impossible to understand unless their roots are discovered.

The historical urbanisation and urban change in Iranian cities can be divided into two main stages (Habibi, 1996):

1. Urbanisation and urban change in *ancient and pre-Islamic Iran*. This period started in about the ninth century BC and continued until the seventh century AD. This period coincided with appearance of Iranian urban civilisation and ended by Arab Muslims attack and conquest of Iran.
2. Urbanisation and urban change in *Islamic and pre-modern Iran*. This period was started by early Islamic states forming in Iran and continued until the mid-nineteenth century in the Qajars time. The time of the Qajars dynasty is as a transitional period (Barati, 1997) in the changing of Iranian history from Middle Ages period to Modern period.

This chapter has four main parts. The first is study of state and urban spatial concepts in ancient Iran and the second is a study of state and urban spatial concepts in Islamic Iran. The third part is study of historic concepts and forms of urban spaces and finally the fourth part is a conclusion to finding theoretical interpreting way of historical Iranian city concepts.

### 3.1. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Ancient Iran

State and city in Iran have been mutually dependent and have had a vital association with each other. As a theoretical point of view (see chapter two), the erecting of cities in the aridisolatic land of Iran by scattered sources was possible only by the will of state (in its Iranian concept) and forming state conversely needed cities (in their Iranian concept) for concentration of power and gathering scattered value added for ruling. So these kinds of urban centres were the bases of despotic states and analysing the relation between the state and urban centres must be done in this regard.

As a spatial concept and principal character of the ancient cities, the position of the sites for honour and respect, either metaphysical (i.e. temples) or physical (i.e. palaces), have always been inside the city walls, separated and isolated from living quarters and, as a result, living quarters were always positioned outside the city walls. Both metaphysical and physical potencies of the city were allocated in the hands of one authority, the ruler. Therefore, there was no authority for people to worship or to idealise their own way of life freely and independently. These aspects all indicate an organisation of space imposed by the authorities outside of the people of society. The city was, therefore, based on positions rather than relations, or in fact, on power relations rather than social relations (Barghjelveh, 1998: 247).

#### 3.1.1. Emergence of State and City (*shahr*) Concepts:

##### Country - City - of Iran (*Iranshahr*)

City in Persian is *shahr*, which means urban centre as well as territory and country. For example *Iranshahr* means country of Iran and *shahryar* means ruler of country (king) and so

on (see Dehkhoda, 1956). In the European feudal system, economic and political power was concentrated in the rural sector and the term 'country' in this culture means 'land away from towns and cities' (see Hornby, 1989). In the other words, 'country' in Persian refers to urban centres whereas in English it refers to rural sectors.

The ancient Iranian civilisation emerged by forming of new community in new settlements, i.e. urban communities. These new communities did not form on the base of tribal organisation, but were organised on the basis of a new concept, i.e. state (Habibi, 1996). Their spatial organisation, as historic evidence shows and their political role as theoretical views suggest (see chapter two) support the notion that they were not city-states.

These early Iranian urban centres were called *shahrestan*, meaning the centre of a territory or region (Tafazzoli, 1989). Country of Iran was called *Iranshahr*, i.e. territory of Iranian state. There were some similarities between these cities and the historic Mesopotamian city-states such as Ur, Babylon, Nineveh and so on, but in spatial organisation and concepts they were completely different to each other. The Iranian cities built by centralised and powerful states must be analysed in their social, economic and political context.

#### 3.1.1.1. Concept of Ancient State of Iran

The state in historic mode of ruling in ancient Iran was despotism (see chapter two) which depended on scattered and isolated village units for the agricultural surplus autonomous village units of production. This rulership was originally provided by martial nomadic tribes who succeeded in setting up various urban states at different stages of history. The size of the

direct and indirect collective agricultural surplus was so large as to enable these despotic states to spend on transport, communications, military and so on.

The Shah, or king, forms the state. In most kinds of religious in various times he is a typical representative of God on earth even though he was not a religious priest he gets this situation by power and sometimes in a blood competition. He rules at the top of a power pyramid of tribes and above the social classes but does not relate to them. On the contrary they are under his support. Wealth and religion were related to power, i.e. the Shah. This concept of state power, which grasps wealth and divine right by force, has influenced Iranian history over all periods since Medes era.

#### 3.1.1.2. Concept of the Iranian City (*shahr*)

The emergence of early cities in ancient Iran was related to state. As mentioned above, *shahr* means 'territory' and the equivalent of 'city' in ancient Iran is *shahrestan*. From a spatial point of view, a *shahrestan* was a citadel, in garrison style and with a palace, administrative and army buildings, and their families' houses. From the conceptual point of view the *shahrestan* was a centre of region and territory. It seems that *shahrestan* was built by rulers as garrisoned citadels for spatial organisation and governance of *Iranshahr* (the territory of Iran). The functions of a *shahrestans* were holding security, collecting taxes and carrying out other duties of state in the region. It can be said that they were symbols of state in the region.

#### 3.1.2. Social Construction and Politico-economy in Ancient Iran

There was no form of a slavery-based economy in ancient Iran. Furthermore, as Katouzian (1981) mentions, there was, as far as one can tell, no concept or status of citizenship - with

its significant social implications - in the ancient, pre-Islamic society, as was central to the slave-based political economies of Greece and Rome. There was, therefore, no notion of democracy (in its classical sense) or of dictatorship built up from the concentration of political power by delegation or usurpation. Clearly, there was slavery in the empirical sense of this term, and it survived until the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but the nature of the relationship between the state and the 'freeman' was not so fundamentally different from that of the 'freeman', the master, and the slave. There are evidence of great public works - for example, the monumental imperial highway stretching from Susa to Sardis - which are indicative not only of social wealth but also, particularly, of the economic power of the state. The organised and efficient network of state posts and communications, as well as the countrywide system of travellers' inns (*karvansaras*), built and organised by the state, are further evidence for the economic role and significance of the Persian state (see Herodotus, 1954).

The society was divided into four classes below the shah himself: priests, warriors, scribes and peasants. The highest officers in the state were the chief minister, the *vuzurg-framadar*, the commander-in-chief, the *eran-spahbad*; and the chief priest, the *mobadan-mobad*. The chief priest headed the state church, which professed the locally evolved religion of Zoroaster (Morgan, 1988: 9). The system of state administration was rigidly hierarchical: the *shatrada* (satrap<sup>1</sup>), and the *marzaban* were, respectively, the civilian and military governors appointed by the shah to each and every province; they were each directly responsible to the shah himself and they were usually watched by undercover agents from within or outside their own departments 1. Later, under the Ashkanians (174 BC - 224 AD),

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<sup>1</sup> . The original of 'satrap' is more likely to have been *shatrapat*, where *pat* (or *pad*) is of the same Indo-European origin as the Latin *pater*



this system was somewhat 'decentralised', in so far as regional governors enjoyed a measure of autonomy, as well as security of tenure, as long as they rendered the required (especially financial) obligations to the king-emperor. For this reason, the Ashkanian system became known, in the post-Islamic era, as *muluk al-tavayefi* (or government of communal/ tribal rulers).

Katouzian (1981) mentions that translation of the European term and concept of feudalism into this Perso-Arabic word has caused untold confusion among educated Iranians about the nature and significance of both European feudalism and the Ashkanian *muluk al-tavayefi* system. In fact, it may be argued that, depending on the economic and military power of the Iranian state (among other factors), the Achaemenian (satrap), and Ashkanian (*muluk al-tavayefi*) forms of regional administration have intermittently survived in the country down to the present day: for example Sassanis (224-642 AD), Safavis (1501-1722 ) and modern Pahlavi (1926-1979) systems resembled the former, while the Ghaznawis (952-1035), Afshars (1729-1746), Zands (1750-1779) and Qajar (1779-1925) systems were more like the latter. In either case, however, the nature of despotic relations between the king-emperor, his provincial appointees or dependent rulers, and the mass of the people was fundamentally the same.

In the case of Iranian ancient politico-economy, Katouzian (1981) emphasises that, **there were no city-states nor a Roman-type imperial system of government.** The *shah* was not a king - nor the *shah-in-shah* an emperor - in any of the European sense of these terms. He was a despot whose authority, and therefore legitimacy, was founded largely, if not entirely, on personal success rather than on legitimate succession. The myth of the divine right of

‘kings’ was indeed functional, because it did not so much legitimise dynastic succession as legitimise personal success: it was divine right of personal might, rather than of ancestral privilege.

### 3.1.3. Spatial Organisation of Ancient Cities

The pre-Islamic period produced two main city styles (early camp cities and organised cities) and one city middle style (Hellenic cities) (Habibi, quoted by Barghjelveh, 1998) as follows:

- 1) Early Camping Cities: The period of the emergence of cities; the gradual growth of urbanisation in ‘Medes’ and ‘Achaemenian’ times (900 - 400 BC);
- 2) Hellenic cities: the period of the foundation of Greek-planned cities by the Seleucid governors; the rapid growth of urbanisation and the flourish of exchange ‘Seleucidian times (300 BC);
- 3) Organised cities: the period of the suppression of Hellenic cities: the gradual rule of the central governors over and the foundation of strategic; cities; city and society based on caste distinctions in the ‘Ashkanian’ and ‘Sassanian’ times (300 BC - 700 AD).

#### 3.1.3.1. Medes and Achaemenian Times: Early Camping Cities

From about 800 BC massive migrations took place on the Iranian plateau. From these the Medes finally emerged dominant. Their capital was Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) which built in the late seventh century (Pope, 1976). During the Medes period, ‘urbanisation’ was no more than a ‘sedentarisation’. Its spatial crystallisation was also no more than a citadel

which put dread into the people. Its whole idea was a camp constructed upon a hill with some small dwelling locations around it. Mumford writes:

"Deioces' first act was to build a palace suitable for a king, and to ask for 'guards for the security of his person.' One may justifiably assume that in older days the guards themselves preceded or accompanied the erection of the citadel and the palace, and that the palace itself existed, as a visible seat of power and the repository of tribute, before the function of justice was exercised by the king. 'Being thus possessed of power,' Deioces 'compelled the Medes to build one city, and having carefully adorned that to pay less attention to others.' I would emphasise the last phrase: the deliberate establishment of a monopoly, economic and political, has been one of the pre-requisites for the rapid growth of the city. And as the Medes obeyed Deioces in this, also, he built 'lofty and strong walls, one placed in a circle within the other ... Deioces then built fortifications for himself, around his own palace, and he commanded the rest of the people to fix their habitations round the fortification.' Perhaps the best definition for the inhabitants of an early city is that they are a permanently captive farm population" (Mumford, 1975: 61).

Mumford mentions that in lessening the physical distance by concentrating population in the city, Deioces took care to increase the psychological distance by isolating himself and by making access to his person formidable. This combination of concentration and mixture, with isolation and differentiation, is one of the characteristic marks of the new urban culture (ibid.: 62). Such an organisation of space was in response to the principle of contrasting the citadel with its surrounding. In this view, the inhabited city was always outside the walls and probably only in the case of danger were people allowed to go to inside the inner city.

The Persian Empire was established by 560 BC, when two powerful Aryan states, Media and Persia, were confederated by Cyrus the Great, the first Achaemenian. The whole of Western Asia was organised into the world's first great empire - which lasted for two hundred and thirty years (Pope, 1976). In the Achaemenian times the city had, basically, a military, commercial and administrative character. The invention of the coin, the establishment of commercial roads, the development of exchange, and the growth of crafts all facilitated the spatial development of market places inside the walls. The Greek who came to Iran in Alexander the Great's time called Pasargad, the capital of Cyrus the Great, 'military camp for Persians' probably because of its military form. As the buildings were scattered in more than 300 hectares (Poro, 1986), Cyrus the Great's capital was more like a camp than a city.

### 3.1.3.2. The Seleucid Time: Hellenic Cities

After the arrival of Alexander the Great and during the Seleucid occupation the city became an opportunity for the mixing of two philosophies: East and West the first based on the founder-family autocracy, and the second on an aristocracy of nobles (Habibi, 1996). After the death of Alexander in 323 BC, Seleucus (circa 312 BC) took up the reins of the Empire. The Seleucids individualised Alexander's vision of a combined Greek and Persian civilisation. Hellenic design became dominant but never completely absorbed. Cities were laid out according to geometric Greek plans, temples were built on Greek models and characteristic elements of Greek design were used for ornament. However, an acceptance of strongly Hellenic forms seems to have occurred only in areas with concentration of Greek and Macedonian personnel (Pope, 1976).


### 3.1.3.3. Ashkanian and Sassanian Times: Organised Cities

In the Northeast of Persia, in what is now central Asia, another people, the Parthians, developed a different style in the spatial organisation of cities by combining both Greek and Persian styles (*ibid.*). During the Ashkanian reign - a Parthian dynasty - (174 BC - 224 AD), the spatial differentiation of the city appeared much lighter than in the 'Achaemenian' times. This can be said to be because of:

- 1) the expanded influence of the 'central government authority', expressed in increased growth of exchange and wealth; and also,
- 2) the enormous influence of the Hellenic styles from previous times, expressed in the decreased growth of social distinctions inside the city walls.

This led the main parts of city to be positioned as follows (see figure 3.1): first, the palace surrounded by massive walls; second, the barracks, stores and treasury with their own walls; third, the ruler's relatives' residence, the civil and government officials' residence and also the clerics' residence all surrounded by their own walls; and finally, the ordinary quarters including the craftsmen and small retail sellers' residence surrounded by the outer walls (Habibi, 1996).

Figure (3.1): The Parthian City of Koi-Krylgan-Kala, in Kharazm, 400-100 BC, Reconstruction.



Source: Sultanzadeh (1988: 76).




The foundations of the Sassanian Empire were laid by Ardashir I, a local ruler in Fars who overthrew the last of the Parthians. His reign is dated from 224 AD. The most striking Sassanian remains may still be seen in Fars. But if Fars was, and remained, the Sassanian heartland, the imperial centre was at Ctesiphon, on the Tigris a few miles from where the Abbasid caliphs would later build their capital, Baghdad. The *iwan*, the sixth-century audience hall of the greatest of the Sassanians, Khusraw I Anushirvan, survives in part at Ctesiphon, and its open frontal arch is still the largest brick vault known ever to have been erected (Morgan, 1988).

During the Sassanian times (AD 224-642), the city was again based on a caste organisation, but this time more complete and effective compared to the previous one. It was arranged around absolute autocracy based class ranks, all located in their own positions inside the city. A citadel with its tall ramparts, as the military part of the city, was surrounded by residence for the ruler's relatives, both components locked together as the main part of the city i.e. the *Shahrestan*. The spatial organisation of the market place was similar to that of today, comprising four routes facing the four city gates (East, West, North, and South), sometimes inside the *Shahrestan*'s walls and sometimes outside; and finally, the ordinary quarters outside walls (figure 3.2). This time, again, the city - as in the bulk of the residential area for the population - was outside the walls.

Figure (3.2): Plan of the Sassanian Ardashir-Khurreh (Firuzabad) City.

The typical Sassanian city was organised spatially on the basis of four geographical axes with four gates in each axis and circular in shape. The diameter of the city was about two kilometres.

Source: Huff (1986: 192)



### 3.2. State and Urban Spatial Concepts in Islamic Iran

The Sassanian Empire fell quickly, and in its entirety, to the Arab Muslim armies in 642 AD. The Arabs shattered Persian military power at Nihavand in 637 (Pope, 1976) and eventually swallowed Persia whole. For a century Iran was ruled by Arab governors who were responsible to the Umayyad caliph in Damascus. By the mid-eight century the Abbasid overthrew the Umayyads. The new dynasty of caliphs transferred the capital of the Islamic Empire from Damascus in Syria to the newly founded city of Baghdad near Ctesphon; the imperial centre was again where it had been in Sassanian times.

Surprisingly, the continuity of Persian life was not really severed (*ibid.*). The “Persian” identity and the Persian language survived to an extent not paralleled in the former Byzantine provinces, such as Egypt and Syria, that were added to the Arab empire at much the same time as Persia was conquered. Conceivably the Indo-European structure of the Persian language made it more resistant to assimilation to Semitic Arabic than were the languages of the former Byzantine provinces, such as Syriac and Coptic. But for whatever reasons, the conquered ex-subjects of the Byzantine Empire were ultimately absorbed into the new Arab-Muslim civilisation whereas the Persians, though Muslims, never became ‘Arabs’. They are still Persians, and they still speak Persian (Morgan, 1988).

By observing the general characteristics of the history of the Iranian political economy and the institution of land-ownership Katouzian (1981) believes that Iran has not been a feudal society and he emphasises that in the absence of serious argument and evidence to the contrary- those who disagree are not doubt entitled to their private opinions.

### **3.2.1. The Forming of Early Islamic States:**

#### **Restoration of the Old Iranian Concepts of State and City (*shahr*)**

The period of Sassanian rule forms an important part of the background to the history of Islamic Persia. The Sassanian royal house, the last of the major pre-Islamic dynasties, ruled Persia from the early third century AD until the 630s. It is hardly surprising that this centuries long stretch - a little over four hundred years - should have left its mark on Persian history and society (Morgan, 1988).

For the next century Persia was ruled by Arab Governors who were responsible to the Umayyad caliph in Damascus in Syria. By the mid-eighth century trouble was brewing, and the Abbasid Revolution the religio-political rising that overthrew the Umayyads, began in Persia, in the province of Khurasan. Whatever the causes and character of the Abbasid Revolution, it undeniably had momentous consequences in terms of the perpetuation of Persian traditions. First, the new dynasty of caliphs transferred the capital of the Islamic empire from Damascus to what is now Iraq; the imperial centre was again where it had been in Sassanian times. Baghdad, the building of which was begun in 762 by the caliph al-Mansur, was planned as a round city, in a Persian style. Secondly, the position of the caliph itself became influenced by the Persian imperial precedent. The Umayyad caliphs, at least in their early days in theory, had still to some extent been tribal chieftains, treated without excessive deference and always readily available to their subjects. The Abbasid caliph was a remote, inaccessible figure, to be approached only with due (and elaborate) ceremony: a true Oriental monarch in the traditional style, an emperor (Morgan, 1988).

After the mid-ninth century, real power in Iraq was in the hands of the Turkish commander-in-chief, not of the caliph himself. Turkish slaves came by purchase or capture from the East as youths, were converted to Islam, and trained as soldiers. There was nothing dishonourable about this slavery: a Muslim military slave could rise to the highest ranks in the state or the army without necessarily even having been manumitted by his master. Before long, caliphs were nominated, deposed and murdered by their Turkish Mamluk generals. General confusion at the centre, and the series of succession struggles between different Mamluk factions (supporting different Caliphate candidates), meant that the grip of the central government began to slacken in the provinces of the Islamic empire. Local

dynasties, to a greater or lesser extent enjoying *de facto* independence, emerged in North Africa, Egypt, Persia and Central Asia. Few of these rulers cared to place any theoretical emphasis on their lack of submission to Baghdad. No one thought of abolishing the caliphate, or even of displacing the Abbasid house: the caliphate was seen as necessary for the legitimisation of political rule that was in reality in the hands of others. For a further four hundred years Muslim sovereigns continued to seek 'appointment' by the caliph (Morgan, 1988).

The first of the Persian 'independent' dynasties is traditionally said to be the Tahirids, four generations of whom ruled Khurasan between 821 and 873. The next family to appear on the Persian political scene was a very different matter. This was the Saffarid dynasty. They arose in the province of Sistan. Ya'qub the Coppersmith (*saffar*) declared himself *Amir* in 861 and expanded his power both Eastwards into modern Afghanistan and Westwards into Persia. In 873 he ended Tahirid rule in Khurasan. The Samanids were next to claim the centre of the Persian political stage. The base of their power was in the region of Transoxiana, especially the great cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. Although the Samanids did not labour their 'Persian' identity to the extent that the Saffarids had, they were of Persian origin and they did offer important encouragement to the then emerging New Persian literary language. The principal rulers in Persia after the fall of the Samanids came from the East, the Ghaznavis. The Ghaznavis were the first major Islamic dynasty to have their centre in the territory of what is now Afghanistan and that was, at that time, and for long after, on the very fringes of the Islamic world. Their capital was at Ghazna, to the South of Kabul (*ibid.*).



In Western Persia and Iraq the major power contemporary with the Ghaznavis was the Buyid dynasty, which was to prove the last significant Persian dynasty of Persian ethnic origins and background until the Zands in the eighteenth century. They came from Daylam, in the Alborz mountains to the Southwest of the Caspian Sea. Between 934 and 945 the three Buyid brothers established themselves in Shiraz, Rayy and Baghdad. At its height in the later tenth century the Buyid Empire included Iraq, central, Northern and Western Persia, Kirman in Eastern Persia, and even Uman, across the Persian Gulf. Shiraz was the capital. Once the Buyids were established in power, the 'Persian' element in their kingship came to the fore. The dominant culture was Persian rather than Turkish or Arabic. Adud al-Dawla was calling himself *shahanshah* (978 AD) on his coins. Although the Buyids were some kind of Muslim and their period marks the most sustained attempt to set up a rulership in Persia that had direct and overt continuity with the Sassanian tradition (Morgan, 1988).


The mode of production and social structure during Muslim rule underwent no basic changes compared to the pre-Islamic period. In the absence of Arab rulers, the Islamic states, administrative practice in governing empires, Iranian had vital role in organising Islamic states. Habibi (1996) mentions that Iranian administrators restored the old Iranian concepts and models in this regard, so new cities were built and organised along pre-Islamic concepts and styles.

### 3.2.2. Social Structure and State in Pre-Modern Iran

An approach for characterising the social structure of pre-modern Iran is provided by through understand in the modes of production. This views the whole system as a social

formation made up of three distinct but interacting modes of production corresponding to the three major economic sectors already identified by empirical analysis - a *pastoral nomadic* mode of production in the rural tribal sector, a *peasant crop-sharing* mode of production in the agricultural economy, and a *petty commodity* mode of production in urban areas. The modes of production approach illuminates the reasons for the dominant overall position of the state in the history of Iran (Foran, 1993: 42).

Diagram (3.1): The Social Formation of Pre-Modern Iran



Source: Based on Foran (1993: 41).

The historic mode of ruling, despotism without any limiting law and which depended on the agricultural surplus of scattered village units (see chapter two). Aridity served to create autonomous village units of production, none of which could produce a sufficiently large

surplus to provide a feudal power base, but all of which taken together produced a collective surplus so large that, once appropriated by an organised external (regional or countrywide) force, it could be used to prevent the fragmentation of politico-economic power. This martial force was originally provided by invading nomadic tribes, and after that both by the existing and by further incoming nomads, who succeeded in setting up various urban states at different stages of history and prevented the later emergence of feudal autonomy in agriculture, or bourgeois citizenship in towns. As mentioned above, Katouzian (1981) named this model as Persian despotism, based on the 'aridisolatic' society.

Recent scholars emphasise that the church/state distinction did not exist in medieval Islam and, moreover, that the caliph, though certainly recognised as head of the Islamic community, had few of the powers of the pope. The leading intellectual of the day, al-Ghazali, carefully formulated a theory that would accommodate the institution of the sultanate acceptably within the boundaries of Islamic thought. His approach was to argue that the sultanate was not separate from but integral to the caliphate or imamate (cited in Morgan, 1988).

In Wallerstein's world-systemic terms, pre-modern Iran until Qajar's reign would be classified as "a world-empire in the external arena". World-empires were world-systems (i.e. units with a single division of labour and containing multiple cultural systems) with a common political system: "World-empires were basically redistributive in economic exchange (primarily long-distance trade), but such clusters, however large, were a minor part of the total economy and not fundamentally determinative of its fate" (Wallerstein, 1979: 6). The pattern of trade and commerce of various Middle Ages empires in Iran

certainly fits this characterisation. In this regard Foran (1993: 39) believes that eighteenth and nineteenth century Iran, in Qajar's time, had begun to move closer to the periphery of the European world-system.

For surveying social structure and state in pre-modern Iran in spite of the research hypotheses on the influence of the state in social structure forming, the general periods of various states need to be specified. Most dynasties who reigned in Iran, from the Saljuqs in the eleventh century until the Qajars in the nineteenth century, were nomadic tribes, had tribal origins or, like the Safavis had reigned by support of them. The origin of some tribes was the Eastern lands of Iran, and some others from the West. These two different histories are studied separately as tribal states of Eastern origin and tribal states of Western origin.

### 3.2.2.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin

The arrival of the Saljuq Turks marked a new era in Persian history. They were living on the lower reaches of the River Jaxartes in Central Asia, at the edge of the *Dar al-Islam* proper and were converted to Islam. They were still nomads and were still organised tribally. Their conquest marked the beginning of Persia's period of Turkish rule, a period which lasted until the early sixteenth century and even, in some senses, until 1925. By around 1059 Saljuq rule was established reasonably securely throughout Persia and Iraq, as far as the frontiers of Syria and of the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia. The Saljuqs were a tribe of Ghuzz or Oghuz Turks, named after their leader, Saljuq (or, in a more Turkish spelling, Seljuk). Toghril entered Baghdad in 1055. The caliph al-Qaim conferred on Toghril the title of *sultan*, an Arabic word originally meaning 'power'. Beyond any question, Saljuqs were Islamic sovereigns first and foremost. Nevertheless, the Sassanian

legacy - whether in language, culture, political thought or forms of administration - had remained in some senses alive and potent for four hundred years. It was to form a permanent part of the amalgam of influences which came together to form medieval and modern Iran (Morgan, 1988).

The Saljuq Empire may be divided into those areas that were administered directly by the sultan and those that were governed indirectly. Direct administration of cities and agricultural land was perhaps something that did not come naturally to the Saljuqs, with their Central Asian nomadic background. Such areas as were ruled directly tended, for reasons of administrative convenience, to be concentrated near the various Saljuq capitals. The greater part of the empire was governed indirectly. Much land was handed out as assignments, *iqtas*, to powerful Turkish *amirs*, these being the most important single institution of Saljuq government, which also had a singularly long life ahead of it. The origins of the institution of *iqta* lie far back in Islamic history, but as an instrument of government and administrative device it gained prominence under the Saljuqs' immediate predecessors. It may be defined, very broadly, as an assignment of land or its revenue; conferred at the will of the sultan and revocable at his pleasure. Under no circumstances was an *iqta* regarded as a hereditary grant - the *iqta* was, in essence, simply a bureaucratic device: it was in no sense basic to the whole structure of society (see Lambton, 1987). Morgan (1988) believes that it is another matter entirely to call such a society 'feudal'. The third kind of indirectly administered land was that occupied and governed by tribes, for example in Azarbaijan in the Northwest, and in Iraq who were allowed a considerable degree of internal autonomy.



The central administration of Saljuqs were the *Dargah*, the court, and the *Diwan*. The *Dargah*'s permanent population included the military establishment and the great *amirs* of the Saljuq world. The other half of the central administration was the *Diwan*, which was staffed by members of the Persian bureaucracy. The head of the *Diwan*, and thus the official who was ultimately responsible for the collection of the state's revenue, was the *vazir*. Hence he occupied a position which might be characterised as that of 'Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury'. This basic pattern of central government in Saljuq times had been inherited from earlier regimes in the Eastern Islamic world, such as the Abbasid caliphate, the Samanis and the Ghaznawis. Despite countless wars, invasions, conquests and changes of dynasty, the administrative system which was institutionalised in the time of Nizam al-Mulk (an enormously powerful *vasir* throughout the reigns of Alp Arslan and Malikshah) was, broadly and with variations in detail *and* terminology, the means by which Persia was governed until the nineteenth century (see Lambton, 1987 and Morgan, 1988).

The arrival of the Mongols in Persia brought destruction and slaughter on a scale unparalleled in history. Persia itself had to endure two major invasions: those of Chengiz Khan and his grandson Hulegu, and later constituted a major part of a Mongol Kingdom, the *Ilkhanate*. Hulegu had set out from central Asia in 1253, proceeding very slowly towards Persia. Iraq, together with much of Anatolia, was brought by him definitively under Mongol control. Hulegu set up his capital at Maragheh in Azarbaijan and the Kingdom, or the *Ilkhans*, was duly established, to be ruled by Hulegu and his descendants for the next seventy years. Abaqa, reigning from 1265 to 1282 moved the capital of the *Ilkhanate* from Maragheh to Tabriz where it stayed until Oljeitu moved it to Sultanyya.

Tabriz speedily developed because of its situation on trade routes and its pasturelands which were considered to be the best in the country.

The Persian peasants, had to endure a grim time under *Ilkhanate* rule. The main instrument of this oppression was the taxation system. After the difficulty the Mongols may have experienced in grasping the point of agriculture, the peasants left their land in droves. Inevitably this had its effect on the taxability of the agricultural sector, and ultimately led to governmental bankruptcy. In analysing the effects of the nomadic influx into Persia, Morgan (1988) believes that the Saljuqs were, on balance, of benefit to the economy but he mentions that no such suggestion can be made in respect of the much greater nomadic immigrations that occurred in Mongol times.

Although not everything in Ghazan's reform programme improved the lives of the Persian subjects, one of its effects was to tie the peasants to the land. Some positive points may be made in the Mongols' favour. The fact that Persia became, for a vast Asian empire did mean that intellectual horizons were broadened. Persia became a link in the chain that led from Europe to China, and the influence of motifs from Chinese landscape painting in Persian art of the fourteenth century, the first great age of Persian miniature, was highly beneficial. But, the Mongol period was a disaster for Persia on a grand and unparalleled scale (Morgan, 1988).

The collapse of the *Ilkhanate* after the death of Abu Said in 1335 resulted in a series of factional struggles for control of the central government of Persia which had no decisive. In these circumstances it was possible for local dynasties in different areas of the country to

assert their independence ultimately Timur rose to power. Timur was from *Shahr-i Sabz* in Transoxania. He was a member of the Barlas, a tribe of Mongol origin which had become Turkish in speech and had adopted Islam. He was not a descendant of Chengiz Khan. Timur's army seems to have followed the traditional steppe pattern in most respects. Like the Mongol army, it relied on its great mobility and on the skills of the steppe cavalry archer (*ibid.*).

Timur's campaigns in the former *Ilkhanate* had various results, apart from massacre and destruction on a scale equivalent to, and perhaps exceeding, that inflicted during Chengiz Khan's subjugation. He suppressed some of the most powerful of the local dynasties, such as the Muzaffaris and the Karts, perhaps thus ending any possibility that the ultimate successors to the *Ilkhans* as rulers of Persia would be of sedentary origin. So far as the nomadic powers of the region were concerned, his activities were less decisive. Northern India was subjected, on the flimsiest of pretexts, to attack in 1398 and Delhi was sacked and its legendary wealth carted off to Samarqand. Syria still part of the lands of the Mamluk Sultanate was invaded and briefly conquered. An ephemeral campaign with more far-reaching consequences was that against the Ottoman Empire. This culminated in the battle of Ankara in 1402, at which Timur defeated and captured Sultan Bayezid. Timur had taken on all comers and vanquished them all without exception (*ibid.*).

Like earlier Eastern conquerors of Persia, Timur made extensive use of the old-established Persian bureaucracy in the administration of his empire. He found the construction of architectural masterpieces in his capital, Samarqand, even though he himself was rarely to

be seen there. Indeed, the world was plundered for the greater glory of Samarqand (Morgan, 1988).

### 3.2.2.2. Tribal States of Western Origin

In the fifteenth century the West of Iran was the scene of the rising of the Turkmen dynasties, Qara-qoyunlu (Black Sheep) and Aq-qoyunlu (White Sheep) respectively. The Qara-qoyunlu Turkmen was semi-nomadic Turkmen confederations dominate the political history of Western Persia, Iraq and Eastern Anatolia between the death of Timur in 1405 and the accession of the first Safavi shah in 1501.

Qara Yusuf, Qara-qoyunlu, was able to eliminate Timur's grandson Aba Bakr in 1408. He defeated and executed Ahmad Jalayir in 1410 and occupied large areas in Anatolia, Azarbaijan, Mesopotamia and Iraq. His successor, Jahan Shah, included much of Eastern Anatolia, North-western, Western and Central Persia, and Iraq. Their capital was at Tabriz. There, Jahan Shah gave patronage to scholars and poets, even writing poetry himself, and he engaged in building work. Substantial fragments remain in Tabriz of his Blue Mosque, the tile work of which was produced to the highest quality (Morgan, 1988).

The Aq-qoyunlu confederation centre was at the town of Amid, to the West of the Qara-qoyunlu homeland. From 1452 Uzun Hassan seized Amid and thereafter he rose to victory over Jahan Shah in 1467 and extended his power in such a way as to alarm the Timuri ruler Abu Sa'id, who marched against him but was defeated in 1469. Uzun Hassan, now unstoppable, was able to occupy Iraq and the whole of Persia as far east as Fars and Kirman. Khurasan and Transoxania remained in Timur's control. Tabriz became their

capital. After Uzun Hassan's death in 1481 the Aq-qoyunlu realm withdrew into a kind of isolationism. There was no further territorial expansion but much internal prosperity instead, reflected in the opulence of court life in Tabriz and in its patronage of the arts. A series of administrative reforms followed, which were interpreted as an attack on the influential nomadic sector of the population (Morgan, 1988).

The Safavis rule over Persia is conventionally dated from Shah Ismail's capture of Tabriz and defeat of the Ag-qoyunlu ruler Alwand in 1501. Before that time there was a close relationship between the Safavis and the Aq-qoyunlus in Uzun Hassan time and this was strengthened by marriage and family ties between two houses. However it did not survive far into the reign of Yaqub Aq-qoyunlu.

A number of broad tribal groupings - Rumlu, Shamlu, Afshar, Qajar etc, constituted the Safavi state. Their way of life was traditional steppe type and, by the advent of the Safavis dynasty, they were compulsorily converted to Shi'ism. The advent of the Safavi dynasty brought with it compulsory conversion to Shi'ism. The form of Shi'ism chosen by Shah Ismail was not the faith of his Qizilbash followers. It has sometimes been suggested that Ismail's motives were, in reality, and in the modern Western sense, 'political': that he saw in Shi'ism a convenient source of identity, a means of differentiating his kingdom from its Sunni neighbours, Ottoman and Ozbeg (Morgan, 1988). Bernard Lewis has some wise words about such reasoning: "When modern man ceased to accord first place to religion in his own concerns, he also ceased to believe that other men, in other times, could ever truly have done so, and so he began to re-examine the great religious movements of the past in search of interests and motives acceptable to modern minds" (Lewis, 1976).



An undisputed economic peak was attained in the seventeenth century under Shah Abbas and his immediate successors. Shah Abbas made many reforms in internal reorganisation of state such as organising a permanent army, answerable to and paid by the Shah himself and including personal bodyguards, a cavalry force, a corps of artillerymen and a corps of infantry armed with muskets. The governing form of the provinces was in two general kinds. The provinces which were granted to the tribal chiefs as assignments (now known as *tiyul*, like a version of the *iqta* of Saljuq times) and the crown lands as *khassa* which were administered directly by the Shah. The administration of the Safavis empire had been centralised in the hands of the Shah to an extent previously unparalleled (Foran, 1993: 98 and Morgan, 1988: 136).

The centrepiece of social change in the long Safavis period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries is the fall of the dynasty itself to a fairly small invading party of Afghan tribesmen at Isfahan in 1722. Lockhart (quoted by Foran, 1993) characterises the state of the Iranian People during Ashraf's reign as 'terrible' due to wars, rebellions, famine, pestilence and the destruction of their homes and livelihoods as a result of the Afghan invasion. The eighteenth century was marked by fairly frequent changes of 'dynasty' the Afghans from 1722 to 1729, Nadir shah and the Afshars from 1729 to 1746, Karim Khan Zands in Shiraz from 1750 to 1779, and finally the rise of Qajars to a more permanent position of power after 1785 (Foran, 1993: 59).

### 3.2.3. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Pre-Modern Iran

As the new ideology of Islam was spread all over the country, its ideas gradually influenced all aspects of the cities as there were always a defined doctrine based on equality of rights for all citizens. But, with reference to different periods and different places, there have been different commentaries about how the ideology of Islam is interpreted into forming an ideal city by different governors. Most 'Islamic' cities, predominantly built by the people, usually followed different interpretations of Islamic ideals. As a result, therefore, they also demonstrate different performances of architectural styles or different organisation of space as authorised and expressed by different governors. As Cruickshank (1996) mentions:


“Within Islam, however, the variation in styles is distinctive: so much so that to many Muslim scholars the common pattern is blurred to the extent that they deny that there is any such thing as Islamic architecture. These varied styles have evolved around tribal or dynastic foci by which they are known” (Cruickshank, 1996: 561).

The Muslims, conquering Persia and Rome in seventh century were going to accept the administration of a large empire, which had never been experienced by them. The Persian bureaucrats who had just subscribed to Islam accepted this responsibility. Pope (1965: 76) believes that essential elements of Sassanian culture continued to operate within the new framework. The Sassanian's urbanisation policies were the bases for establishing new cities. Thus the city in Sassanid time was formed from three parts: First, the *Kohandezh* or citadel, which was the most important, as well as a political and administrative, section, included a palace, Fireplace and military centres. Second, the *Shahrestan*, or the centre of territory which encircled *Kohandezh* or the citadel, included some neighbourhoods for the great, the

noble, and the teachers. The city gates which were situated in four geographical directions had an entrance to this section. Third, the *Rabadh* or suburb, was a periphery of the *Shahrestan* and a residential area for the merchants, the businessmen and the farmers. Sometimes this was encircled by a wall (figure 3.3). The four cardinal directions, which were religious symbols, had a crucial role in the physical formation of the city.


Figure (3.3): Diagram of a Ancient (Sassanian) Iranian City.

1. Kohandezh or Citadel
2. Shahrestan or Main City
3. Suburb



Baghdad, the building of which was begun in 762 at the beginning of the Abbaside time as a capital for the Islamic state by the caliph al-Mansur, was planned as a round city (fig. 3.4), like Sassanian Firuzabad (fig. 3.2). In the city centre was the Great Mosque and the financial house. It had a carefully royal palace, its audience hall fronted by a Persian-style *iwan*. To fortify the city, Baghdad was surrounded by double external and internal walls entered, like Sassanian cities, through four gates. The space in between these walls were provided by rooms for the guards. The position of the caliph himself became more influenced than it had been in the Iranian imperial precedent. The ancient Middle Eastern imperial tradition had, in a sense, been re-established in the Islamic city of Baghdad (see Lassner, 1980; Morgan, 1988 and Sultanzade, 1988).

Figure (3. 4):  
Reconstruction of  
Baghdad, Iraq, at the  
time of al-Mansur.  
A.D. 762-7  
Source: Leacroft,  
1976.



The urbanisation policies of Islamic states extended the city beyond the *Shahrestan* walls, and in the *Rabadh* or the suburb, which automatically and independently expanded the city, and finally after mixing and uniting to the *Rabadh* and *Shahrestan*, the main walls or the city were transferred to the old *Rabadh*. In some areas the Islamic state had made a military-state camp close to the old cities for the purpose of controlling them. Due to the dependence of city life on the state, and on account of the historical urban tradition in Iran, the people gathered gradually around these cores, and encroached into the old cities, while new cities, like Neishabour in Khorasan arose and flourished (Habibi, 1996).

The sixth-century urban civilisation of the early Islamic era was halted by the invasion of the Mongols. The Mongol invasions in thirteenth century formed one of the most hideous episodes in history. Whole provinces were depopulated by massacre, cities obliterated, and precious libraries consumed in the campfires of the invaders, losses from which Persia never fully recovered. But by the end of the century the Mongol conquerors - tamed and

instructed by Persian culture, started rebuilding and reconstruction commenced all over Persia. Abaqa (1265-82) moved the capital of the *Ilkhanate* from Maragha to Tabriz. So Tabriz speedily developed into a great metropolis (Morgan 1988: 68). One can only imagine what happened to Maragha. Among the greatest Ilkhanid achievements in urban development also lost to us is the quarter of Shanb (Sham) Ghazan erected some two miles from Tabriz in the West part of the city with many buildings and facilities in such variety, organisation and magnitude that hardly rivalled by anything since Perspolis (Pope, 1965: 170).

Wilber says that "in 1306, 'Oljeitu' ordered work begun on the city of Sultaniyya ... The site was an extensive plain near Qazvin which had been a favourite summer camp of the *Ilkhans* under the name of 'Qunghurolonge' or 'the falcon's hunting ground'. A citadel 500 *gaz* on a side and protected by a wall and sixteen towers of cut stone was soon finished" (Wilber 1949: 92-3). By the year 1313 practically all construction was completed (ibid.: 97) of the magnificent monument, the mausoleum of Oljeitu, the highest Islamic dome building, being over 50 metres, Wilber says: "for size, architectural stateliness and grandeur [it] rivals all creations of other countries and other periods" (Wilber, 1949: 99). It was erected with so many mosque, hospitals, quarters and so on. Within few years after Oljeitu died in 1316, rapid decline set in and, in a hundred years only ruins dotted the site, while by the seventeenth century only crumbling fields of debris marked the location of the city (Wilber, 1949: 98).

Persia toward the end of the fourteenth century was again a victim for the furious ambitions of Timur. Again whole cities were levelled, entire populations massacred, and the fourteenth century, which began with the rapid creation of beautiful monuments, ended in disaster. Under Timur's imperious driving force, Samarkand, already architecturally rich,



once more became “the focus of splendour”. He assembled skilled engineers and competent architects from all his far-reaching domains: Fars, Iraq, Azarbaijan, Damascus and Baghdad, in addition to hundreds of stone-cutters from India (Pope, 1965: 193).

The invasion and reign of Saljuqs, the Mongols and Timur who were of Eastern origin had a considerable effects on the architecture and urbanisation of Persia, a period which stretched about five centuries and their achievements in architecture were great. Because of their tribal origin, their architecture appeared in the form of mono-structures like tents. Unfortunately their traditions had no understanding of urbanisation, and the urban patterns were without any plan or precision, which expanded self-actively. People fear of foreign rulers saw their alleys and passes become narrow with many bends in them. From fifteenth century, the Turkmen of Anatolia in the West, coming from the former Byzantine civilisation, entered Iran.

Minorsky (1943) citing Sir Thomas Herbert that in Persia there were about 90 walled towns and about 40,000 villages (Minorsky, 1943: 162). Available contemporary European estimates indicate the population of most of the chief urban places totalled perhaps one million people, with anywhere from a quarter to a half of them concentrated in the capital of the country (Foran, 1988: 75).

Qara-qoyunlu and Aq-qoyunlu Turkmen, having lived in Byzantine territories were aquatinted with urban cultures and brought about extensive new concepts to Iran, which were later followed in Safavis and even in the Zands periods. These included the erecting of urban spaces such as great urban squares which recalled the Greek agoras and the Roman

forums. Erecting urban complexes with regular geometric forms which were developed around the central square and the wider urban pattern expanding self-actively in the meantime, became the new tradition of urbanisation in Iran. Thus, three historical main periods of urbanisation in Iran are;

1. The ancient regular citadel cities;
2. The irregular but great cities of early and middle Islamic centuries; and
3. The regular cities consisting of state urban complexes, with a great square.

Yet order and the civil urban spaces had never been developed in central urban patterns and postponed up to the modern era and the 20th century.

Most of the researchers focusing on the administration of Persian cities have mentioned to a sort of autonomy on neighbourhoods, businessmen, merchants and religious groups, but emphasised that these cities in general were never self-governed (see; Bausani, 1971; Petroshevski, 1968 and Katouzian 1988). The state handled all social institutions of city life and formed them. There are, however, almost no purely utilitarian structures in Persia (Pope, 1965: 242). Architectural styles, so gradually developed in Persia across periods of political and economic decline, were also slow to deteriorate.

In spite of using different materials associated with relative wealth, and at various scales, the pattern which was followed led to a relatively homogeneous built environment. The central government, on the other hand, had no tendency, or, it could not have, to control the way the urban fabrics were developing (Barati, 1997). The nineteenth century, under the Qajar dynasty, saw no important monuments, the period of great Persian architecture had

already ended. The few large buildings of the Qajar period are without distinction (Pope, 1965: 231).

### 3.2.4. Qajars and Urban Spatial Concepts

The Safavis dynasty had lurched into an intertwined economic, political and ideological crisis by the turn of the eighteenth century. A small army of Afghan tribesmen easily brought down the whole edifice in 1722. A modern historian, Jean Aubin, has characterised the century as “catastrophic ... by far the blackest period in the whole history of Islamic Iran” (Aubin, 1968: 241) and Foran (1993) analyses the conditions during the successive reigns of the Afghans, Nadir Shah and Karim Khan Zand, and speaks of societal dislocation, of wars, civil and foreign, famine disease and emigration, adding up to destruction of the economy and depopulation of the country. The eighteenth century was a developmental reversal of huge proportions and its consequences, in terms of and into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Foran, 1993).

A number of factors combined to bring the Qajars to a position of what would prove to be long-lasting political power in Iran by the turn of the nineteenth century while their rivals, the Zands underwent considerable disunity after Karim’s death in 1779. They consumed each other in deadly infighting for the throne. The Qajars were located in the more populous North and able to mobilise a more dynamic economic and human resource base while the Zands found themselves in the less populous South, with a more fractious tribal situation and vastly diminished ties to the world economy, partly the result of Karim’s ultimate spurning of these advantages. The more efficient Qajar military machine was aided at several junctures by fortuitous outcomes in key encounters. Aqa Mohammad’s

army was 'well in excess' of 20,000. By 1790 he had taken control of Azarbaijan, none of whose tribal leaders nor the merchants who administered Tabriz could successfully oppose him (Foran, 1993).

The shah's powers remained, as in the past, far-reaching and wide-ranging in principle. He declared war and peace, made treaties, granted *tiyuls* and offices, determined and collected taxes, was the seat of last recourse in the legal system, had the power of life and death over all subjects, and had the final claim on virtually anyone's property. This led to an imperious and absolute style of government, which was to some degree transmitted downward to all levels of the state. The bureaucracy of circa 1800 was quite rudimentary and small but, in the course of the nineteenth century, the administration both grew and modernised itself, until by the 1890s there were ten ministries. Examples of modernised areas of the state include the postal service, the official newspaper, telegraphs, and education (ibid.: 138).

The transitional period from the traditional period to the modern, is the period in Iran within which many basic changes in all aspects of Iranian life started. This period lasted from the reign of Nasir-al-Din Shah, the fourth of Qajar kings (1848-1896) until the 1940s when the first Pahlavi king, Reza Shah (1925-41), abdicated as a result of pressure from the Russians and the British. In this period external as well as internal pressures provided the possibility for huge changes in the society and the built environment but even this political change was not able to solve the country's endless problems, particularly those caused by both the regime's internal dictatorship and the external interventions (Barati, 1997).

The extraordinary degree of Russian control over Iran in the economic sphere by the outbreak of the First World War has been eloquently stated by Entner: "To a remarkable extent, Persia had been drawn into Russia's economic orbit and was a functioning part of her economy" (Entner, 1965: 77).

France enjoyed considerable cultural influence through its religious missions and schools, The composition of Iran's trade also changed dramatically this period toward a classic 'colonial' pattern by the early twentieth century (Foran, 1993: 114).

The conclusion that the author draws out of the evidence of this history is the ineluctable rise of foreign control and power vis-à-vis Iran. In the terms of world-system theory, Iran moved from the *external arena* of the sixteenth, seventeenth - when at the height of Safavis splendour, it cast itself as part of a non-European *core* - and eighteenth centuries to the *periphery* of the world capitalist system in the course of the nineteenth century. Late Qajar Iran clearly fits Wallerstein's definition of the periphery a world-economy, being "that geographical sector of it wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods (that is, goods whose labour is less well rewarded) but which is an integral part of the overall system of the division of labour, because the commodities involved are essential for everyday use" (Wallerstein, 1974: 302). The increasing exchange of Iran's raw materials - opium, cotton, rice, wheat, tobacco, dried fruits, silk and wool - for Europe goods and European control of the terms of trade, tariffs, shipping and transport, are all powerful indicators of this new pattern of peripherality and dependence (Foran, 1993: 115-116).



Due to the intensity of Russian-British rivalry in Iran, Iran was a periphery of a particular kind. Unlike those countries and regions that were directly colonised (India, Egypt, much of Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere), or were formally independent but subject to a single strong outside power (most of Latin America, first to England and then to the United States), Iran was a battleground for two strong imperialist powers - the English, the core power and the Russians, a semi-peripheral giant on its Northern border (Foran, 1993: 116). As Bausani notes, "Iran thus had all the disadvantages of being a colony without any of the few advantages, such as the creation of industries either to the direct benefit of the colonisers or for their military purposes, improvements in the juridical system, and so forth" (Bausani, 1971: 172). The clearest examples of this are in the lack of infrastructural development, especially the agreements not to build railroads, and the 'most favoured nation' commercial status that had to be won by Russian armies (Foran, 1993: 116).


#### 3.2.4.1. Social Structure in Qajar Iran

Despite all the political and economic dislocations of the century, Shi'ism proved durable and socially cementing in Iran, but saw a shift in its locus of legitimisation away from the monarchy and downward into the popular milieu (Foran, 1993: 102). Therefore, in spite of the existence of socio-economic stratification, the strength of communal bonds prevented the formation of a class consciousness and state-wide socio-political classes. The communities, whether tribal, rural or urban, were almost all similarly organised hierarchically. The rich and poor were tied together particularly through tribal lineages, religious sects, regional organisations and paternalistic sentiments (Abrahamian cited in Madanipour 1989). Inherent in the diversity of the communities (which could be defined as a city quarter, a village, a tribal camp, a religious community or a corporate organisation)

was the communal conflict between these groups, not dissimilar to the strife in feudal Europe of the Middle Ages (Vance cited in Madanipour 1989). The quarter itself was a kind of clan or tribe within which, alongside the ordinary people, the influential people in politico-economic terms used to live within all communities. It was indeed a balanced distribution of economic, political, and social powers throughout the traditional towns (Barati, 1997).

The subsistence-level existence of Iran's peasantry, difficult as it had been in the first half of the nineteenth century, would seem on balance to have worsened after 1850 until the end of this period in 1914 or 1925, due in large measure to the commercialisation of agriculture in the broader context of Iran's increasingly dependent and peripheral position the world system. Foran tentatively concludes that the urban population in general and artisans, workers, and the urban poor in increasing order, suffered significant material decline in their standards of living at the end of the nineteenth century in the period leading up the Constitutional revolution (Foran, 1993: 132). Between 1630 and 1800, virtually no changes had taken place in either fundamental modes of production or their constituent classes within the Iranian social formation. By 1914, both quantitative and qualitative changes had occurred in the Iranian social formation. Quantitatively, the proportion of pastoralists dropped significantly, the urban sector (petty commodity plus capitalist modes of production) had almost doubled its share of the population, and the peasantry had become an even clearer majority (since the pastoral mode declined in size). Qualitatively, a small capitalist sector had emerged with a more prominent native working class than native capitalist class, due to the presence of rival foreign capitalists and the additional Iranian workers in Russia (Foran, 1993: 135-6).

Diagram (3.2): The Iranian Social Formation in Qajar Time (Transitional Period).



Source: Based on Foran (1993: 241).

3.2.4.2. Concepts of Urban Change in Qajar Iran

One of the most important events in the transition period was sending of students to Europe to study architecture. This was the first step towards the discarding local architecture which happened later on. It also led architectural education to be brought under the control of the central government. The first individual who was sent to Europe to study architecture was Mirza Mahdi Khan-e Shaqaqi (1844-1920). He accompanied the first group of Iranian students who were sent to France in 1857 by direct order of Nasir-al-Din Shah. Shaqaqi

came back to Iran in 1864 after he had received an architecture qualification from the Ecole des Beaux Arts, Paris (Barati, 1997).

Tehran in Timur's era, in the fifteenth century, was a large village with no walls, (Madanipour 1989). Becoming the Capital, Tehran started rapidly to flourish. In 1797 the city had an area of only two square miles with a population of 15,000, but after about a decade there were about 50,000 people there (Barati, 1997). James Moriyé, the British ambassador deputy in 1807, criticised Tehran for its simple mud buildings and epidemics. However he recorded four large schools, 150 *karvansarais* and the same number of public baths, two large squares, and two palaces in Tehran. The bad conditions of Tehran particularly in terms of health and hygiene were mentioned by several travellers in this period (Semsar 1987).

Application of these ideas not only created undesirable development in urban areas, but also led to some processes of urban development which were under the strict control of the centralised state. The gaps in the social structure and a sort of cultural dualism between local values and physical changes on the one hand, and the urban structure on the other, later led to the emergence of a totally disintegrated environment and a large number of problems in the social and physical environment.

In the Qajar regime, some important buildings and spaces which in effect reinforced the traditional pattern of the cities were built. In 1869 the Qajar king Nasir-Al-Din Shah decided to develop the town and its surroundings. He ordered the existing wall and moat to be destroyed and new ones built (figure 3.5) (Barati, 1997).




Figure (3.5):  
Main Structure of Tehran  
after Building the New  
Wall in 1860-70s.

Source: Tavassoli et al.,  
(1992)

In this new era Tehran started its take off to become the largest and considerably different city in the country. With these developments, and for the first time, the use of Western patterns and Western names was seen. William Jackson, when he visited Tehran in 1903, described the Iranian Royal Bank, *Bank-i Shahi*, as being of mixed Iranian and European architectural style (Semsar 1987). This combination continued but, over about seventy years, the superiority gradually changed in favour of Western civilisation (Barati, 1997). Seeing the West as a model for the future gradually spread from the Qajar Palaces to the town itself in the form of some governmental buildings. But this idea was not generally accepted by society until the time of Reza Shah when these ideas started to be imposed on society by force.



### 3.3. Pre-Modern State and Urban Form in Iran

The concept of the Iranian pre-modern state dedicated in chapter two and its historic evolution as a system of apart and above the society discussed above. The pre-modern Iranian ruling class of Shah, high bureaucrats, military commanders, and provincial governors, through its control over the key governing institutions - central bureaucracy, provincial government and army - forming the state. Taken as a whole this state has a powerful grip on the rest of society and commanded much of the country's overall surplus (Foran, 1993: 24). This form of state and its changing through the history affected urban forms strongly. Among the most important characteristics of urban spaces are their dynamism and susceptibility to change. It means that with emergence of a new state, could therefore urban spaces lose its former function and change into another one or abandon forever.

The main features of the city in Islamic period (pre-modern era), were *mahlleh* (district) mosque, bazaar, access and square (see Habibi, 1996; Sultanzade, 1986 and Tavassoli, 1991). Some of the basic characters of these spaces were as follows:

#### 3.3.1. *Mahalleh* (District / Quarter)

Also of great social significance in this period is the system of social and individual responsibility for every *mahalleh* (quarter), not only regarding physical issues but all aspects of the environment. Neighbourhood relations, for instance, affected by religious and social values, made the social group of a *mahalleh* into an extended family. Every social and development activity was done by the people although the rich had more responsibility and there were many reasons and ways for this particular group to participate in the quarters

maintenance or development. The Islamic tradition of *waqf*, the practice of giving, for example, a continual fund for the building and maintenance of public buildings from the estate of a person after his death, was one of the most important contributions of rich individuals to public buildings and services.

Therefore the quarter was above all a socio-cultural pattern rather than a physical one. This adopted social and physical structure, which was the transformation of cultural knowledge, is intelligible in people's minds as in their symbolic systems, or spatial language (see chapter two for more details).

Madanipour (1989) stated that, in terms of urban form, the quarter system was the manifestation of the existing socio-economic structure. Every quarter had its own centre and also a specific social and physical personality. The spatial relationship between different spaces all over the town, on different scales, was actually the physical manifestation of a socio-cultural relationship between the groups. Not only the physical pattern and organisation but also invisible social values determined the unity of the *mahalleh*. This kind of relationship still exists in traditional Iranian towns today (see Motawef, 1996).

Sultanzadeh, in discussing the designing of city *mahalleh* (quarters) mentioned that the quarters were not planned out in advance but the general process of the physical shaping of the quarters depended on the city's economy and population growth. Their final shape emerged through the time (Sultanzadeh 1986: 243).

The *hammam* (public bath) is a centuries - old institution which had always been associated with the mosque and water reservoir, together with coffee house and local shops, these form the nucleus of public services in the centre of the neighbourhood (Madanipour 1989).

In cities in the pre-modern era, shared cultural values and traditions brought the different social classes to live together to form a coherent society. The significance of mixed social classes in the quarters with rich people living side by side with craftsmen and workers, was that the close presence of influential people led to a relatively balanced situation in terms of the even distribution of social powers throughout the urban fabric. The existence of this balance of people of different status led to a unity and coherence within which economy, religion and customs were equally important to all members living in the quarter (see Amirahmadi, 1990).

### 3.3.2. Mosque

The Islamic state was born in the city and formed in the mosque. This holy religious space, Great Mosque (*Masjid-i Jami*), through its social and political role, became the most important element of the city in the Islamic period. Changing of Great Mosque form had close relation with changing of Islamic state concept (Habibi, 1996). There are four periods which are distinct in the position and role of the Great Mosque in the Islamic City:

- **First**, the beginning of the Islamic period mosques appeared in a very ingenuous form. The exemplar was the mosque of al-Medina - the mosque of Prophet Mohammad (pbuh). There was no difference between Islamic ideals and political decisions at that time.

- **Second**, shortly after the beginning of the Islamic state, the Great Mosque clearly exhibited a close relationship to the government (in that case Umayyad Caliphate). In this time, it was built beside the palace and was completely in hands of the governor who sought augmenting his political powers through the Islamic ideals.
- **Third**, at the end of the first century of the Islamic period during the Abbasid Caliphate the political and religious powers were separated from each other. In this time the Great Mosque was again separated from the government and was built far from the palace.
- **Fourth**, from the sixth century of the Islamic period onward, the appearance and the location of the Great Mosque changed fundamentally. This time, instead of being a place for prayer and political decisions it was a place for government to show off its power.

From the mosque five times a day came the call to communal prayer and, on Friday, the call for attendance. The mosque became the basic educational institution, from elementary grades through to sophisticated theology, including grammar (a subject more significant than in Western schooling), philosophy and popular lectures. A college, *madrassa*, was often attached, and each mosque had its own library. The mosque was also a political institution of central influence and accommodated varied functions. At the mosque royal decrees, notices of war and so on, are still posted. The mosque was often a court of justice; where contracts were frequently drawn and signed. It often became physically integrated with the city - indeed often becoming its very focus. With its various appendages it was a

veritable *civitas Dei* set in the midst of the *civitas mundi*. In cases where this integration of the two worlds was complete, the mosque merged with surrounding buildings. Hence it had neither external walls nor facade, save for the portal, and its boundaries were frequently difficult to define (Pope, 1965: 77).




Figure (3.6): Plan of the Great Mosque of Isfahan showing the spatial relationship between the courtyard of the Mosque and the surrounding streets.

Source: Tavassoli et al. (1992)

### 3.3.3. The Bazaar

In the Islamic period, the vastness of Islamic empire, and the relative security in its scope, as in the ancient time, were more than ever among the most important factors of trade and prosperity. For this reason, the Bazaar became a main element of the city. Considering the tradition remained from cities of the Sassanian time, the Bazaar passed through the city extended from the site of the authority to the outer wall and then expanded further to all directions. In the Islamic period, Bazaar surrounded the mosque and the school. Like the



mosque, the initial forms of Bazaar were simple and in the course of its evolution they gained a spatial complexity and more sophisticated arrangement, and again like the mosque became a place to show off the magnificence of the reigning powers. The Bazaar could be counted as the backbone of the city (see figure 3.7).


The Islamic government itself was one of the founders and promoters of the Bazaar, not because of the need for circulating of commodities and capital of its people, but for the reason that it was the main owner of commodities and capital.

The physical organisation of the bazaar was also ordered along a certain hierarchy which was not accidental (Marcais, quoted by Barghjelveh, 1998). “The synthesis is achieved through continuous space, defined by cyclically repeated geometric forms, cumulatively sensed through movement. Movement coalesces space and time into a unity that is infinitely extendible in space, yet finitely complete at any given point in time” (Ardalan et al, 1973: 95).

Figure (3.7): Plan of the bazaar of Kashan.

Bazaar as a covered road includes different traditional trade spaces, mosques, *madrasseh* and so on.

Source: Biqlari, 1976




### 3.3.4. Access and Square

The various accesses in the traditional pattern have evolved some specific characteristics by which users were able to recognise them from another. The narrow accesses, *Kooy*, *Koocheh*, and *Paskoocheh*, were under the responsibility and control of the neighbours to varying degrees according to whose buildings bordered them. In this hierarchy *Paskoocheh*, the last, narrowest and closed one, was a semi-private space for the neighbours with social significance, offering a socialising space and playground for children. The main road usually passed through the community centre, therefore some small shops such as the butcher, baker, grocer, were located there. The community mosque and public bath were also connected to this road. These buildings and spaces were the elements that confirmed the status of the main roads (Barati, 1997).

The squares were vast open spaces which had an encircled area or a distinct and non-surrounded one with different functions, including communication, trade, sporting, administration, military, or any combination of these, and were situated in or around the city (Sultanzadeh, 1986).

Squares fulfilling social functions have never existed within Iranian cities and the small squares within residential districts had a predominantly religious function. The great squares of the cities such as Saheb al-Amr square in Tabriz, Naqsh-e-Jihan in Isfahan (figure 3.8), Arq square in Tehran, were mostly formed by rulers.

Figure (3.8): Naqsh-e Jahan Square of Isfahan. The Safavis' Governmental Square and surrounding elements: Polo Field of the Kingdom, Ali Qapoo and Private Palace of the Shah, Masjid-i Shah, Masjid-i Lotfollah.



Source: Based on Tavassoli et al. (1992)

The modern public squares of the city, since the Qajar time in the nineteenth century, were constituted from converting military squares such as Toopkhaneh and Mashq (martial exercise) squares to the public urban spaces, but because of the lack of citizenship rights, there were never changed over to being social spaces and served merely communicative functions or as places for governmental martial exercises.

### 3.4. Conclusion: Pre-Modern Iranian City (*Shahr*) as Seat of State

The city (*shahr*), through history, has been state's territory and *shahrestan* as a centre of a region or different territories. The cities were constituted by the ancient states to perform administrative, political and military duties of rule in different regions, and the governors or military settled in cities which were citadels in form. From a physical point of view these

cities were built like military camps, including a citadel in the middle with the palace, Zoroastrian temple and military barracks placed in it. Around the citadel was a place for settlement of the noblemen: the teachers and other affiliates of government who were from the top classes of the society and the main wall of the city surrounded them. The ordinary people, shopkeepers and the shops settled outside the city wall, around the gates. There were among the lower class of the society together with the peasants.

By the start of the Islamic period the ancient caste system and the class privileges were demolished and the long period of Middle Ages in Iran began. The city walls, the boundaries of differentiation between the higher (in the core) and the lower classes (in the periphery) were destroyed and the *Rabadh* (periphery of *Shahrestan*) encroached into the *Sharestan* (the inner city). At this time a wall would be built round the *Rabadh*, if necessary.

Physically there is no difference between the city and the village in this period, except in population and the location of a military-administrative centre which was in the citadel or around the city. In this period, like the ancient times, the city identity had no distinct functional meaning, unless the government was present.

Surveying pre-modern social constructions and politico-economic developments in Iran shows dramatic social mobility and structural stagnation as the most important historic characteristics of the society in this period. In this regard the historical continuity of physical patterns as a socio-spatial patterns in the cities and the villages can be understood. The physical pattern of the city was homogenous but comprised different quarters (*mahallat*) that

demarcated tribal formations and this main character of the Iranian pre-modern city reflected a tribal structure of state - Iran in its long Middle Ages was mainly a scene of tribal ruling and intertribal wars.

The historic development and decline of cities was driven almost entirely by the political interests of the state. Most Iranian towns were built by rulers as capital cities and centres of authority. In this kind of city the people were not necessarily supportive of the State - much of which was established through invasion and conquest - and therefore the spatial organisation, architecture and urban spaces were designed to suit the rulers' purposes. They therefore only built palaces, administrative buildings, citadels and city wall.

The organisation of cities was based on the siting of *mahallat* (districts) and physical needs were organised inside these territories by the people. As the construction of cities was of simple mud buildings, the state was able to build vast cities rapidly. Investment in city construction was thereby minimised. This phenomenon of the successive and rapid rise and decline of cities was a common feature throughout Iranian history.

Urban spaces are socio-spatial products of society and state as a system was above the system of society. The spatial organisation and physical patterns of cities in the absence of social organisation and social classes in pre-modern Iran had no formal or geometricised structure. This should not be seen to be mere irregularity, as the physical pattern across many cities, with small differences, show general similarities. Common spatial principles formed them, and the urban identity was secured from a unique origin - government. So the proper way of describing this important phenomenon in terms of urban development is through the approach



of recognising the state as being the generator of the socio-spatial forms of Iranian cities, in other words by analysing the *pre-modern Iranian city as a seat of state*. In this regard we can redefine the figure of Rapoport as:





Fig. (3.9): The pre-modern Iranian city as seat of state.  
(Based on Rapoport, 1980)  
Source: The author

# THE MODERN IRANIAN CITY: SPATIAL SEGREGATION

## CHAPTER FOUR

### MODERN IRANIAN CITY: SPATIAL SEGREGATION



# 4

## THE MODERN IRANIAN CITY: SPATIAL SEGREGATION

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### Introduction to Chapter Four

- 4.1. Constitutional Revolution: Emergence of the Modern Era in Iran
  - 4.1.1. Social Construction, Politico-economy and Revolution
  - 4.1.2. Popular Organisations and Municipal Management
- 4.2. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Social Structuring
  - 4.2.1. Visions and the Pahlavis' Sovereignty
    - 4.2.1.1. Nationalism in Iran
    - 4.2.1.2. Pseudo-Modernism in Iran
  - 4.2.2. State and Social Structure in Modern Iran
    - 4.2.2.1. Oil, the State and the Social Classes
    - 4.2.2.2. Politico-Economy of Iran in Reza Shah Pahlavi Period
    - 4.2.2.3. Politico-Economy of Iran in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Period
    - 4.2.2.4. Social Construction in Modern Iran
- 4.3. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Urban Change in Modern Iran
  - 4.3.1. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Modern Iran
  - 4.3.2. Urban Development Planning Systems and Execution
    - 4.3.2.1. The Executive: National, Regional and Local Levels
    - 4.3.2.2. Planning Systems and Urban Development
- 4.4. Modern Concepts and Forms of State, Cities and Urban Spaces
  - 4.4.1. Modern State Concept
  - 4.4.2. Modern City Concept
  - 4.4.3. Modern Urban Forms and Concepts
    - 4.4.3.1. District (*mahalleh*)
    - 4.4.3.2. Street
    - 4.4.3.3. Square
- 4.5. Conclusion: Modern Iranian City (*Shahr*): Spatial Segregation

## Introduction to Chapter Four

In the latter part of the Qajar period certain new developments can be discerned. The old problems continued, such as the extravagances of the court, military weakness, and administrative inefficiency, but there were alongside of them a growing discontent and demand for reform. But the process of change was a gradual movement: there was no sudden transition from the medieval to the modern. Already before 1906 the breakdown in the administration which had occurred had led to considerable changes in practice while, on the other hand, certain medieval survivals lingered on or have reappeared from time to time in the period after 1906. These various and conflicting movements and tendencies came to a head in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6 and resulted in the grant of the Constitution by Mozaffarud-Din Shah in 1906. With this began a new period in the history of Persia (Lambton, 1953: 151,177). The grant of the Constitution in 1906 marks a new period in the history of the relationship of the various classes.

To evaluate the nature of social structure and the change in governance in the modern era along the lines of the evaluation of the pre-modern era in chapter three, the author studies the structure which covered the whole class organisation, culture, politics and economy of Iran. These helped him recognise the nature of modern government and its influence upon Persian social change, forming urban spaces, and modern concepts of these spaces.

The Islamic Republic of Iran replaced the Pahlavi Dynasty in February 1979. This event followed many changes in the political structure of Iran. Basically a religious republic state replaced the secular monarchic regime. In terms of economy Iran, after the Revolution, was faced with huge problems which were imposed by the state of the 1980 to 1988 war with

Iraq. The shortage of resources, war damages and expenditure, alongside a rapid population growth, all added to a complicated situation and economic difficulties were evident all over the country (Motawef 1996). These events were rapid and did not allow a stable social structure to appear in the cities (Barati, 1997). So this research concentrates on the time up to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

#### **4.1. Constitutional Revolution: Emergence of the Modern Era in Iran**

The late nineteenth century was simultaneous with determining social movements in modern history of Iran. Failing of reforming attempts against increasing dissatisfaction of people on the one hand and the increase of foreign influence on the other, paved the way for these movements. Tobacco movement in the years 1890-1892 was the first, wide-ranging and mass movement of Iran in this regard. It was against granting monopolistic privilege of trading all tobacco produced in Iran for export or selling in the domestic market for fifty years to the English company of Talbot. This wide-ranging and mass movement led to the conciliation on the contract.

In May 1896, 48 years after Nasir-al-din Shah's monarchy, Mirza Reza Kirmani, one of the followers of Jamal-al-din Asad Abadi, assassinated the Shah. For the first time the Shah was killed not by a competitor, but an unknown peasant suffering from the government oppression, injustice and cruelty. Jahanbagloo (2000) considered this assassination in a particular way, as a sign of Iran's entering to the Constitutional Revolution. These social motions finally led to a great movement in 1905 which created a fundamental transformation in Persian history. This was the Constitutional Revolution, that signalled the end of the Middle Ages in Iran and, for the first time in Persian history, a Constitution was



written, the legislature and a court of justice were founded and powers separation was formed. A government which had determined judged and executed the law itself for centuries was subject to the law and under the supervision of the parliament. For this reason the Revolution became known as 'Constitutional' owing to power being conditioned by the law and the people's will. Foran (1993) suggests that the Constitutional Revolution paved the way for the modernisation of Iran.

*Mashruteh*, the local name for Revolution, is a Perso-Arabic word meaning 'conditioned', 'constrained' or 'qualified'. The central demand of the Persian Revolution was thus the establishment of a constrained or qualified monarchy; it was also the Revolution's greatest - though not lasting - achievement (Katouzian, 1981: 56). In the European languages, the struggle for *Mashruteh* is generally described as the Constitutional Revolution of Iran. This is symbolic of some serious confusion which go beyond wasteful semantic squabbles; the confusions arise from differences in historical experiences, cultural visions and conceptual frameworks, which are reflected in the use of language. The Persian Revolution was not fought for a social contract; rather, it aimed at a contract or legal framework which would make life and labour less insecure and more predictable. The revolutionaries did not demand equality before the law, for there existed no law (in the European sense of this term) before which men could be equal. That is 'the law' itself was the expression of the whim of those in positions of power, each of whom - according to station - could decide to treat different people differently at different times. Thus the law itself was as changeable as the law-giver, his interest, his mood and his pleasure. By fighting against despotism, the revolutionaries fought for law itself (Katouzian, 1981: 56-57) and the concept of freedom for which the Iranian revolutionaries fought was not freedom from legal restraints, but from

organised and official *lawlessness*; not to enjoy socio-economic equality, but to *divide* the absolute *power* of the state, and share it out between them (Katouzian, 1981: 58). It was freedom from political impotence, social indignity and economic insecurity. It was a struggle by 'subjects' and 'servants' - including landlords, merchants and others alike - to become not so much citizens (in the strict European sense of this term) as *persons*. It was a demand for all to enjoy security of life, limb and property from unconstrained and unpredictable bureaucratic licence. That is why the revolutionaries simply assumed that all other aspects of social welfare and national integrity would be ensured by their triumph against despotism (Katouzian, 1981: 58).

The basic demands of the Persian Revolution were well within the theory and history of Shi'ism. Their success could have meant a greater voice for Shi'ite leaders in the affairs of the State which, itself, was weak, divided and dominated by foreign powers. The religious leaders could not possibly have remained passive towards the vocal and active movement of the majority of their followers. The mosques, theological colleges and religious charities were financed mainly by regular payments and posthumous endowments (*vaqf*) of the propertied classes behind the revolution. Therefore, in the first few years, Shi'ite leaders and preachers were almost totally united in supporting the revolutionary cause and its final triumph in 1906 (*ibid.*: 62).

Foran (1993) believes that the revolution is an outcome of mixed joining of classes and their own modes of production. The coalition of revolutionary groups may be considered as an urban, popular and multi-class unity. In their classification of social powers, the coalition of constitution proponents (merchants, intellectuals, workers, some businessmen

and clergymen and marginal urban classes) on the one hand, and conservatives and reactionaries (the Qajar court and their relatives, some clergymen, the tribes and some of marginal urban classes) on the other. Peasants, nomads and foreign powers had less interference. To conclude the arguments of this brief introduction, **the *Mashruteh* Revolution was fought against traditional despotism, for political, social and economic reasons, by all the classes and individuals who hoped to gain from its results.** It was not a bourgeois, nor a 'semi-bourgeois', revolution (Katouzian, 1981: 64).

#### 4.1.1. Social Construction, Politico-economy and Revolution

The transitional period of transfer from medieval to modern Iran, which incurred many basic changes in all aspects of Iranian life, started from the reign of Nasir-al-Din Shah (1848-1896), the fourth of the Qajar kings (Barati, 1997). The Iranian economy, and also its polity, was inescapably jolted out of 'equilibrium' in the nineteenth century, when the agents of imperial rivalry, free trade, modern technology, political democracy and so forth, made their presence felt in the country. Loss of territory reshaped the map of the country, robbed it (sometimes) of some of its best human and other resources, diminished both its productive capacity and its internal market, and reduced its political power. This, among other things, resulted in the preferential tariff treaties which left the economically weak and technologically backward native industries vulnerable in competition with cheap machine-made products, which, in return, led to a loss of manufactured exports, a shift to primary cash-crop production, a possible decline in staple-food production, and a general rise in imports. The payments deficit and the inflationary consequences were reinforced. Meanwhile, population growth had had a further depressing effect on the standard of living of the majority of people. There was clearly no technical progress, in the strict economic

sense of this term, worth talking about. If anything, there were signs of technical regress, by which means the loss of a self-developed know-how, refined over the centuries, without the acquisition of a suitable substitute which, in its economic consequences, would be at least equal to the foregone technologies (Katouzian, 1981: 45).

The growth of foreign trade was only one aspect of Iran's greater contact with European countries. **The Anglo-Russian rivalry weakened the Iranian State without replacing it by direct colonial rule.** It laid bare the helplessness of the Shah and the bureaucracy, and it humiliated the Iranian people, who blamed the political system as the sole reason for the country's subjugation. It demonstrated European standards of living, education, and so on, which the intelligentsia thought as being exclusively the result of constitutional forms of government. It taught them that, in an alternative system, private property could be safe and powerful, political power could be shared, official posts could be more secure, and life and limb could be better protected against arbitrary decisions. And this, they thought, was all that was necessary for a free, powerful and prosperous Iran (Katouzian, 1981: 55). In this period there were many cases in which the clergy, *Ulama*, along with merchants, artisans, and intellectuals, co-operated in the political struggle against the Shah and his decisions. One of these cases was the struggle between these groups and the Court which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution and the establishment of Iran's first parliament, *Majles-i Shoora-i Melli*, between 1905-11 (see Lapidus 1988).

The modern Iranian state rose out of a period of near anarchy from 1911 to 1925 (Lapidus, 1988). Theoretically, Iran's transition was from being an external arena largely outside the ambit of the world-economy to having an increasingly integrated peripheral role in the

capitalist world-economy as supplier of raw materials and consumer of manufactured imports - textiles, hardware and processed agricultural products such as sugar and tea. This produced differential impacts on various groups and social classes. The three modes of production (*Pastoral Nomadic*, *Peasant Crop-Sharing* and *Petty Commodity*) that combined in the period from 1500 to 1800 were preserved, although the petty-commodity mode of craft production was heavily undermined by the Western imports, and agriculture turned increasingly to the cultivation of crops for export. Relations of exchange rather than production was most affected. Meanwhile, a small new capitalist mode of production emerged, with certain unique historical features. The growing weakness of the Qajar state vis-à-vis Western states and their more powerful armies and economies was linked to processes of fiscal crisis and delegitimation internally (Foran, 1993: 143).

After Constitutionalism a new middle class in Iranian society gradually emerged. Beyond the royal family in Iran the relationship between this new bourgeoisie and their European counterparts was the main force in founding the basis for the European modernism (Barati, 1997), echoing the idea of sending students to Europe that started during the Qajar period. On the one hand, attention to modern sciences and industries, and particularly military activities, led to the invitation of some skilled Western military engineers and cartographers to Iran. On the other, this led also to the dispatch of groups of students to the West (Adamiyat, 1993). State centralisation, economic modernisation, and a new educational system, consequently, helped to create an elite of army officers, bureaucrats, merchants, contractors, doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers and writers, who adopted Western values and a Western life style (see Ashraf 1980 and Lapidus 1988). In this period external as well



as internal pressures provided the possibility for huge changes in the society and built environment.

The First World War was the last straw. When the war ended, Iran was in political and economic ruins (Katouzian, 1981: 66). In the period 1900-1918 a new factor emerged in Iran which was destined to dominate almost every aspect of the political economy in the following decades: the discovery, production and export of petroleum. This afforded the government some room to breathe, as a source of domestic expenditure and foreign exchange. But the oil revenues were meagre both in absolute and in relative terms (Katouzian, 1981: 67).

#### 4.1.2. Popular Organisations and Municipal Management

In this period many organisations appeared which, before the revolution, would have been totally impossible. Among them were labour unions, communities, the early political parties, freedom-fighters or popular armed units (*mojahedeen*) and the urban and provincial communities (*anjumans*) established according to the 1906 Constitution to supervise local issues. These *anjumans*, which consisted of merchants, artisans, *ulama*, and intellectuals, ran the schools, put out newspapers, repaired the bazaars and public spaces, and finally assumed responsibility for stabilising the *Mashruteh* Revolution (see Abrahamian, 1982: 87 and Browne, 1910: 245). The newly-emerged phenomenon of participation in the social arena that appeared at the dawn of *Mashruteh* by the formation of the *anjumans* faced intense desires of large cities inhabitants, so that at the threshold of shelling the Parliament 180 *anjumans* were active in Tehran (Saber, 1999).

In 1907 the municipal (*baladiye*) act for constituting the municipalities “to defend the cities interests and giving the urban dwellers’ needs”, in 1907 was passed through parliament. In this act the establishment of municipalities and the regulations concerned forming of municipal communities (*anjuman-e baladiye*) and the agenda of their duties were included (Hojjati Ashrafi, 1996). The municipalities’ tasks and their organisations related to urban problems were fairly simple; provision of bread and sweeping the city lanes were among the most important of them. By the domination of Pahlavi regime and through the armed despotic rule of Reza Shah in 1930, by cancelling the former act, a new one was passed that decreased participation of the people in administration of the affairs to an insignificant level, so that the interior ministry appointed the head of the city or province (Hojjati Ashrafi, 1996).

#### 4.2. The Pseudo-Modernist State and Social Structuring

Modern utopian ideals were sponsored by the intellectuals in the Constitutional Revolution. In 1905 these ideals were in the form of demands for court of justice and, in 1906, for a legislative assembly, a constrained ruling system and a written Constitution (Foran, 1993). The Constitutional Revolution witnessed a short-term triumph for these modernising intellectuals, who were influenced by Western ideologies, Nationalism, liberalism and aspired the modernisation of their society according to contemporary European societies (Abrahamian, 1982).

Between April 1924 and November 1925, when the Qajar dynasty was overthrown, Reza Khan played his hand very carefully, especially with regard to religious affairs and, above all, his relations with Qum. In mid-October 1925 a simple motion - signed by a number of

deputies, including some who until recently had been in opposition - was tabled in the *Majlis* demanding the abolition of the Qajar dynasty and the temporary transfer of the royal title to the Prime Minister. According to the provisions of the Constitution a constituent assembly elected and ratified the decision (Katouzian, 1981: 91).

The year 1926 marks the beginnings of the supremacy of pseudo-modernism in Iran, which, though with interruptions and variations, lasted in 1979 by a revolutionary movement. A brief discussion of the meaning and significance of concepts of modernism and pseudo-modernism, and their relevance to the study of modern Iran is necessary. Modernism is a synthesised vision of both science and society which gradually emerged from European developments in the past two centuries. It is a general attitude which reduces sciences to mechanistic, technological and universal laws, and social progress to the purely quantitative growth of output and technology. In this respect, the modernist vision is not ideological, for a mechanistic and universal attitude to science, and purely quantitative and technological aspirations for society, may be contained and pursued within conflicting ideological frameworks. Many intellectuals and political leaders of the Third World itself are voluntary victims of superficial version of his European modernism - that is, of pseudo-modernism (Katouzian, 1981: 101,103).

Modern technology (which is often confused with modern science) is seen as omnipotent, and capable of performing miracles which would solve any and all socio-economic problems once purchased and installed. This may explain why traditional social values and techniques of production are regarded as inherent symbols of, indeed causes of, backwardness, and sources of national embarrassment; and why industrialisation is viewed

not as an objective but as an object, and the installation of a modern steel plant not as a means but as an end in itself (Katouzian, 1981: 103).

#### 4.2.1. Visions and the Pahlavi's Sovereignty

The characteristics at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century in Iran were the acceleration of collapsing traditional society owing to the politico-economic influence of the West, and its spreading of European thought lines on the one hand, and the development of movements and social and political oppositions on the other. An strange mixture of political liberalism, romantic nationalism, religious patriotism, and western aspiration formed the ideological foundation of political communities (*anjumans*) of the Constitutional Revolution and the defending it (Entekhabi, 2000). In this way the Iranians who were dispatched to the European countries for education or business purposes had a major role. At the beginning of 20th century due to the development of business relations with the West and the Iranians interest in studying modern sciences, this trend increased. As Ghaffari (1989: 177) points out, between 1904 and 1914 an average 300 Iranian student were in France.

Three basic political tendencies can be identified since the triumph of the *Mashruteh* Revolution and all of them may be described as 'nationalist' from the viewpoint of European history and social science. The first tendency may be called 'modern', 'progressive', 'radical' or 'forward-looking' nationalism; the second, 'liberal', 'democratic' or 'bourgeois' nationalism; and the third either 'conservative', 'insular' or backward-looking nationalism, or indeed, 'obscurantist' or 'pro-feudal'! (Katouzian, 1981: 82). In fact, only the first tendency can be clearly identified as having a kind of nationalist vision

similar to its European counterpart. It was hard-headed, modern-minted, impatient and acutely conscious of the ancient - that is, *pre-Islamic* - glories of the Persian Empire. It wanted to remove the barriers which it believed religion had put in the way of Iran's cultural and technological progress. It was weary of the slow processes of parliamentary and judicial deliberations (Katouzian, 1981: 82).

An increasing number of poets, distinguished intellectuals, lawyers and soldiers came to gather around the personality of Reza Khan in 1920s. These literati compiled books and journals about bygone glories which had ended in total poverty and helplessness. They popularised the stories of the Achiminid and Sassanian military and their cultural achievements. It seems inevitable that the practical leadership of this tendency should have been assumed by a military leader, and Reza Khan emerged as the obvious choice (ibid.: 84).

#### 4.2.1.1. Nationalism in Iran

During Constitutional Revolution in January 1906 after a sit-in and for the first time the cry of 'live the people of Iran' was heard (Kermani, 1967). Foran (1993) says that, in this period, nationalism took the form of confirming Iran's right against the West and, in the meanwhile, confirming the people's right against the government. Various factors in the 19th century were effective in emerging and developing a notion of national identity among the intellectual elite of Iran. Today in Persian the term *mellat* is equivalent to 'nation' but original and genuine meaning is 'religion'. Later this word developed a broader meaning and referred to people who determined their identities through religions affiliation. Finally in 19th century after diffusion of western political thoughts the term *mellat* came to mean



'nation'. Xenophobic feeling and religious dogma were among the indivisible components of the Iranian culture (Abrahamian, 1982: 94). In the social movements of 19th century they were actively engaged along with the clergy (*ulama*) and intellectuals. But despite the harmony among different social groups, there was no agreement on Iranian identity. Some, such as the clergy (*ulama*), some bazaar businessmen and merchants, supposed Islam to be the main component of Iranian identity while other groups like intellectuals and some of the modern merchants emphasised upon the western concept of nationality (Entekhabi, 2000: 34).

Political direction and the belief content of Iranian nationalism changed after the *mashruteh*. Despite great hopes stimulated by the Constitutional Revolution, the Revolution years faced increasingly social disorder, the down-fall of ruling authority and government crisis (from 1906 to 1916, 36 cabinets were constituted in Tehran). Chronic financial crisis and Anglo-Russian attempts to dominate Iran and led to riots all over the country. The intellectuals, inspired by modernist feelings and exhausted by the deceleration of reforms, ignored legislative methods and regulations; they could see all their ideals and desires for democracy and its privileges perishing in a country like Iran.

The group of intellectuals, which included poets, writers, journalists, military commanders, government officials and politician, was the origin of an approach that may be named 'civilisation-oriented nationalism'. Its ideology was western-oriented, secularised and intended to create a centralised politico-cultural authority. Therefore the romantic nationalism of the 19th century's intellectuals and the liberalistic patriotism of the constitutionalists depended on political pluralism, equity and the value of national ruling

thought was replaced in the 1920's, by a civilisation-oriented nationalism which relied on a positive command and intention- oriented perception. The proponents of this approach were discouraged from constitutional practice and incomplete function of democracy in a backward country like Iran and influenced by newly emerged fascism in Europe believed, that an Iran freed from the hand of monarchical despotism needed an 'idealistic dictatorship'. For them it followed that the Iranian people had to be deprived of freedom, for they were not mature enough to constitute a *demos*. These proposed reforms came into existence during Reza Shah's rule (1925-1940). He effectively buried the democratic and liberalistic ideals of the 19th century nationalists and constitutionalist patriots as well (Entekhabi, 2000).

There were many Iranian politicians and intellectuals who began to formulate ideas, and develop social aspirations, which had been profoundly influenced by their knowledge of European (including Russian) societies (Katouzian, 1981: 103). In a country in which the term 'nation' and the European concept of 'nationhood' had never existed, a narrow concept of 'the Iranian nation' was fabricated. This had no beneficial results whatsoever; but it sowed division among the Iranian cultural entities, which had always made up a coherent *community of Iranians* (ibid.: 106).

Reza Shah's nationalism, too, differed from much of the earlier Iranian nationalism in that it was cast in secular rather than Islamic terms and focused on the might and glory of the State and Shah. The only variety of nationalism permitted was what Keddie (1981: 94) designates as "official nationalism stressing national homogeneity, anticlericalism, and a modernity and strength that were read into the pre-Islamic past." and finally Katouzian

(1981: 171) concludes that **Iranian nationalism, in the historical sense of this term derived from European experience, has been the ideology of despotism: the ideology of Reza Shah, his son and its supporters.**

#### 4.2.1.2. Pseudo-Modernism in Iran

Both the European modernists and their superficial emulators in 'developing' countries are universalising in science and homogenising in society. And the pseudo-modernists of the developing countries, who suffer both from cultural alienation and from a national inferiority complex, jealously try, by all possible means, to create miniature show-pieces of 'homogeneity' with European societies (Katouzian, 1981: 125). The rise and supremacy of official, as well as unofficial, pseudo-modernism in Iran was based on, first, an uncritical rejection of all existing Iranian traditions, institutions, values and so on as being 'backward' and a source of national humiliation and, secondly, a superficial zest, an emotional fever, for the imitation and emulation of all things European within the narrow confines of a small, but increasing, group in the urban community. That this pseudo-Europeanism itself was based on the ancient institution of Iranian despotism shows up the true 'modern and progressive' content of official pseudo-modernism; who believe that you 'need' an iron dictatorship in order to achieve democracy.

This irrational attitude of cultural self-denigration and capitulation was, however, combined with an equally irrational sense of Iranian chauvinism and self-glorification. It was by no means a one-man operation for not only the organs of the state, but also scores of journalists, writers, poets, intellectuals, teachers and academics, made significant contributions towards its realisation (ibid.: 105-106).

It was not the European ideas and techniques in themselves that played havoc with the whole social fabric. It was the failure to initially understand and criticise those ideas and methods within their own, European context and to use, not emulate, those of them that, in a sensible synthesis with Iranian social and historical realities, could serve the cause of social reconstruction and progress (Katouzian, 1981: 107).

#### **4.2.2. State and Social Structure in Modern Iran**

Pesaran (1982) believes that there are two sorts of political stability of which one comes to existence because of increasingly participation of people, and the other because of sheer might. The Pahlavi governments during modern era of Iran, used the second pattern in that they relied on the army and oil revenues.

After the second World War the United States replaced Britain and Russia as the principal interfering country in Iran's affairs so that at the end, the Pahlavi dynasty had converted to an armed despotic monarchical system buttressed by petroleum and depending on the United States at the dawn of Islamic Revolution in 1979.

##### **4.2.2.1. Oil, the State and the Social Classes**

A key factor behind the modern Iranian political economy has been oil production and revenues. As a theoretical framework to elucidate the mechanisms of development in the oil-exporting countries, Katouzian (1981) mentions that the most distinctive feature of oil production, export and income is that - except in the initial stages - they require hardly any contribution from domestic means of production. In particular, the involvement of the

national labour force in the production of oil is all but negligible. This provides the most important contrast between oil production and the production of other important minerals, such as coal, copper, diamonds and even gold itself. In the case of all these other minerals, the proceeds are shared by private and public capital and labour; the share of the state in the profits (other than the return on its own investment) would, as usual, arise from the indirect taxes imposed on the product, and the income tax paid by the people involved in any means of production.

By contrast, oil revenues accrue to the state directly as a large and independent source of finance: the state does not even have to depend on the domestic means of production for this revenue, and does not have to return a large percentage of it in terms of wages and other costs, as in the productive enterprises under public ownership. Therefore, once these revenues rose to a high level, making up at least 10 percent of the national output (source), they begin to offer the state an unusual degree of economic and political autonomy from the productive forces and the social classes of the country. For society at large, these revenues become an invisible (almost mysterious) source of growing 'welfare' through the state, until they begin to appreciate their hidden mechanism.

To the extent that the oil revenues make the state independent of the domestic means of production and the social classes, the latter then become dependent on the state for employment, direct hand-outs and privileges, borrowed capital for investment, booming domestic markets for high profits in production, trade and speculation, as well as general welfare schemes ranging. Therefore, as the fount of economic and political power state expenditure affects the fortunes of various social classes. **The petrolic system of**



**stratification turns the state into the patron of a growing clientele, the patrimonial guardian of life and labour for the urban masses** and the agent of social excommunication for the peasantry. If, as in the case of Iran, there already exist historical forces and institutions of despotism, and a traditional domination of urban over rural society, the petrolic system merely serves to reshape and reinforce the already existing, or surviving, relations and tendencies (Katouzian, 1981: 246).

State investment expenditure places great emphasis on the urban sector; it emphasises construction, modern service activities such as banking and insurance, and heavy industries (steel making, machining and so on). It also employs the latest - capital-intensive - modern technology. This is the usual pattern of the pseudo-modernist approach to economic development, with or without oil, the complex reasons for which cannot be discussed here. Therefore, the investment strategy of the state also promotes construction, services and so on, and discriminates against agriculture. This results in agricultural stagnation, a more rapid widening of the urban-rural gulf, a shortage of food and agricultural products from the supply side, and the growth of peasant migration to towns and cities (Katouzian, 1981: 247). The oil had enough importance to the state for Foran (1993: 312) to call it a governmental institution. It was the fuel of the modern state's machine.

#### **4.2.2.2. Political Economy of Iran in Reza Shah Pahlavi Period**

The years after constitutional revolution were the years of riots and ill fortune. The Shah's disability, the division of Iran between Russia and Britain, the lack of a powerful Parliament and the permanent danger of extensive rebels in different parts of Iran, more than ever disappointed the Iranians who were following a powerful reformist and modern

government (Jahanbagloo, 2000: 21). It was in these unsettled circumstances that a hitherto rather obscure military officer named Reza Khan, who had risen through the ranks from second lieutenant in 1912 to full general by 1920, marched the Cossack Brigade from Qazvin to Tehran in February 1921 to seize the reins of power. There was significant British involvement in the coup (Zirinsky, 1994: 44) and this pushed through a change of dynasty in 1925 by a skilful military centraliser with significant, if misplaced, urban support from the *ulama*, the left, and nationalist middle classes (Foran, 1993: 204). Banani (1961: 47) feels that Reza Shah was inspired, encouraged and supported by an articulate majority of intelligentsia and that the rise of the intelligentsia was at the *ulama*'s expense. Foran (1993: 243) emphasises that the intelligentsia was tied to the state to some degree. The men around Reza Shah, those who had played a crucial role in putting him on the throne, were by no means faceless and dependent lackeys and clients. On the contrary, some of them were among the most able politicians, administrators and army generals in the country (Katouzian, 1981: 108).

The Pahlavi regime, from the outset, presented itself as a secularist regime and took a stand against the clergy, thinkers and Islamic values. Reza Shah's regime believed that Islam was the fundamental reason for Iran's retardation (Bashiriyeh 1984). Therefore one of his objectives was to replace traditional culture, including Islam, with his own secularist ideology and its related policies. Following this policy many changes in Iranian society, e.g. urban textures based on European styles, were imposed on the society (Barati, 1997). Minorsky (1964: 255) mentions that we cannot follow further the vicissitudes of Islam in Persia. Under Reza Shah Pahlavi the people's attention was turned toward new undertakings and new horizons. The Europeanisation of the state was pursued with

remarkable zeal, and public displays of a religious type, such as the celebrations of the month of *Muharram*, were looked down upon. The role of the clergy was considerably reduced, such that it was kept out of political affairs (Minorsky, 1964: 255). Reza borrowed heavily from the West a host of economic, political, and judicial concepts and realities, from dress codes to urban architecture, judicial statutes to the educational system, secular ideologies glorifying the state and nation to modern industry and technology (Foran, 1993: 225).

Iran's urban modes of production remained two - the petty-commodity in the craft sector and the capitalist in the industrial sector - but the capitalist mode now began to expand both in absolute terms and relative to artisan production. In the 1930s the state took the lead in extending the development of capitalism in Iran. A majority of the state's development resources went into infrastructural projects, of which the most spectacular was the railroad, a wasteful, costly project with numerous drawbacks. Other infrastructural developments included 20,000 kilometres of roads, the inauguration of air transport, installation of electric power in all major cities (though water systems remained unimproved) and building a communications network (Banani, 1961: 135). The result of these investments was that Iran's infrastructure for capital and industrial development was markedly enhanced between 1925 and 1941 (Foran, 1993: 234). On the basis of the evidence it is clear that, in his economic policies, Reza Shah wasted the national resources by investing them in projects which involved high costs and low returns (Katouzian, 1981: 133). Reza Shah's despotism was both central and bureaucratically centralised (Katouzian, 1981: 150).

The 1930s can be seen as a transitional period in Iran's place within the world-economy. For Ashraf, the Reza Shah era represents a transition from "the semi-colonialism of the

19th century and early 20th century to the neo-colonialism of the cold war era". Iran remained dependent despite Reza Shah's avowed nationalism, self-reliance, and strong state, due chiefly to three inter-related mechanisms: control of oil by the British, unequal trade with the Soviet Union and Germany, and the vicissitudes of trade as a periphery of raw materials (Foran, 1993: 249). Thus the 1930s solidified Iran's place as a periphery of the world-economy. This picture of growth, with its uneven benefits across classes, sectors, and regions, is the pattern we have conceptualised as a *dependent development* (Foran, 1993: 244).

Reza Shah's main sources of support came from the incumbents of the institutions he created - army officers, bureaucrats, monopoly traders, industrialists and a segment of the intelligentsia (Foran, 1993: 250). Though Reza's state lacked deep legitimisation in civil society it was able to rule by this combination of extending material advantages to new groups, repressing long-standing opponents and the losers in the developmental process, and keeping much of the population either apolitical or silent. Reliance on the army successfully underpinned this approach to power for most of his reign and, though social movements did occur, they were defeated (Foran, 1993: 251).

The Allied invasion put a seal on Iran's continued dependence in the Reza Shah period. In other words, Reza shah could *arguably* have remained in power if he had possessed a real social base or measure of internal legitimacy. In their absence, however, the tensions in the world-system, which had given him an opportunity to rise to power in 1921-25, proved his undoing in 1941 (Foran, 1993: 255).

#### 4.2.2.3. Politico-Economy of Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Period

Iran was occupied by the Allies countries in the World War and Reza Shah abdicated and his son, Mohammad Reza succeeded him. The Allies exploited Iran, acquiring their supplies at rock-bottom rates by devaluing Iran's currency, printing money and granting themselves credits. These economic developments had a harsh impact on the population, bringing about shortages of basic goods, especially in the cities, and forcing devaluations of the currency (Foran, 1993: 266). In such hard situations the social forces were released from state pressure. For example on December 12, 1945, a locally-chosen provincial assembly led by the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan under Jafar Pishivari declared the establishment of the "Autonomous Government of Azarbaijan" at Tabriz. They called for: freedom and autonomy in Azarbaijan within the national territory of Iran; support for democracy, constitutional government, and local self-rule; use of Azari in schools and administration; protection of minorities' and women's rights; and economic measures aimed at reducing unemployment, distributing land, and retaining provincial tax revenues (ibid.: 274). These movements relied on Russia and, by agreement of the Iranian government and Russia, they were defeated after only one year, in December 1946.

Between 1951 and 1953 the second mass social movement to take place in the twentieth century swept Iran. It was the Oil Nationalisation Movement. Musaddiq, the leader of the movement, was the Prime Minister and the head of an independent government administration; that is even at the best of times, he was in charge of *only one organ of the state*. The rest of state apparatus was still in the hands of despotic agents and institutions, who, in pursuit of their own interests, collaborated with the interested foreign powers



against the Iranian Popular Movement (*Nehzat-i Melli-yi Iran*) (Katouzian, 1981: 164). Like its predecessor the Constitutional Revolution, the struggle for oil nationalisation, led by Mohammad Musaddiq, confronted both the monarchy and foreign powers in Iran, mobilised a vast urban multi-class populist alliance and, after initial successes, suffered internal and external intervention, to end in failure by the *coup d'etat* of August 1953, with the advice and support of CIA.

Katouzian (1981: 164) believes that the Iranian Popular Movement in this period was not a nationalist movement, and Musaddiq was not a nationalist. It was a democratic (i.e. *Melli*) movement aimed at the establishment of sovereignty without, and democracy within, the country. Foran (1993: 283) see this movement as a revolutionary attempt to break Iran's external dependence on the West and, in particular, on Great Britain, and that internally, it offered a far-reaching reform-oriented attempt to make Iran a functioning, democratic, constitutional monarchy.

In 1962 the Land Reform (Land Nationalisation) Law was implemented. Katouzian (1981: 301) mentions that it was not a proposal for democratisation and does not mean, and was not intended to mean *nationalisation* which, in the Iranian conditions, would mean *state* ownership as opposed to *public* ownership. **The main political consequence of the land reform was the effective replacement of the all-powerful landlord in the villages by the obtrusive state** (Foran, 1993: 322). It caused the carry over of class antagonism from landlord to government authority. The young peasant now believes that, where as before the elders said that if a child died it was the will of God (*dast-i khuda*), now that it is the will of the government (*dast-i dawlat*) (Hooglund, 1982: 137). The land reform also eroded tribal

holdings by 'nationalising' all pasture-land, reducing tribal control and increasing dependence on the state (Foran, 1993: 324). To the longstanding urban poor and marginal population was added a vast new group of migrants from the countryside in the 1960s and 1970s. The tide of landless peasants pouring into the cities in search of work also rose (Foran, 1993: 337).

The era between 1953 coup that return the Shah to monarchy and the 1979 Revolution that exiled him of country forever, was a new season in Iranian changing social structure. There was pre-capitalist agricultural transition and urban rapid industrialisation accompanied by huge oil revenues. There was a rise in Iran's oil income from \$817 million in 1969 to \$19 billion in 1974 (Amirahmadi 1990). The main socio-economic characteristic of this period is the influence of oil revenue on all aspects of life in Iran. Iran's GNP and industrial growth rates were among the highest in the Third World. Given the lack of manufactured exports and its dependence on oil revenues for growth, however, these proved rather deceptive indices of development. Encompassing manufacturing, construction, services, the state bureaucracy, and middle class professionals, the capitalist mode of production became the largest mode in the urban sector as well by the 1970s (Foran, 1993: 325). Manufactured non-oil exports were only 2-3 percent of all exports circa 1975, comparing poorly with such countries as India (over 50 percent), Singapore (60 percent), and Mexico (33 percent). At the very "gates of the Great Civilisation, the output of all agricultural and industrial goods put together was only about one-fifth of the entire national output of the 'Japan of the Middle East" (Katouzian, 1981: 258). Behind this litany of problems lurked structural weaknesses deriving from the dependent nature of Iran's industrialisation process (Foran, 1993: 327).

Conceptually, the most striking changes over three decades has been the qualitative transformation of the peasant crop-sharing mode of production into a capitalist agricultural sector with the attendant transformation of peasant sharecroppers into small-holding peasants, and landlords into capitalists. For understanding Iran's place in the world-system of the 1960s and 1970s, Foran (1993: 341) mentions that, theoretically, Iran was moving from the periphery of the world-economy into what Wallerstein (1974) calls the semi-periphery, that middle echelon of states both in terms of economic rewards and political power in the world-system, a group which is simultaneously exploited *vis-à-vis* the core while itself exploiting the periphery.


The United States took the lead from Great Britain as the undisputed hegemonic core power in Iran after the 1953 coup. One of the examples which shows the extent to which the second Pahlavi leant on Western countries can be seen in the enactment of 'Capitulation' in 1963, by which all the Americans in Iran were given 'Judicial Immunity'. Such laws were attacked severely by all the opposition, especially the clergy and the various Islamic movements and the other parties. As a result the concession was later cancelled (Barati, 1997). Multiple ties - economic, political and strategic - were established between the two countries and Tehran became the CIA's Middle Eastern headquarters (Foran, 1993: 345). Indeed, after the coup against Prime Minister Mussadeq, a period of suffocation started. This political period, 1951-79 has been called 'ruling through fear'. From this time all kinds of policy making processes were under the direct control of the Shah, his family and his government (Barati, 1997).

Finally a massively popular but loosely united revolution brought the Shah down in 1978-79 (Foran, 1993: 217). Nearly all researchers of Iranian politics believe that this revolution was an outcome of class coalition. Abrahamian (1982) says that the coalition was among the traditional middle classes (the clergy, merchants) and modern middle classes (intellectual, students) and the workers and the lower urban classes acted as “destructive forces” of the revolution. Foran (1993), by means of a logical combination of revolutionary theories on modes of production, world systems, dependence, the system's legitimacy, the nature of government with the political cultures of the opposition, explained the Iranian Revolution and suggested the concept of a 'multi-class, popular and urban coalition'. He supposes the main quality of the revolution as populist.

#### **4.2.2.4. Social Construction in Modern Iran**

The total population of Iran, estimated at around ten million people between 1900 and 1914, grew by almost 50 percent, to 14.6 million in 1940. The compound rate of population growth, which, due to war and famine had been only 0.08 percent a year for 1900-1926, increased considerably to 1.50 percent annually for 1926-1940. There were dramatic shifts among sectors of the population. In 1900 the population was 20.9 percent urban (2.07 million people), 25.1 percent tribal (2.47 million), and 54.0 percent peasant (5.32 million). 1940 estimates suggest 22.0 percent urban (3.20 million), only 6.9 percent tribal (about one million), and some 71.1 percent peasant (10.35 million). This reflects the devastating degree of sedentarisation and semi-settlement of the tribal sector (Foran, 1993: 227).

Diagram (4.1): The Iranian Social Formation Under Pahlaviup to 1941.



Source: Based on Foran (1993: 242).


Agricultural policy in general was virtually ignored and the budget allocated to this vast sector of the national economy was minuscule. Government pricing policies actually worked *against* agricultural expansion (Foran, 1993: 229). The overall standard of living of Iran’s peasantry was not very satisfactory, to say the least. Many observers held it to have deteriorated by the end of Reza Shah’s reign (Keddie, 1980: 154), by which time peasants were usually hungry. A 1950s survey by the United Nations found daily caloric intake in Iran at under 1800 calories per adult, “the lowest in the entire impoverished Middle East” (Keddie, 1960: 2). Health conditions were equally abysmal (Foran, 1993: 231).



Against this background, a boom in the import-export (but mainly import) business, and the related tide of consumption of modern products was created. At once, the country began simultaneously to display the signs of Rostow's stages of *tradition*, *transition* and *high mass consumption* - of course in different sectors, and for different social classes; there were, however, no signs of *take off* or *industrial maturity* (Katouzian, 1981: 207).

The population had continued growing since the Second World War, probably at an average annual rate of 2 percent. The 1956 census estimated the population at 18.5 million, 70 percent of which was rural, and of the remaining 30 percent, one-third was located in Tehran. Rural-urban migration was still insignificant: the growing concentration in the capital was primarily due to the flow of migrants from other towns and cities because of better social and economic prospects, the concentration of bureaucracy in Tehran (to which any Iranian applying for a passport had to come, wherever his or her home), and modern attractions such as drive-in cinemas. The peasantry grew relatively poorer, but the urban 'middle class' increased in number, and enjoyed a significant rise in income and consumption. They began to buy refrigerators, television sets, and so on - all of which were imported - on hire purchase (ibid.: 207-208).

Diagram (4.2): The Iranian social formation under Pahlavi up to 1977.



Source: Based on Foran (1993: 340).

4.3. The pseudo-Modernist State and Urban Change in Modern Iran

The new phenomenon in modern urban development was a split in society between the followers of the Pahlavi state that believed in modern European society as the symbol of progress and the majority of society who were against these ideals. The process of adapting these modernising ideals and models affected the urban physical shape and scale. Some detached new towns built on the outskirts of main cities, and these reinforced social divisions in the cities.

In this period, the state belief that the traditional part of the city was a symbol of retardation. A series of bureaucratic reformism was carried out by the state on the modernisation and 'beautification' of the cities. In principal, such reforms and reconstruction concerning the construction of wider streets, resurfacing their pavements with cobbles and asphalt, the regulation of means and methods of traffic and so forth, were badly needed. The actual reforms, however, tried to fulfil these tasks in the most superficial, arbitrary and - in effect - vandalistic manner. In the construction of new streets, or the extension and widening of the old, the policy was to demolish any and all buildings - residential, monumental, historical or whatever - merely in order to keep the road-lines straight. Thus the modernisers played havoc with community life and historic architecture at will (see figures, 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).

The state's unrealistic idea was to develop the environment, excluding people and their culture, and then encourage or, in some cases, force the people to adapt themselves to their revised environment. All these environmental changes, based on unrealistic policies led to a deep gap between people and the state (Barati, 1997). In this regard Katouzian (1981: 275) mentions that what took place in Iran was not social and economic progress, nor modernisation, but pseudo-modernism fuelled by the oil revenues; likewise, the structural shifts of the economy were due not to urbanisation, but to urbanism.

#### **4.3.1. Spatial Organisation and Urban Change in Modern Iran**

Organising and forming the structures of the cities was done strictly according to master plans. These plans and their standards provided a certain extent uninformative and boring fabrics. The criteria and standards of these master plans were absolutely alien to the nature

of the historical and traditional Iranian architecture (Safamanesh, 1993). These imposed standards by the state changed urban forms on a vast scale.

Foreign consultants were used in preparing the urban master plans and the outcomes were greatly influenced by the architectural styles of modernist Europe (see Mashhadizadeh, 1994). The significant principles of these plans were zoning and the gridded network patterns by which the existing unity of the texture was destroyed. According to these plans some historic buildings and urban spaces were completely demolished and some new government buildings were built. As a general rule, the new networks of wide and straight streets imposed on the cities caused severe damage to the urban fabrics' identities.

#### **4.3.2. Urban development Planning Systems and Execution**

*"Ideas may have political implications but, while they remain just ideas, this dimension remains fairly passive. Policies, by contrast, are actively political and the course of policy-making in planning cannot therefore be understood without reference to a wider political frame"* (Ward, 1994: 4).

Socio-economic developments of the people who were able to establish the constitution, Parliament and modern administrative formations in the first decade of the 20th century in Iran were important from the beginning. The first systematic action was forming the Economy Council by the Government in 1937 in order to administrate countrywide economic planning (Toufigh, 1999). From 1946 the first seven-year plan (1948-1955), in participation with an American company named 'Morrison Nodson' and the second covering the seven-year period 1955-1962, were confirmed. The third plan also was

provided, in participation with the Harvard Consulting Group and the views of employees in the United States embassy in Iran, for the five-year period of 1962-1967. Another two five-year plans also by the year 1977 were provided and implemented (Saber, 1999) but the sixth one, due to the rise of the Islamic Republic, was not implemented.

The outcome of these plans, in spite of some relative achievements, led to increasing dependency, for the presumed economic mobility was false and depended on oil revenues. The programmes never caused a truly socio-economic development. Saber (1999), according to the analysis of the Plan and Budget Organisation, says that the 30 years of economic planning practice was a sign of aspiration and lack of a correct understanding of development as a concept that their overall effect was the wasting of financial resources.

The most important obstacle against the success of planning in Iran was the centralisation - and perception of centralisation of - political power and its function (Sahabi, 1999). The upper echelon of officials, like Reza Shah or his son, accepted the nature and necessity of planning but the plan was never a restrictive factor to these powerful decision-makers. The glory ordered when he desired, though it was in contrast to the plan. **The existence of the order and the plan was always a paradox in the history of planning in Iran**, and they co-existed in a system which depended upon order and law and the desires and intentions of each official (Sadeqi Tehrani, 1999). The co-existence between the ingrained despotic system of the country and modern democratic institutions could result in nothing except a repeat of the foregone conditions.



Katouzian (1981: 256) mentions that, in a despotic political economy, 'economic plans' are little more than formalisations of whims and propaganda, which are themselves subject to violent fluctuations, and Halliday (cited in Foran, 1993) quotes one expert to the effect that "the only kind of planning in Iran is what the Shah wants" (Foran, 1993: 326). Dehesh (1994: 409) argues that the second Pahlavi had an oil-based and petrol-dollar-led economic planning strategy focused upon quick modernisation via industrialisation and urbanisation, and in doing so tried to emulate the West. Without any consideration of the realities in the country, such as the value systems, culture, as socio-economic structures and so on, this kind of abstract planning could not help the society to move towards real development.

#### **4.3.2.1. The Executive: National, Regional and Local Levels**

There were three administrative levels of government: National, Regional (provincial), and Local, political power in Iran was vertically polarised and the government was highly centralised. The real policy and decision-making power lay at the national level, and the other levels dealt only with implementation.

At the regional-administration level, the country was divided into provinces (the first country division Act in 1933 consisted of ten provinces and, in the last time of Pahlavis era extended to 25 provinces), each governed by a governor appointed by the state. He dealt mainly with implementation, especially the security affairs of province. He headed the Provincial Office, which was a branch of the Ministry of Interior affairs. Each other Ministry has its own provincial branches also, but they are co-ordinated by the Provincial Office and the governor. All these offices together form the 'Provincial Authority'. Each Province is in turn divided into counties (sub-regions), each with a 'local governor' appointed by the provincial governor.

Provincial branches of all Ministries have sub-branches at this level, controlled by the local governor and the head of the provincial branches, just like the provincial branches but at lower levels. These offices together form the 'Local Authority'.

The above describes the way national government control extends in principle down to local levels. All important decisions are determined by the central government, and the role of the local offices is to implement these policies at provincial and local levels, although this includes, of course, making the decisions required for day to day implementation. Actually, the Constitution of 1906, which was still in force during the second Pahlavi regime, provided for more truly local authorities in the form of 'councils' at provincial, district and local levels. The Councils' Law (under the 1933 and 1941 Acts) and Municipalities' Law (under the 1966 Act) stated that Municipalities must be administered by councils and elected by local people. This included municipal and neighbourhood councils for each city and town (Hashemi, 1988).

Neighbourhood (*mahalleh*) Councils were to be locally elected and, in turn, to elect members of the Municipal Council, as well as deal with neighbourhood affairs. The Municipal Council was to employ or appoint a Mayor (as a salaried executive) to administer the city or town under its supervision. Such councils existed before 1979 but had been batten over mainly by elite and groups related to the monarchy, and by some aristocrats.

#### **4.3.2.2. Planning Systems and Urban Development**

The preceding section has reviewed the early developments which led to the Constitutional Revolution and the short-lived balance it attempted to achieve. As previously discussed, during the Pahlavi era (1925-1979), the dominant policy was to achieve development

according to a modernised Western model by, firstly, secularising society and, secondly, through programs of national infrastructure and other economic developments.

Hashemi (1993), the Deputy of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, argues that both before and after the Islamic Revolution in Iran the main institutions responsible for decision making were dominated by politicians and 'engineers' (a group of technocrats influential in implementing urban development plans). Inevitably the system of decision-making about the built environment is now almost the same as it was before the revolution. In this regard, a number of problems can be identified and classified as follows:

- Central decision making system;
- Lack of opportunity for people to participate in the development process;
- The application of global theories, ideas and solutions which are still imported from a variety of foreign countries; and
- The continuation of the split between the socio-cultural environment and the physical planning developments (Barati, 1997).

### **The National Planning System:**

As has been seen, under the Shah's regime the Plan and Budget Organisation, set up in 1948, prepared mainly medium-term national plans (five- to seven-year Development Plans) based on a sectoral approach and dealing mainly with national infrastructure such as railways, roads, ports, dams, and major industries, but also facilitating different economic activities. Five such national plans were prepared and largely implemented, a sixth being overtaken by the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

**Regional Planning System:**

A regional System was set up under the Shah's government in the early 1970s and some regions were conducted by foreign agencies such as the BATTLE Group and CETIRAN. The Plan and Budget Organisation (PBO) signed a contract in June 1975 with CETIRAN to start the Spatial and Regional Planning System. In 1976, the results of the first stage of regional study were published in 48 volumes. These discussed the main problems expected to be faced during the following two decades such as centralisation and greater regional divergence, and, consequently, mass rural migration to uncontrolled urban agglomerations such as the capital Tehran (Toufigh, 1992). Then work started on the second stage, to prepare a 20-25 year spatial plan for Iran as well as to prepare regional policies and proposals for inclusion in the sixth National Plan (1978-1982). So the regional planning was considered then to be an integral part of the national planning system of the country.

**Urban Planning System:**

Finally, with regard to urban planning, the preparation of Master Plans for cities and towns in Iran was started in the 1950s under central government supervision. Then plans were to be prepared by private, national and international consultancy firms. An Act of 1973 set up the Higher Council for Urban Development and Architecture (HCUDA) to control urban planning and to approve city or town Master Plans. However an Act in the following year changed the name of the Ministry of Development and Housing to Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and placed urban planning under the Ministry (MHUD). According to this 1974 Act, MHUD was to prepare frameworks and regulations for urban planning and architecture (building) and the HCUDA, of which now the ministry became the secretariat,

was to approve and ratify master Plans for urban areas, regional plans and physical plans (MHUD, 1991: 1). Under this system the MHUD signs contracts with private consultancies for preparing master plans for specific cities, providing them objectives to be followed. The consultants prepare the master plans according to the regulations and objectives received from MHUD, but usually dealing with the details themselves. This system is still in operation after the post-Islamic revolutionary time.

The procedure of preparing master plans starts when MHUD commissions a private consultant firm to prepare plans for cities and towns according to the regulations and objectives mentioned above, and ends when the HCUDA ratify the proposed plans. Then the plans are passed to the municipalities and considered as laws to be implemented.

#### **4.4. Modern Concepts and Forms of State, Cities and Urban Spaces**

All environmental changes based on unrealistic political policies led to a deep gap between the people and the state (Barati, 1997). Urban centralisation, in fact, is the physical manifestation of a powerful centralised government system. Since the whole system acts in a dependent way, the city, too, finds a dependent character.

The outcome from socio-economic development programmes, and urban development plans as well, were nothing but a reinforcement of the extreme centralisation of facilities and wealth, and, following them, of the population into the capital and, to some extent, into several other large cities (see Hosseinzadeh Dalir, 1988), so that the population of Tehran, according to the 1956, 1966 and 1976 censuses, was seven times more than in the second rank cities such as Tabriz and Isfahan (Zanjani, 1989). This concentration not only had



deeply undesirable effects upon the hierarchical system of the city but, in socio-economic dimensions, on urban and rural life, and led to acceleration of migration and suburbanisation of large cities (Mashhadizadeh, 1994). Urban planning influenced by urban problems caused structural change and a new spatial structure was born in the city. Habibi (1996), in this regard, says that the transformation of urban space arose through massive interventions of the political systems, not via social change and movements.

#### 4.4.1. Modern State Concept

The revolution of 1977-79 marked the end of two socio-historical cycles: the long cycle which began with the 1921 coup and led to the rise and fall of Reza Shah's pseudo-modernist despotism, the twelve years of interregnum and dual sovereignty (1941-53), the decade of dictatorship (1953-63) and the fifteen years of petrolic pseudo-modernist despotism; and the short cycle which arose with the Shah's bloody counter-revolution of 1963, reached its peak with the 'oil-price revolutions' of 1973-4 and ended with one of the greatest revolutions in human history (Katouzian, 1981: 234).

In the modern concept of Iranian state, **the traditional institution of direct land assignment to the State clientele had been replaced by assignment of indirect capital (i.e. oil revenue) to them. The state was still the monopolist of economic and financial resources, from which granted privileges to (and withdrew them from) whoever it pleased.** Apart from that, the state 'investment' itself most probably camouflaged many other things, including construction for military purposes, and the purchase of 'machinery and equipment' for the armed forces. **This was 'capitalism' in no sense whatsoever; it was pseudo-modernist petrolic despotism** (Katouzian, 1981: 266). By this, a powerful

government that, besides claiming full authority on decision-making and implementation, also becomes a great source of income.

#### 4.4.2. Modern City Concept

In the late Qajar time and the Pahlavi period the Kings seem not to have seen the existence of a vernacular culture as an improvable system but one that was deficient. Hence they regarded it as something to be ignored, or to be changed by force through the imposition of outside ideas and physical technologies, as well as by the replacement of the original social structure with social groups determined by their income and closeness to the Pahlavi regime. This led to a situation in which a new social classification was enforced. When the influential people began to leave the traditional urban areas some basic changes emerged as follows:

- 1) The distribution of the upper social class all over the city had been the basis of a relatively balanced power distribution in the various districts. After the separation of the upper social class from the rest of the urban population this balance, which matched Iranian culture and Islamic beliefs, collapsed.
- 2) The disintegration of the social classes led to a kind of social detachment between other groups.

This might have been seen as an improvement brought about by the emergence of capitalism in Iran but, on the other hand, it created many problems such as a deep socio-cultural dualism which still exists today, as well as the destruction of an understanding

about culture, society, and environment. Such dualism brought uncertainty into the society about life and the environment (Barati, 1997).

In Reza Shah's time, a new district was added to the Northern part of Tehran, which included several government buildings, wide streets, large squares, and many houses for the upper class or high bourgeoisie. These residences were based on European styles and the new district became detached from the traditional central and Southern parts of the town in which vast majority of people were living in relatively poor conditions. The continuation of such conditions led to some considerable migrations of the rich from the old town to the North. Consequently, the separation of the social classes was highlighted and physically structured by these developments (ibid.).

#### **4.4.3. Modern Urban Forms and Concepts**

The modernisation of Iran from the urban viewpoint originated in Reza Shah's period and was continued by his successor, Mohammad Reza Shah. But the move was almost entirely exogenous not culturally deep but superficial its urban patterns only deepened the gap between traditional and modern. The phenomenon of the city should be the outcome of social change but, during this era, without real social transformation, the surface of society and cities became modern but the deeper context was untouched (Hourcade, 2000). Pursuing this policy, the physical urban texture was destroyed to extend the influence of the ideology of Pahlavis. To build wide and straight roads cutting across almost all the vernacular or traditional urban fabric through out Iran was a significant decision based purely on the new ideology and its related policies (Barati, 1997).

Changing city structure, following the governmental urbanisation actions in the years after the 1900's, paved the way to forming new spaces for new functions in the city. The most important of them were education in a 'modern' style, service activities, trade, medical, and administrative functions; all these were new. Accordingly they were accommodated in modernist monuments. Of course the street as an urban space, which had already entered the Iranian urbanisation system, offered prime grounds for the installation of these new activities (see Safamanesh, 1993 and Habibi, 1996).

The building forms also changed from the inward looking courtyard housing to 'extroverted' buildings such as detached houses, terraces, and medium to high-rise apartments and these had to be served with new access systems (Madanipour 1989).

#### 4.4.3.1. District (*mahalleh*)

The emergence of *urban dualism* - of a complete sociological division within the urban population - is a product of this period: formerly, the old residential quarters had included families of *all* ranks. High officials, older families, merchants, ordinary artisans and petty traders lived side by side in the same city quarters (*mahallat* - plural of *mahalleh*). Clearly, rich and poor houses were very different in many respects but, by and large, they were built on the basis of a tradition of Iranian architecture. More significantly, this ensured social contact between different classes: the rich were in daily contact with the ordinary, the poor and even the beggars.

All this began to change when new wealth led to an entirely unplanned movement towards the well equipped modern parts of the cities, into new houses, the building of which was

facilitated by the state's free grants of urban land to army officers and the higher civil servants. The damage was completed when the poor immigrants began to settle in the declining districts; and the departure of the rich left no local resources for the environmental protection and renovation of the old districts by city authorities. In these parts of the cities, many old houses with large tree-shaded gardens were levelled off by property speculators who were free to build cheap hovels in their place. Meanwhile, tremendous social and psychological pressures were applied to those older families, to make them move out of their traditional districts at all costs. **The sense of community which, in spite of class differentiation, had always been present in Iranian cities, was lost** (Katouzian, 1981: 208).

#### 4.4.3.2. Street

The prevailing type of urbanisation project in modern Iran in the 20th century was the construction of streets and these were mainly carried out without adaptation to the traditional fabrics of cities. The scale of these forcing themselves into historic urban patterns brought about as a radical changes (Barati, 1997).

Kostof (1992) mentions that more than a mere traffic channel ensconced within the city's solid mesh, the street is a complex civic institution, culture-specific and capable of dazzling formal variation and calculated nuance. In traditional patterns in Iran, the urban spaces were usually formed on the points of contact between routes and, as most cases, these routes had only a functional value, and bearing in mind the cultural model of inward-looking architecture. Its enclosing sites were never deliberately designed or composed in order to create a sense of space or unity; they were simply as dictated by the dwelling spaces.



In the modern structure of the city, by settling various land uses on both sides of the street, it became an active form of urban space and, as its physical organisation was formed to, present a straight-edged space, the bodies of the both sides became important (see figure 4.1).



Figure (4.1): Pre-modern urban pattern of city of Shushtar, Iran, and modern interferences.

The traditional pattern of residential cul-de sacs and rare sinuous through-streets, bordered by the walls of courtyards-centred (inward looking) houses. Juxtaposed to this delicate net are wide straight streets and traffic roundabouts typical of the pseudo-modernisation activities of pahlavi in 1930s.

Source: Kostof, 1992: 221

4.4.3.3. Square

The main modern urban development characteristics in the Pahlavis' time were wide streets and huge squares at the crossing of these streets. Such squares were absolutely new and had no socio-spatial basis in Iranian traditions. These squares have typically become traffic circles which also function as mere visual landmarks in the urban space. None of these squares, dominated as they are by cars, provide a place for pedestrian activity in any significant way. These are very different from the squares in the main fabric of the western cities which work as meeting points and sometimes as elaborate places for local traditional ceremonies (see figures 4,2 and 4.3).




Figure (4.2): Pre-modern fabric of the city of Hamadan and modern plan, 1930s.  
Designed by the German engineer, Carl Ferisch.

Source: Habibi (1996: 172).




Figure (4.3): Modern Central Square of the city of Hamadan.

Source: Habibi (1996: 171).

#### 4.5. Conclusion:

##### Modern Iranian City (*shahr*): Spatial Segregation

Modern Iranian history has been punctuated by a series of upheavals against strong royal despotic power. Despite the focus of these struggles on constitutionalism and their culmination in a republic, most of Iran's twentieth century was dominated by the pseudo-modernist despotic state established by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926, which continued until his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, was overthrown in 1978-79.

The changes introduced by the Pahlavi's regime in modern Iran tore up both the traditional social fabrics as well as the physical structure of the cities. The building forms also changed from the inward looking courtyard housing to 'extroverted' buildings.

The quarters and their socio-spatial structures of organisation have disappeared from most Iranian cities. All of these developments have led to a chaotic condition within which the concept of *shahr* (city) no longer exists, to such an extent that it can be described as a *fragmented city with no identity and offering no meaning to its inhabitants* (Bahrainy, 1990). Indeed, broad segregation may make population groups hostile strangers to one another, place necessary facilities beyond easy reach and overload transportation systems (Lynch, 1990: 41). The break with context has created a split in the typology of physical fabric, and is consistent with the breaks in social structures which have developed over the same time (Madanipour, 1989).

In the pre-modern era the state acted as a system above, and without a bases in, the society. Despite the different cultures and social classes in cities, the seats of state, they formed a

coherent society by sharing cultural values and traditions. This unity and coherence within the society and against the above system of state led to a historic mixed social classes in the quarters, so that rich people lived side by side with craftsman and workers. In the rural areas and rural societies, the characteristics of the built environment were the same as urban societies. The built forms of the cities and villages as well were organic, fused into an entity which was, largely, broken up only by narrow alleys and cul-de-sacs and with minimal public and open spaces, i.e. squares and streets.

After the nation-wide *Mashruteh* Revolution a historic social change occurred in the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. People won their civil rights, Parliament was formed and Constitutional Law was approved. Reza Pahlavi, as the Shah, was appointed to fulfil the law and meet peoples' expectations for development. But very soon he returned to the traditional ruling system of Iranian despotism.

Pahlavi ideology based its legitimacy on modernism, the will of people and intellectuals. Theoretically the way to 'authentic' modernisation is through the social empowerment by allowing people a share in power. Instead of this, Pahlavi split the society and made a new class, their followers, as modern class in all their behave and life and settled them in planned and equipped towns in modern suburbs of main cities. It was a pseudo-modern development in urban life.

The social split in the modern era under the policies of the Pahlavi regime, discontinuity of historic Iranian architecture and urbanism, and people's lack of the sense of belonging and commitment to urban spaces lie behind the objectives of this research, as socio-spatial

structures analysed in this chapter. Spatial segregation and the shaping of modern public urban spaces as state oriented socio-spatial structures forms the hypothetical basis for the examination at Tabriz, the research case study, in Part Three.

PART THREE:  
DEFINING THE SUBJECT THROUGH  
CASE STUDY

CHAPTER FIVE:  
STATE AND STRUCTURING THE URBAN SPACES IN TABRIZ

- 5.1 Urban Politics of Fashan City in Iran
- 5.2 Urban Status of Western District in Tabriz
- 5.3 Tabriz in the Period of the State under the Influence of the West and the Constitutional Movement in Iran
- 5.4 Pre-war Modernist Urban and Old Urban Development in Tabriz
- 5.5 Conclusion

CHAPTER SIX:  
READING OF SOURCES OF DATA INTO THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

- 6.1 Methodological Review of Sources
- 6.2 The Survey of Urbanization
- 6.3 Urbanization and Distribution of Residential Population
- 6.4 Urbanization Policy and Control
- 6.5 Conclusion



## PART THREE: DEFINING THE SUBJECT THROUGH CASE STUDY

### **CHAPTER FIVE: STATE AND STRUCTURING THE URBAN SPACES IN TABRIZ**

- 5.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin in Tabriz
- 5.2. Tribal States of Western Origin in Tabriz
- 5.3. Tabriz in the Period of the States under the Influence of the West and the Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution
- 5.4. Pseudo-Modernist State and Modern Development of Tabriz
- 5.5. Conclusion

### **CHAPTER SIX: READINGS OF TABRIZ'S CITIZENS INTO THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT**

- 6.1. Methodological Review of Survey
- 6.2. The Survey (Questionnaire)
- 6.3. Dimensions and Attributes of Urban Development
- 6.4. Correlation between Constructs
- 6.5. Conclusion



# STATE AND STRUCTURING THE URBAN SPACES IN TABRIZ

Introduction of Chapter Five

5.1. The Urban Space of Tabriz in History

5.1.1. The Situation and Changes of Urban Space in Tabriz

5.1.2. The Structure and Function of Urban Space in Tabriz

5.1.3. The Urban Change, Structure and Future


5.2. Urban Space of Modern Urban in Tabriz

5.2.1. The Urban Space of Modern Urban in the Form of Urban Space in Tabriz

5.2.2. The Urban Space of Modern Urban in the Form of Urban Space in Tabriz

## CHAPTER FIVE

### STATE AND STRUCTURING THE URBAN SPACES IN TABRIZ



## Introduction to Chapter Five

- 5.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin in Tabriz
  - 5.1.1. The Saljuqs and Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
  - 5.1.2. The Mongols and Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
  - 5.1.3. The Timurs, Chupanis, Jalaieris and Tabriz
- 5.2. Tribal States of Western Origin in Tabriz
  - 5.2.1. The Qara-qoyunlu Turkmen and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
  - 5.2.2. The Aq-qoyunlu Turkmen and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
  - 5.2.3. The Safavis and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
- 5.3. Tabriz in the Period of the States under the Influence of the West and the Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution
  - 5.3.1. The Qajar, Western Semi-Colonisation and Tabriz
  - 5.3.2. The Qajar and Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz
  - 5.3.3. Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution in Tabriz
- 5.4. Pseudo-Modernist State and Modern Development of Tabriz
  - 5.4.1. The Pahlavi State
  - 5.4.2. Contemporary Urban Changes in Tabriz
    - 5.4.2.1. State and Emergence of New Social Classes in *Shahr*
    - 5.4.2.2. State and Emergence of Modern Urban Development in Tabriz
- 5.5. Conclusion
  - 5.5.1. The Historic City of Tabriz; a *Shahr* as Seat of State
  - 5.5.2. The Modern development of Tabriz; Change as Spatial Segregation

## Introduction to Chapter Five

The Iranian city (*shahr*) as seat of state, in historic point of view and spatial segregation in *shahr*, as result of urban development in modern Iran contains the two main hypothetical statements of research that have emerged through investigating the role of state in social construction and spatial organisation of cities in Iran in the previous chapters. This chapter as a case study structured in ways that parallel analytic induction of study. City of Tabriz as a case study expressed to a refinement of researcher's interpretation..

As the capital of the province of East Azarbaijan, Tabriz is located in the Northwest of Iran, and lies on latitude 38° 07' North and longitude 46° 15' East (fig. 5.1). At 1350 meters above sea level, the city is situated on a huge triangular shaped plateau called the 'Tabriz



Figure (5.1): Map of Northwest of Iran and Tabriz, its the most important city in this area.

Source: Times (2000), Plate: 30.

plain'. This plain, which is located in the East Coast of Lake Urmia, covers a vast area of about 470,000 hectares (PBO, 1991: 13). Except from the West side, which is open to the coasts of Lake Urmia, this plain is enclosed by Mount Mishow and Morrow from the Northwest, Mount Eynal-Zaynal from the North and Northeast, and the foothills of Mount Sahand from the East and South. The general slope of this basin is from East to West and the city of Tabriz is located in the Eastern corner of this basin where the foothills of the Sahand meets Eynal-Zaynal's steep slopes. Tabriz is 620 kilometres from Tehran, 150 kilometres from Jolfa on the border of the Republic of Azerbaijan and about 400 kilometres from Makkow on the border of Turkey.

Tabriz is one of the Iran's five important cities (the others being Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and Shiraz) and was administrative capital of country in some periods in the Middle Ages. During the *mashruteh* Revolution, which saw the emergence of the Modern Era in Iran (see chapter four), Tabriz was the heart of struggle against despotism. Therefore, in spite of the history and its important role in contemporary social transition, this city is a good case for study the historic and modern urban development in Iran regarding to the influence of state in meanings, concepts and forming of urban spaces.

The history of Tabriz in the ancient and pre-Islamic times is not very clear, so this research studies and analyses this from the Saljuq time, since which it has been one of the most important cities in Iran. For surveying the urban development of Tabriz, the author will specify the general dynastic periods that have shaped it and its role in the nation's history. Most dynasties which reigned in Iran, from the Saljuqs in eleventh century until the Qajars in nineteenth century, were nomadic tribes or had tribal origin or, like the Safavis, had reigned by support of them. The origin of some tribes that influenced evolution of Tabriz



was the eastern lands of Iran, and others came from the west. The first two parts of this chapter are about the historical development of Tabriz during these two periods.

The later Iranian Revolution (*Mashruteh*) and the Qajar reign are among the important periods in the transition of concepts of state and urban developing in Iran. The third part of the chapter is about this period. The modern urban development of Tabriz is covered in the fourth part of this chapter. In the conclusion, the researcher applies the theoretical approach that has emerged from his understanding of the evolutionary forces of Iran to elicit a conceptual modelling of the urban development of Tabriz.

### **5.1. Tribal States of Eastern Origin in Tabriz**

The Eastern tribal origin states include: The Saljuqs in eleventh and twelfth centuries from the lower reaches of the River Jaxartes in central Asia, the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries from the Eastern Asiatic steppes, and the Timurs in the fifteenth century from Transoxania who invaded Iran and opened it. During most of this era, Tabriz was a major city, often the capital, since it was situated in a part of Persia most favoured by many of these dynasties that ruled the country. In this period the influence of steppe tent dwelling traditions of conquering tribes in forming urban spatial patterns in Tabriz is obvious.

When Arabs conquered Azarbaijan in 624 AD Tabriz was only a small military fortress and in the early Islamic period, and for a long time after, was but a small town overshadowed by the cities of Ardabil and Maragheh for about two centuries (see H. O., 1991: 20 and Lockhart, 1960: 10). It then became one of the important cities in that time, because of its geographical situation and its proximity to the steppe lands.

### 5.1.1. The Saljuqs and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

The Saljuqs were a tribe of Ghuzz or Oghuz Turks and lived on the lower reaches of the River Jaxartes in Central Asia. The arrival of the Saljuq Turks marked a new era in Persian history. They conquered Persia in 1035, after the death of Mahmud Ghaznawi, from the North-eastern borders of the country; they were still nomads and they were still organised tribally (see Morgan, 1988 and Lambton, 1987). Their conquest marked the beginning of Persia's period of Turkish rule, a period which lasted until the early sixteenth century and even, in some sense, until 1925.

By around 1059 Saljuq rule was established, reasonably securely throughout Persia and Iraq, as far as the frontiers of Syria and of the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia. They faced the armies of Byzantine led by Alp Arslan and soundly defeated them, and Romanus Diogenes himself was captured.


The central administration of the Saljuqs contained two halves of the *Dargah* (court), which included the military establishment and the great *amirs* of the Saljuq world, and *Diwan*, which was staffed by members of the Persian bureaucracy. This basic pattern of central government in Saljuq times had inherited from earlier regimes in the eastern Islamic world was broadly, with variations in detail and terminology, the means by which Persia was governed until the nineteenth century (see chapter three).

Nasir-Khosrow - the well-known Iranian traveller of the 11<sup>th</sup> century in the Saljuq time - described Tabriz as a rich and prosperous city and more important than its rivals Ardabil and Maragheh. According to the writing of Nasir-Khosrow, in 1046 Tabriz had 50 caravanserais, and the city wall was 6,000 paces (about 4.16 km) and was estimated to

cover an area of about 175 hectares (Chander, 1987: 330). The existence of 50 caravanserais in such an area implies a high population density for Tabriz in that time.

After being taken by the Saljuq conqueror Tugril Beg in 1054, Tabriz was again surpassed by Ardabil and Maragheh for more than a century. However, later in 1213-14, it was again described by Hamavie (1965: 36) as the chief city of Azarbaijan. The Saljuqs ruled for about two centuries in Azarbaijan, from 1045 until 1220. Trade was the most profitable business in the vast Saljuq Empire, so they tried to develop bazaars in the cities and the bazaar of Tabriz is said to have been the most successful one.

Figure (5.3), shows a recent plan of the bazaar. The initial foundation of these huge complex dates back to the Saljuqs and it was since developed in various times. In modern era, the Pahlavi reign, some destruction occurred by the construction of new streets. Anyhow, the Tabriz bazaar remains the largest covered bazaar in Islamic architecture. The main fabric of the bazaar has two main north-south *rasteh* (straight covered ways with shops along both sides; see figure 5.2a). The widths of bazaar's ways are four or five meters and their height is five to six meters. The main *rasteh* are connected to each other by little *rasteh* and *sara* (large open spaces with shops around) and *timcheh* (like *rasteh* but not as long as that; some are wider and higher with gates on two sides; see figure 5,2b). Nowadays, the bazaar gridiron works as the heart of Tabriz and has a main role in physical pattern of the city (Varjavand, 1993).



a) A *rasteh*  
b) A *timcheh*

Figure (5.2, a and b): A *rasteh* (straight covered ways with shops along both sides) and a *timcheh* (like *rasteh* but not as long as that; some wider and higher and for a more specific goods) in the Bazaar of Tabriz.

Source: The author.




Figure (5.3): Tabriz Bazaar  
General Map

Source: Kimia (1997)

### 5.1.2. The Mongols and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

The Mongols were nomads and lived at the North-eastern end of the territory which now forms the Mongolian People's Republic. Their flocks and herds were mainly of sheep and horses, though they also used camels and oxen. At the time of their arrival in Persia, and for long after, the Mongols continued to adhere to Shamanism, the traditional religion of the steppe peoples, but due course in their various Asiatic kingdoms adopted one of the locally dominant religions, Islam or Buddhism (see Morgan, 1988).

Hulegu had set out from Central Asia with his army in 1253, proceeding very slowly towards Persia. Baghdad was besieged in 1258, was taken and sacked and much of the population massacred and Iraq, together with much of Anatolia, were brought definitively under Mongol control. It is said that, for Persia, the Mongol period was a disaster on a grand and unparalleled scale. Hulegu set up his capital at Maragheh in Azarbaijan and the kingdom of the Ilkhans was duly established, to be ruled by Hulegu and his descendants for the next seventy years. Abaqa in 1265 moved the capital from Maragheh to Tabriz and in 1313, Oljaitu, the Ghazan Khan's successor, moved the capital to the city of Sultaniyyeh, near Zanjan (see chapter three).

From the nomad's point of view, Azarbaijan was the most favoured province of Persia since it had the best pasturelands in the country: it was inevitable that the Ilkhanid capital should be situated there. Abaqa (reigned 1265-82) had moved the capital of the Ilkhanate from Maragheh to Tabriz, also in Azarbaijan. Tabriz, a small settlement which was in the main east-west trade way, speedily developed in to a great *metropolis* (Morgan, 1988: 68).



One of the highest points which Tabriz reached in the Islamic period was during the Mongol II Khan dynasty in the late 13th and early 14th centuries. During the Ghazan Khan reign (1295-1304) it was, in fact, the chief administrative centre of a vast empire that stretched from the Oxus to the borders of Egypt and from the Caucasus to the Indian Ocean (Lockhart, 1960: 11).

During the Mongol rule, the city expanded beyond the limits of the Saljuqs era. Realising that the existing city wall was too small for his capital, Ghazan Khan ordered a new wall to be erected around the city. The expansion mainly took an east-west direction because of the topographic limits that the city faces from the North and South. At the two ends of the city the two new quarters, Shanb Ghazan and Rashidieh were built. According to Azimi (1996), Tabriz, during the Mongols rule, is estimated to have covered an area of about 1,265 hectares with a city wall of about 15 kilometres long.

Another great Ilkhanid achievement also lost to us is the quarter of Shanb (Sham) Ghazan that Ghazan Khan erected some two miles from Tabriz in the West part of the city, where these arose palaces, a mosque, monasteries, an edifice for public administration, gardens, fountains and where Ghazan Khan constructed a mausoleum for himself in this new quarter. He also built an observatory, colleges and libraries to attract scholars from all parts of his empire. Pope (1965) explains that this suburb, in variety, organisation and magnitude, was hardly rivaled by anything since Perspolis. Ghazan Khan's Vazir (minister) Rashid-al-Din (a historian, philosopher and physician), built his own quarter in the East part of the city called Rashidieh in 1300 which, unfortunately, no longer exists. In this quarter he built a university for which he brought the best scientists from the vast empire. The quarter included schools, libraries, a paper-mill, a pharmacy, public baths,

beautiful gardens, a mint, stores and many houses (see Scerrato et al.,1976; Pope, 1965; Ulyari, 1992; Lavasani, 1992 and Niknam L., 1995).

Rashid-al-Din's rival the Vazir Taj-al-Din Alishah built a gigantic mosque called Alishah Mosque. Since this mosque was constructed too quickly, its gigantic dome collapsed after a few years. Today, only one of its walls has remained which shows the wonderful conception of its architect and superb quality of its brickwork (fig. 5.4).



Figure (5.4):  
Alishah Mosque, Tabriz.  
The remained south wall,  
a huge brickwork.

Source: Mizbani

Buildings in the Ilkhanid era were mostly erected in the open spaces and reflected the nomadic culture of Mongols. On the subject of spatial pattern of urban elements in Ilkhanids era, Wilber (1955) mentions that in primitive times and also in later times the great mosques were usually situated in the bazaar, or with a close relation to it, but that Ilkhanid mosques did not any relation with the bazaar. For example the great Ilkhanid building in Tabriz, Alishah mosque (fig. 5. 5), was built far from the bazaar and even the city texture. This cultural pattern was also applied to the new quarters, Shanb Ghazan and Rashidieh.




Figure (5.5): Alishah Mosque from afar. This mosque is erected in the open space, far from the bazaar and apart from the city texture. The city walls can be seen on the left side of the picture.

Source: Duhoseh in Sultanzadeh (1997)

A drawing of Tabriz by Turk traveller in the 14th century (Fig. 5.6) shows a vision of the city during the Mongol period. The big houses, large house yards, mosques with tall minarets, roads, bridges, gardens, and city wall display the structure of the central part of Tabriz. The existence of several mosques in a relatively small area implies the impact of the Islamic culture in the social life, and the bigger houses may represent the existence of wealthy and/or large size households.




Figure (5.6): A Drawing of Tabriz by a Turk Traveller, 14th Century A. D.  
Source: Sultanzade, 1997.

### 5.1.3. The Timurs, Chupanis and Jalaieris, and Tabriz

The collapse of the Ilkhanate Empire after the death of Abu Said in 1335 resulted in a series of factional struggles for control of the central government of Persia, which had no decisive outcome. In these circumstances it was possible for local dynasties in different areas of the country to assert their independence (Morgan, 1988: 83). In this time, for a half century Tabriz was the scene of tribal conflicts between the Jalaieris and the Chupanis. When Sultan Muhammad Jalaierie gained power in 1336, he made Tabriz his capital city. During the Jalaierie and Chupani eras some important buildings were erected such as Dameshqiieh Mausoleum, large government buildings and the Ostad-Shagherd Mosque among which only the last one remains today.

Timur - Tamerlane or Tamburlaine (Timur the Lame) in Western literature - was born near Shahr-i Sabz in Transoxania, traditionally if perhaps suspiciously in the same which the "Ilkhan, Abu Said, died. He was a member of the Barlas, a tribe of Mongol origin which had become Turkish in speech and had adopted Islam. He was not ad descendant of Chingiz Khan. Later in his career he married two Chingizid princesses, and thus acquired the title of *guregen* (son-in-law). Timur's army seems to have followed the traditional steppe pattern in most respects. Like the Mongol army, it relied on its great mobility and on the skills of the cavalry archer (Morgan, 1988: 87).

In 1386, Timur occupied Tabriz and sent all the city artisans to his capital city of Samarghand. He appointed his son Miranshah as the governor of North western Iran and Minor Asia, and he himself went on further conquests. Lockhart (1960) mentions that, for Tabriz, Miranshah went mad and destroyed many of the magnificent historic and public buildings. Following this event Timur returned to Tabriz and removed him from power and appointed Miranshah's son, Mirza Umar, for government.



After the death of Timur in 1402, his successors could not control the west part of the large territory which he had conquered. In Azarbaijan, Sultan Ahmad Jalaierie, who had already been removed from power by Timur in 1386, regained power and ended the uncertain situation (Vahram, 1970). After the death of Sultan Ahmad in 1418, a Turkman tribe called Qara-qoyunlu (Black Sheep) came to power and ruled the country until 1467.

## 5.2. Tribal States of Western Origin in Tabriz

Surveying the influence of the tribes that came to Iran from the West and conquered it, including Qara-qoyunlu and Aq-qoyunlu Turkmen and Safavis, provides great insights into the subject of the formation of urban spaces. This point is important that these tribes were living in West lands that mainly belonged to Byzantine and, that, through their strong relation with Greece, inevitably were under the influence of Byzantine and Hellenic their culture and civilisation. Minorsky (1964) mentioned that there still remain many interesting and important problems connected with the emergence in the fourteenth century of the Turkmen federations of the Qara-qoyunlu (1378-1469) and Aq-qoyunlu (1378-1502). The roots of the Persian *risorgimento* under the Safavis (1502-1722) go deep into this preparatory period (Minorsky, 1964: 228). The Safavis were of Azarbaijan origin but they had lived in Anatolia in exile for a few decades.

By moving these tribes to Iran and ruling from Tabriz in fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, some concepts of Byzantine and Greek civilisation became adopted in the historic spaces in Tabriz. The unique space pattern of the Blue Mosque (*Gok masjid*) and Sahib al-Amr square (*maidan*) with its bazaar on a bridge are unique monuments in Iranian architecture and urban design (see figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.13).



### 5.2.1. The Qara-qoyunlu Turkemn and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

The rulers of the Qara-qoyunlu are called Barani or Baharlu, (Minorsky, 1978: 391). The origin centre of the Qara-qoyunlu federation lay at Arjish, on the Northern bank of Lake Van and consisted of various Turkman clans (Minorsky, 1982: 272). They were semi-nomadic confederation of Turkmen. Qara Yusuf was able to eliminate by 1408, Timur grandson Aba Bakr power and defeated and executed Ahmad Jalayir in 1410. In Jahan Shah's reign following the death of Shah Rukh in 1447, Qara-qoyunlu lands included much of eastern Anatolia, North-western, Western and central Persia, and Iraq. Their capital was at Tabriz (Morgan, 1988: 103).

In the 1437, Jahanshah Qara-qoyunlu chose Tabriz again as the capital city. In the year 1462, Abd al-Razzaq describes Jahan-Shah's rule in the following terms: "The capital, Tabriz by its numerous population and the prevalence of tranquillity, emulated Egypt" (Morgan, 1988: 103). Jahan Shah (in Persian, it means 'king of the world'), called himself not only *sultan*, a specifically Islamic title, but also *khaqan*, an unmistakably Turko-Mongol one. He gave patronage to scholars and poets, even writing poetry himself, and he engaged in building work. Substantial fragments remain in Tabriz of his Blue Mosque, which is one of the highest quality tile works in Islamic architecture.

In 1465 the famous Blue Mosque of Tabriz was built by Jahan Shah (figures: 5.7 and 5.8). This mosque is the chief architectural feature of the city and has been many times described by archaeologists. During his visit to Persia in 1936, W. Hinz ascertained the signature of the builder: Abul-Muzaffar Jahan-Shah ibn Shah Yusuf Nuyan, and the date, 25 October 1465 (Minorsky, 1982: 277-279). This mosque was covered by top quality blue *moarraq*.

Figure (5.7):  
North Facade and Entrance of  
Blue Mosque, Tabriz.

Source: The author






Figure (5.8):  
South Facade of Blue Mosque,  
Tabriz.

Source: The author



The design and architecture of the Blue Mosque in comparison to the other historic and famous Iranian mosques is unique. It does not follow the common inward and four *iwan* form of mosques and erected in open spaces outside the city fabric with interesting facades and windows in its sides. In traditional mosque light is taken through the ceiling because they are placed among the city fabric, are enclosed of their sides and there are no other possible source of light. It is said that the Qara-qoyunlus brought these concepts from their origin in Anatolia, former Roman lands and current Ottomans

emperor. The plan of the Blue Mosque (fig., 5.10) compared to older ones from the Bursa (fig., 5.9) support this matter.



Figure(5.9): Plans of Four Main Mosques in Bursa, the Ottomans' first Capital.  
Source: Sultanzadeh (1997)




Figure (5.10): Plan of Blue Mosque in Tabriz (1465) which is Adopted from Mosques of Ottomans.  
Source: Sultanzadeh (1997)

### 5.2.2. The Aq-qoyunlu Turkmen and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

The rulers of the Aq-qoyunlu are called Bayundur (Minorsky, 1978: 391) and the original centre of the Aq-qoyunlu federation was based on Diyarbakir and consisted of various Turkmen clans (Minorsky, 1982: 272). The Aq-qoyunlu centre was at the town

of Amid, to the west of the Qara-qoyunlu homeland. In 1452 Uzun Hassan rised and defeated Jahan Shah in 1467, then extended his power and occupied Iraq and the whole of Persia as far East as Fars and Kirman. But Khurasan and Transoxania remained in Timurid control (Morgan, 1988: 104-105).

In 1467, Uzun Hassan occupied Tabriz and ruled until 1500 (Lockhart, 1960: 13). In 1472, the city saw the arrival of an embassy from Venice. There were intensive negotiations to organise a European-Aq-Qoyunlu pincer movement against the Ottomans but, in 1473, Uzun Hassan was defeated by Ottomans (Morgan, 1988).

The Aq-qoyunlus, for the first time, established a relationship with European towns such as Venice (Minorsky, 1978). The marriage of Uzun Hassan to the Greek princess, Daspina Katrina, shows his deep relations with Europeans (see Parsadust, 1976). These European relations and benefiting of Byzantine heritage in Anatolia, origin land of Aq-qoyunlu, caused transforming of new urban elements and concepts to Tabriz that the most important of them for Iranian urban development was *Sahib al-Amr Maidan* (square), which became a pattern for other similar squares in Iran (see Habibi, 1996).

Tabriz was re-elected as the capital city by Uzun Hassan and remained as a prosperous city. The Venetian sources are of considerable value for the period of Uzun Hassan. Giosafa Barbaro, sent by the Venetian republic in 1474, describes the animated life of Tabriz to which embassies came from all parts. Barbaro was received in a pavilion of the magnificent palace which he calls 'Aptisti'. An anonymous Venetian merchant who visited Tabriz as late as 1514 still speaks of the splendour of the reign of Uzun Hassan who has so far not yet had an equal in Persia (Lockhart, 1960). Uzun Hassan's other

architectural contribution to his capital was the Qaisarrieh bazaar (Mirsalim, 1993) which remains today.

The reign of Yaqub (1481-90), son of Uzun Hassan, was time of splendour for Tabriz. He patronized the arts and did many construction works; for example in 1483 he built the Hasht-bihisht palace in the garden of Sahib-Abad. Beside the Hasht-bihisht there was a harem in which 1000 woman could be housed, a vast *maidan*, a mosque and a hospital to hold 1000 patients (Houtsma et al., 1934: 588).

The remained masterpiece of Aq-qoyunlus is Sahib al-Amr *Maidan* (square). Unfortunately, most of its buildings such as imperial palace, hospital, imperial mosque, school and bazaar (Zoka, 1989; Karang, 1995 and Niknam L., 1995) are now ruined (fig. 5.11). This square, from historic point of view, is an unparalleled urban space in Iran.




Figure (5.11): Sahib al-Amr *Maidan* (square), Tabriz, 15th century.

Source: Sardari Zenuz (1997)



Regarding to its scale and elements, it has been adopted from prototypes found in Europe, East Roman Empire and Greece, and as Habibi (1996) said, it is origin of the other similar squares such as *Sabze Maidan* in Qazvin and *Nagsh-i Jahan Maidan* in Isfahan.

Another unique urban element in this period was bazaar on the bridge (fig. 5.12). *Sahib al-Amr Maidan* complex is located in the north side of Mehran Rud River opposite the bazaar, which is located in the south of Mehran Rud. Two main *rastehs* of the bazaar continue with shops along their two sides, over the river (on the bridge) and connected *Sahib al-Amr* complex to bazaar, so a huge new complex was established. This kind of bridge was unique to Iranian urban design and destroyed by flood and nothing remains of it today.



THE BAZAAR ON THE BRIDGE, TABRIZ

Figure (5.12): The Bazaar on the Bridge, Tabriz.

Source: Richards, 1931.

### 5.2.3. The Safavis and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

Shaykh Safi (1252-1334) and other religious leaders of Safavis lived in various lands in the West of Iran. Safavi rule over Persia is conventionally dated from Shah Ismail's capture of Tabriz the aftermath of his victory the Aq-qoyunlu ruler Alwand at Sharur in 1501 and Tabriz remained capital of country until 1548 when possibility of attacks by Turks led Shah Tahmasb I, Shah Ismail's successor, to choose Qazvin as his capital. In the sixteenth century the founder of the Safavi dynasty (1501-1722), Shah Ismail I (1501-1524) established the Safavi government in Iran. Reinforcing independence, Ismail also accepted Shi'ism as the official Islamic school of thought in Iran whereas the official religious school during the previous Empire had been Sunni. It was a political strategy suggested by Shah Ismail against the Sunni neighbours, Ottoman and Ozbeq (Foran, 1993: 25).

When Shah Ismail was crowned in the city, it had a population of about 250,000 (Chander, 1987). Olia Chalabi, who visited Tabriz in 1639, described this city as having 270 caravanserais, 320 mosques, 47 schools, 40 churches and very clean passages (Soltanzadeh, 1986: 140). In 1641, Tabriz was hit by a severe earthquake but, when Chardin visited it some thirty years later, it was in a flourishing state. It (Tabriz) had a population of about 150,000, 250 mosques and 300 carvanseraies. Repeated wars and natural disasters during the 18th century led to the dramatic decline of Tabriz from a large city in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries to a small city at the end of the 18th century. For instance, the earthquake of 1721, just before Tabriz was attacked by Turks and Russians, caused the loss of 80,000 people and the destruction of many buildings and the city wall (Lockhart, 1960: 15).

An eighteenth century map of Tabriz (fig. 5.13) shows that, the main physical structure of the city had remained inside the historic city walls and where city developments occurred beyond the walls. During the Safavis time, the city was under the threat of the Ottomans and occasionally seized by them, so the administrative capital of Safavis shifted from Tabriz to Qazvin and, as a result, urban spaces in Tabriz almost stopped developing. In this time a huge population declining happened in the city. The population from 250,000 in 1500, when it was the capital of country, downed to about 80,000 in 1600 (table 5.1). This was the dramatic predestination of urban development in Iran




Figure (5.13): Map of Tabriz in the 18th Century, the final years of the Safavis Bazaar in the heart of the city with *Maidan Sahib al-Amr*, Hassan Padshah Mosque (Aq-qoyunlu's imperial mosque) and its Madrasse (school) in its North made the basic form of the city. Nine gates of the city in that time is mentioned too.

Source: Adopted from Niknam L., 1995

### 5.3. Tabriz in the Period of the State under the Influence of the West and the Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution

The eighteenth century was marked by fairly frequent changes of dynasty - the Afghans from 1722 to 1729, Nadir Shah and the Afshars from 1729 to 1746, Karim Khan Zand in Shiraz from 1750 to 1779 and finally the rise of the Qajars to a more permanent position of power after 1785. This century was catastrophic and one of the blackest period in the whole history of Islamic Iran. Societal dislocation, wars, civil and foreign, famine, disease and emigration, added up to the destruction of the economy and the depopulation of the country. The Safavi dynasty lurched into an intertwined economic, political and ideological crisis by the turn of the eighteenth century. A small army of Afghan tribesmen easily brought down the whole edifice in 1722, when no provincial army rallied to the aid of the Safavis besieged at Isfahan, and high level betrayals and dissension precluded any effective military response from an army that had been neglected for several decades. Lockhart (1958) mentions the state of the Iranian people during the Afghan's reign as 'terrible' due to wars, rebellions, famine and pestilence.

In the Qajar time, to establish a position of what would prove to be long-lasting political power in Iran by the turn of the nineteenth century, Iran had been drawn into Russia's tow and, to a lesser degree, Britain's economic orbit, and was a functioning part of their economy. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is the ineluctable rise of foreign control and power vis-à-vis Iran but, due to the intensity of Russian-British rivalry in Iran, it remained peripheral to the world capitalist system. The growing weakness of the Qajar State against Western states and their more powerful armies and economies was linked to processes of fiscal crisis and internal delegitimation. In increasing order, the general urban population, artisans, workers and

the urban poor suffered significant material decline in their standards of living at the end of the nineteenth century in the period leading up to the Constitutional Revolution.

The *Mashruteh* Revolution was fought against traditional despotism and for a legal framework which would make life and labour less insecure and more predictable, for political, social and economic reasons, and by all the classes and individuals who hoped to gain from its results. **The revolutionaries fought for law itself.** Foran (1993) believes that the Constitutional Revolution forced the country to modernise. One can say that the modern era in Iran began from this time.

During the Qajars time Tabriz was seat of princes and called *Dar al-Saltaneh* (home of state). It was near to the Iran-Russia battle field and became the command centre of the country. From the economic point of view Tabriz was the centre of rich Province of Azarbaijan and located on the Iran-Europe route. Because of its nearness to Russia, the Ottomans and Europe, its trade relations with them and the needs of the country (prevalent in public opinions) for reforming and modernising it was the gateway to Europe and modernisation. Therefore, Tabriz played a vital role in social movements and the Constitutional Revolution.

### 5.3.1. The Qajar, Western Semi-Colonialisation and Tabriz

The Qajars took a position of what would prove to be long-lasting political power in Iran by the turn of the nineteenth century. Aqa Mohammad's army, by 1790 had taken control of Azarbaijan, and none of its tribal leaders nor the merchants who administered Tabriz could successfully oppose him (Foran, 1993: 89-91). The Qajar dynasty (1779-1925) coincided with fundamental social, political and industrial changes in Europe, for instance the French Revolution in 1789. In Iran this period was associated with many



crises and problems which have led it to become known as one of the most chaotic periods in the history of Iran. This period is also considered as the beginning of the simultaneous influence of two phenomena which are alien to this culture and which did not exist together before, these are internal dictatorship and the external intervention of Colonialism (see Ashraf, 1980; Amirahmadi, 1990; Lapidus, 1988; Habibi, 1990 and Barati, 1997).

The Qajar State, generally, was a weak, centralised regime that was faced with many internal as well as external problems. According to Lapidus (1988) the Qajars came to power after a period of anarchy and tribal struggles for control of the Iranian state. However, their regime was never consolidated. The Qajar never dealt effectively with the problems of the country and had no national popularity. On the other hand, the strategic location of Iran with its different raw materials inevitably attracted the attention of all great powers at that time, particularly after the overthrow of the Ottoman Islamic Empire (see Bavar, 1983). The Industrial Revolution in Europe and its rapid development in industry, wealth and militarism together with the retardation of Iran because of the political weakness of its rulers, perpetuated the chaos which existed in the general life of the country. Russia's interventions, internal civil wars, starvation and so on gradually unbalanced these relations.

Continual politico-economic pressure from the North, that is the Russians, provided enough space for the incompetent Qajar kings to lean on the Europeans, particularly Britain. As a result Iran became the scene of severe competition between Russia and Britain. Russia, taking advantage of the weakness of the Qajar regime, had already gained some precious concessions and was developing strong means of penetration. The Russians aimed to extend their possessions in as far as was feasible and to lay the

foundations for the commercial and political domination of the remainder of the country. The treaty of Gulistan (1813) confirmed the loss to Russia of Georgia, Darband, Baku (Azarbijan), Shirvan, and some parts of Armenia. By the treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) Russia obtained Armenia, control of the Caspian Sea, and a favoured position in the Iranian trade. These systematic operations of encroachment continued until 1885, by which time all central Asian parts of Iran were occupied by Russians. The same things happened in Afghanistan where Britain, seeking its own interests, wanted to have the same concessions.

The treaties imposed between Iran and Russia in 1813 and 1828, as well as between Iran and Britain in 1855, not only separated vast territorial lands from the Northern and eastern parts of Iran, but also, by giving affective concessions and trading advantages, provided more space for those countries to expand their economic influences in Iran (Ashraf 1980; Lapidus 1988). Ashraf (1980), calling this period before the 1920s the 'semi-colonialism period', explained that this condition was the result of severe competition between two strong foreign countries (Russia and Britain) for more politico-economic influence in Iran.

During the Qajar period Tabriz was again the scene of fighting between Iran and Russia as, in Safavis, it had been the scene of fighting between Iran and the Ottomans. The Russians occupied Tabriz in 1827, but it was returned to Iran by the 1828 Turkmanchay Treaty. In spite of these unpleasantnesses, Tabriz was the seat of the prince; thus it was considered the second most important city in Iran. Because of the expansion of trade with European countries and Russia in the 19th century, Tabriz benefited from its geographical location on the main Iran-Europe commercial route. As a result, during the rest of the 19th century, and despite the ravages of cholera and plague, it regained much of its population and, by

the end of 19th century, its population reached about 200,000 (Bharier, 1972). Table 5.1 summarises the population change of Tabriz between the 11<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

Table 5.1: The estimated population of Tabriz between 1000 and 1900

Year	Population	Period	Source of estimation
1000	20,000	Saljuq	Lockhart (1960)
1320	110,000	Mongol (capital of all Persia)	Petrushevsky (1968)
1400	150,000	Turkmen (capital of all Persia)	Lambton (1987)
1500	250,000	Safavi (capital of all Persia)	Bemont in Chander (1987)
1600	80,000	Safavi	Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913)
1730	30,000	Afshar	Bemont in Chander (1987)
1809	40,000	Qajar	Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913)
1850	70,000	Qajar (seat of the Prince)	Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913)
1881	165,000	Qajar (seat of the Prince)	Bemont in Chander (1987)
1900	200,000	Revolution (emergence of modern era)	Bharier (1972)

Source: Author Based on Chander (1987) and Azimi (1996)

### 5.3.2. The Qajars and the Forming of Urban Spaces in Tabriz

In 1780, beginning of the Qajar rule, an earthquake caused the loss of many lives and much damage to buildings in Tabriz. The descriptions of the Europeans who visited Tabriz in the early 19th century show how the city had declined by that time. Lockhart (1960) cites, from the records of Pierre-Amadee Jubert, the French diplomatic envoy who was in Tabriz in 1806, that most of the buildings that existed during Chardin's time had been destroyed and the population was only 50,000. According to James Morier, who saw Tabriz after Jubert, the modern town was nearly in the centre of the former one, the ruins of which extended for some distance on all sides (Lockhart, 1960: 15).

The Map of Tabriz *Dar al-Saltaneh*, figure (5.14), shows the city form in the Qajar time, a few years before emergence of the modern era in Iran. This map, for comparison of the contemporary city form to its pre-modern form is very useful. This map was drafted by Mohammad Reza Mohandess and Colonel Qaracheh-Daghi in 1880 and stone-engraved in Karbalaei Assad-Aqa's printing plant in Tabriz. It shows that the city had expanded beyond its city walls and the bazaar and historic core remained the main part of the city (compare with figure: 5.13). Residential districts had inward-directed pattern and meandrous access.

Kont De-Cersy, in notes on his visit of Tabriz in this era, wrote: "Two sides of alleys have heavy and tall walls with only a small access hole which allows only one person to enter. As you pass through these narrow and poor entrances, you enter to magnificent houses with very nice gardens" (Sultanzadeh, 1997: 28). This little description shows the duality in the city that was uncommon to the Kont and surprised him. People had no sense of belonging to public spaces and streets and they were obliged to covering up of their properties against strangers. It is clear that big houses with vast rooms show the social communication between neighbours, so they had no fear of each other, the enemy was identified as being out with their society and, as a historic concept, it was the rulers (chapters three and four).

After a few years, modernisation wave influenced city form and presented a new city concept.




Figure (5.14): Map of Tabriz, Dar al-Saltaneh, in 1880, Qajars time, drafted by Mohammad Reza Mohandess and Colonel Qaracheh-Daghi.

Source: Sahab Geographic and Drafting Institute, 1992.



Expanding the relationships and journeys of people and governors to Europe in the Qajar time introduced new Western concepts and elements in architecture such as arches *kolah-farangi* (villa) buildings, openings in external walls (as windows and so on) to streets (fig. 5.15), using a triangular 'classical' pediment (fig. 5.16), semicircular in facades (fig. 5.20) and classical columns and capitals (fig. 5.21). The Prince had his own French architecture for doing designs and plans in the court (see sultanzadeh, 1997). This was an official way for influence of European concepts to modify architecture and urban design in Tabriz.

The Prince's house in Tabriz, which was constructed by the French architect, Louis-Émile Boileau, during the Qajar period, was a villa-style building with a French architectural style. It was a two-story building with a central entrance and a large arched window. The building was constructed with brick and had a classical pediment. The Prince's house was a symbol of the Qajar dynasty's power and influence in Tabriz.

Figure (5.15): Maqsudie Quarter, Tabriz.

19<sup>th</sup> century openings along street elevations to obtain light. The windows were high enough to prevent strangers viewing to inside the house. Until that time type of houses were inward looking without any openings to the public domain.

Source: The author




Figure (5.16): House of Amir Nezam, Tabriz.

Triangular pediment in the facade shows the influence of classical architecture in the 19th century.

Source: The author



*Kolah-farangi* means ‘European hat’ and it was the name given to the new style buildings which were detached houses in suburban areas. This kind of architecture was strange for people, because the ordinary constructions were immersed into a more generalised urban pattern, forming integrated fabric, with inward looking courtyard housing. Erecting buildings with extroverted forms, looking like hats, in the middle of the garden spaces were unusual.

The famous *kolah-farangis* in Tabriz which were constructed by rulers were *kolah-farangi-i Bagh-Shomal* (fig. 5.17) and *kolah-farangi-i El-Goli* (figures: 5.18 and 5.19).

Later, other *kolah-farangis* were built by rich people in their private gardens.

Figure (5.17): *Kolah-Farangi* (villa) of Bagh-i Shomal, Tabriz.

A large detached house (palace) in the vast garden of ‘Bagh-i Shomal’, which means North garden.

Source: Sultanzadeh (1997)






Figure (5.18):  
Plan of Shah-Goli Palace.  
This villa building now is  
converted to a public restaurant.

Source: Hashemi (1997)




Figure (5.19): Shah-Goli, Tabriz.  
Shah-goli building as a palace in the villa style (*kolah-i farangi*)  
erected in the Qajar time in the middle of a big pool (*gol*) and a  
huge park.

Source: The author

Arcade columns with semicircular arches were introduced for the first time in the facades of buildings in 1850s (figures: 5.20 and 5.21). In Iran, Tabriz took the lead for imitating such architectural concepts and elements.

Figure (5.20): A house in the  
South of Maqsudie quarter,  
Tabriz.

This house was erected in the  
19th century with arcade columns  
and semicircular arches  
(European style).

It is now converted to the  
Architectural College of Sahand  
University.

Source: The author




Figure (5.21): A house in the Maqsudie quarter, Tabriz.

This house was erected in the 19th century with arcade columns and semicircular arches (European style).

Source: The author




### 5.3.3. The Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution in Tabriz

The *Mashruteh* Revolution - the local name for the Constitutional Revolution, meaning conditioned or qualified - represented a demand for all to enjoy security of life, limb and property from unconstrained and unpredictable bureaucratic licence; that is why the revolutionaries simply assumed that all other benefits of social welfare and national integrity would be ensured by their triumph against despotism (Katouzian, 1981: 58, 64). This revolution was popular and Tabriz was the centre of the movement that its leaders were Sattar Khan, an illiterate horse dealer in his forties, and Bagher Khan, a mason (Afary, 1994: 31). These two leaders became the revolution leaders in the country and were called as 'National Commanders' of Iran after their victory. The place that the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz is now called 'The House of the *Mashruteh*' (fig., 5.22).

Figure (5.22): House of Kouzekanani, Tabriz.

It is now converted to 'The House of *Mashruteh*' Museum.

Source: The author



The provincial or national *anjuman* (association) of Tabriz which administered the city during the resistance to the 1901 coup and the ensuing blockade, consisting of merchants, artisans, *ulama* (the clergy) and intellectuals. This *anjuman* assumed responsibility for defence and internal security, ran the schools, put out a newspaper, repaired the bazaar, established contact with the foreign consulates, and operated bakeries that provided bread for the armed volunteers and their families (Abrahamian, 1982).

The first modern-style school in Iran was founded in Tabriz before the *Mashruteh* Revolution, by Mirza Hassan Roshdieh, who was educated in Istanbul and Beirut, in 1888. In the hot days of the *Mashruteh* Revolution in Tabriz, the Municipality was established by the revolutionaries. The city council was formed for city management and selection of the mayor. Gasem Khan Amir Tuman, one of the popular revolutionaries was elected as the first mayor of Tabriz. He was educated in the School of Saint-Cyr of Paris and performed many actions for city development and the well-



being of its citizens, such as repairing and cleaning of the city entrances, making the city infrastructures, overseeing maintenance and development of the city and other actions. The first Iranian library in the modern style, named 'Tarbiat', was founded in Tabriz during *Mashruteh* period by Mohammad Ali-Khan Tarbiat in 1921. After one year he founded the first girls' school, named 'Namus', in Tabriz. The first Iranian nursery school, named 'Baghchey-i Atfal' ('Children's Garden') was founded in Tabriz by Jabbar Baghcheban in 1924. He was educated in Irvan (See Niknam L., 1995).

It seems that the revolutionaries were following real socio-economic modernisation and the consequence of *Mashruteh* were integrated politico-economic changes in Iranian society but lasted only until the Pahlavis' rule. The Pahlavi interpretation of socio-economic modernisation was very different from that of the *Mashruteh* revolutionaries.

#### **5.4. Pseudo-Modernist State and Modern Development of Tabriz**

In 1920s there were many Iranian politicians and intellectuals who began to formulate ideas and develop social aspirations, which had been profoundly influenced by their knowledge of European (including Russian) societies. Katouzian (1981: 103) mentions that in this period, modern technology (which is often confused with modern science) was seen as omnipotent and capable of performing miracles which would solve any and all socio-economic problems once purchased and installed. This is why traditional social values and production techniques were regarded as symbols of, indeed causes of, national embarrassment; industrialisation was viewed not as an objective but as an object.

The period 1921-6 was a period of dual sovereignty: a period of intense struggle for political power both between rival men and between competing political visions. It was

inaugurated by the coup d'etat of February 1921 favoured by the main external power of the time, Britain, and pushed through to a change of dynasty in 1925 by a skilful military centraliser with significant, if misplaced, urban support from the *ulama*, left, and nationalist middle classes (Foran, 1993: 204). This was the beginning of an entirely new era in Iranian history, in the profoundest sense of the term (Katouzian, 1981: 80).

The year 1926 marks the beginnings of the supremacy of pseudo-modernism in Iran which, despite interruptions and variations, was prolonged until 1979 by the revolutionary movement. This period consists of many socio-historical cycles: the long cycle which began with the 1921 coup and led to the rise and fall of Reza Shah's pseudo-modernist despotism (1926- 41), the twelve years of interregnum and dual sovereignty (1941-53), the decade of dictatorship (1953-63), and the fifteen years of petrolic pseudo-modernist despotism; and the short cycle which rose with the Mohammad Reza Shah's bloody counter-revolution of 1963, reached its peak with the 'oil-price revolutions' of 1973-4 and ended with one of the greatest revolutions in human history (Katouzian, 1981: 234).

During this period Tabriz was scene of some social movements against new despotic state, remembering *Mashruteh* movement, so the pseudo-modernist despotic state treated in an affectionless way with Tabriz. Urban development historically was on will of state and in new situation developing of Tabriz declined in comparison to the other big cities.

#### 5.4.1. The Pahlavi State

By establishment of the Pahlavi regime (1925-1979), Iran entered a period in which the economic system started to shift towards a form of capitalism based on centralised and

dictatorial rule. This new system, after providing the necessary basis for stabilising itself, started to rebuild the country according to Western models (Banani quoted by Amirahmadi 1990). One of its targets was to replace traditional culture including Islam, with his own secularist ideology and related policies. Following this policy many changes in Iranian society, e.g. urban patterns, based on European styles, were imposed on the society. An adapted new aristocracy, a new elite, and new middle class emerged. The idea of yielding to Western civilisation gradually became the most vital ideology and strategy in Pahlavi's terms not only in politics but also in economic, social, educational and consumer drives, as well as in the organisation and building of the environment.

Britain and Russia, in 1941, seized control of Iran and forced the Reza Shah to resign and to make his young son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the nominal suzerain of the country. Between 1941 and 1953, Iran passed through a period of open political struggle among its several would-be foreign protectors and its several internal political parties. The United States gradually replaced both the Russian and the British influence and emerged as the principle patron of the post-war Iranian regime (Lapidus, 1988). It is from this period onwards that oil production and oil revenues become a key factor for the vicissitudes (including both the fortunes and misfortunes) of the Iranian political economy (Katouzian, 1981: 92).

On December 12, 1945 Tabriz was scene of a social movement. A locally-chosen provincial assembly led by the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan (DPA) under Jafar Pishivari declared the establishment of the 'Autonomous Government of Azarbaijan' at Tabriz (see Hassanpour, 1994). They called their program for freedom and autonomy in Azarbaijan within the national territory of Iran; support for democracy, constitutional

government, and local self-rule; use of Azari in schools and administration; protection of minorities' and women's rights; and economic measures aimed at reducing unemployment, distributing land, and retaining provincial tax revenues (Foran, 1993: 274).

On the economic front, DPA, decreed a comprehensive labour law; tried to stabilise prices by opening government food stores; and shifted the tax burden from food and other necessities to business profits, landed wealth, profession incomes, and luxury goods. It also changed the face of Tabriz by asphaltting the main roads, opening clinics and literary classes, founding a university, a radio station, and a publishing house, and renaming streets after Sattar Khan, Baqer Khan, and other heroes of the Constitutional Revolution (Abrahamian, 1982: 408). Other measures included nationalisation of banks, building of orphanages, houses for the aged, and hospitals, and in the cultural arena, creation of a theatre and publishing houses for works in Azari, including poetry and folklore collections. Cottam (1964) judges that the DPA accomplished more reforms in one year in Tabriz than Reza Shah had in twenty.

#### **5.4.2. Contemporary Urban Changes in Tabriz**

As Table 5.2 depicts, at the beginning of this century and *Mashruteh* Revolution (1900-1906), Tabriz had a population of about 200,000 and, like Tehran, it ranked first in the Iranian urban system. In 1940, the final years of first Pahlavi (1925-41), the expansion of Tabriz tended to decelerate. For example, while the average annual growth rate of the total and the urban population at the national level during the 1900-1940 period was 0.66 and 1.56 percent respectively, Tabriz grew only at a rate of 0.16 percent per year, which was low compared to the cities and even compared with the natural growth rate of the country.

In second Pahlavi reign (1941-1978) the growth rate of the population of Tabriz was the lowest compared to the other four major cities of the country.

Table (5.2) Population growth in Tabriz compared to the other largest cities in Iran (1900-1976)

City	1900 (a)	1940 (b)	1976 (c)	Average growth rate (%)	
				1900-40	1940-76
Tehran	200,000	541,000	4,530,223	2.52	6.10
Tabriz	200,000	213,000	597,976	0.16	2.91
Isfahan	100,000	204,000	661,510	1.80	3.32
Mashhad	75,000	176,000	667,770	2.15	3.77
Shiraz	60,000	129,000	425,813	1.93	3.37
Total Urban areas	2,033,000	3,773,000	15,854,680	1.56	4.07
Total Population	9,860,000	12,833,000	33,708,744	0.66	2.72

Source: (a) Bharier, 1972; (b) Agiri, 1950; and (c) Zanjani, 1989.

It can be suggested that Tabriz, as the once centre of Persian Azarbaijan, with cultural and political ties to both Russia and Turkey has, for long, been a highly politically-minded city with radical groups not always in accord with the central government. For instance, it was the centre of *Mashruteh* Revolution (1900-7) and in 1946 local extremists power and proclaimed the Republic of Azarbaijan for one year. For these political reasons, Tabriz seems to have received relatively less government attention than other large cities (e.g. Isfahan, Shiraz and Mashhad) and this may explain its relatively low population growth rate during the first period of the modernisation era.

#### 5.4.2.1. State and Emergence of New Social Class in *Shahr*

The implementation of pseudo-modernist ideas by the State led to processes of urban development that were under the strict control of the centralised state. The main characteristics of this period in environmental changes were cracks in the social structure. In the politico-social situation of Mohammed Reza Shah's reign a new social



class emerged. The new middle class which contained an increasing number of government officials, government technocrats, teachers, students etc. This new phenomenon, split in society, in the cities caused a dualism which was reflected in the urban environment.

The process of adapted modernisation models, meanwhile, affected the urban physical shape and scale. Some detached new towns such as Vali-i-Asr (1960s) and many complexes were built to fulfil the pseudo-modernist state's targets. These plans reinforced social class division in Tabriz.

#### **5.4.2.2. State and Emergence of Modern Urban Development in Tabriz**

The modern movement in built environment in Tabriz came back to Reza Shah's reign. Establishing Municipality building in modern style and for the modern institution, was the starting point of that. This building designed by the German engineers in Nazi time who had close relation with Reza Shah and remembering their symbol, flying eagle, and militarist Pahlavi regime (see figures: 5.23 and 5.24). The ground of the building, which was located in the main street, was an old symmetry and in the front of that the first modern square, in sense of Iranian concept, as the cars traffic structure built. This building became the symbol of modern Tabriz as the Alishah Mosque (figure, 5.3), commonly known as *Arg-i Tabriz*, was the symbol of historic Tabriz.

The main structural changes of the first period of the contemporary era in Tabriz can be summarised as follows:

A number of new streets was superimposed on the traditional pattern of the city. One main street was built in the east-west direction which was a result of widening the Iran-Europe

transit road through Tabriz. Other streets radiated from this central street towards the North or South. Another important element was the construction of the railway station

Figure (5.23): The Municipality Building of Tabriz, from the inside.

The first modern building in Tabriz designed by German engineers and built in 1930s. A small square as a streets cross built in the front of the building.

Source: The author





Figure (5.24): Perspective of Municipality Building of Tabriz.

The style of the building is like the flying eagle.


Source: Saliandy et al. (1997).



(figure, 5.25) which linked Tabriz to Russia at the end of the Second World War and, later, to Tehran. The other main new component added to Tabriz was the construction of an airport in the Northwest of the city.

Figure (5.25): Railway Station, a huge modern building.

Source: The author




The most important impact of history in today's structure is, in fact, the presence of the old part in the middle of the city, which is easily discernible from newly built districts in terms of the street pattern, the age, density and quality of buildings (see figure, 5.26).

Figure (5.26): Map of the historic core of Tabriz and modern interventions.

Key: 1. Saheb al-Amr Maidan; 2. Bazaar; 3. Alishah Mosque; 4. Blue Mosque; 5. Military; 6. Administrative; 7. City Wall  
Modern interventions shown in dotted lines.

Source: Based on Mogtader (1964)



Another impact of historical development on the present spatial structure of Tabriz is the existence of the bazaar in the old part both in terms of its physical structure and its economic role which, to a great extent, has influenced the present street patterns. Though rebuilt a number of times, the complex of the bazaar in the city centre, with its existence dating back to 11th century, its relatively large size of over 16ha (Mogtader, 1964), and its exotic structure (domes, covered passages and traditional architecture), forms one of the major physical presence of the city. The bazaar, as the main economic centre in the past and as the most important commercial complex today, remains the focus of the current transportation network. Azimi (1996) says that 52 out of 63 existing public bus routes originate from the bazaar.

The main element of modern urban development in Tabriz can be seen in the new quarter of Vali-Ahd (Prince) Northeast of Tabriz (fig. 5.27) and apart from the main




Figure (5.27): Map of the East part of Tabriz. The quarter of Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr), in the right part of the figure, after about four decades is still apart from the main fabric of the city.

Source: Gita Shenasi, 1993.



city. This modern community, with different social class, introduces a modern urban pattern and architecture (figures: 5.28 and 5.29).

Figure (5.28): Main Square of a Modern Quarter, Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr).

Source: The author



Figure (5.29): Main Square of the Modern Quarter, Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr); view of one of its streets.

Source: The author



Figure (5.30): A modern street in Vali-Ahd (Vali-i-Asr). Changing machinery part to pedestrian way and a few changes in post-modern style have been made recently.

Source: The author





## 5.5. Conclusion

The basic urban structure of Tabriz was formed during the Islamic period, especially after the 11th century. Since it was situated in the part of Persia most favoured by many of the dynasties that ruled the country, it has become one of the important cities in the history of Iran. In fact as Azimi (1996) says, its growth or decline has had a direct relationship to political decisions. Four important stages can be recognised in examining the process of historic growth and basic structural changes in Tabriz.

First, Tabriz, during the tribal states of eastern origin like Saljuqs, Mongols and Timurs was selected as capital of the empire and reached its highest point of development in the pre-modern era. Construction in this stage was mostly done in the open spaces based on the nomadic culture of rulers. Even mosques were erected far from bazaar and apart from the urban fabric.

Second, during the reign of the tribal states of western origin, like the Turkmen Qaraqoyunlus, Aq-qoyunlus and Safavis, Tabriz was a scene of emergence of new architectural and urban concepts in Iran. These Turkmen from former Byzantine lands adopted Ottoman culture and civilisation in the construction of spaces in Tabriz. Prime examples are the Blue Mosque, with its unique Ottoman style architecture from an Iranian point of view, and Sahib al-Amr square (*maidan*), the conceptual origin of historic *maidans* throughout Iran.

Third, during the reign of the Qajars that their dictatorship and the intervention of Russia and Britain brought about a destructive period in the history of Iran. During these times Tabriz was the seat of Princes and considered the second most important city in Iran. Relations with Europe and Russia which were close to Tabriz caused the

emergence of new concepts and elements of western origin in Tabriz. Building the *kolah-farangi* ('European-hat' villa) style houses and using western style decorative elements on the facades of buildings typified this period. Social movements in the last years of the Qajar reign caused the Constitutional (*Mashruteh*) Revolution with Tabriz as its centre.

The fourth and final major stage is the Pahlavis (1925-1979) pseudo-modernist ruling in Iran and the modern era. Tabriz declined in this period and an unparalleled social and spatial segregation occurred in the city.

#### **5.5.1. The Historic City of Tabriz; a *Shahr* as Seat of State**

Tabriz, as a fortress in the ancient times, became the largest city in the Middle East and capital of a vast empire during the reign of Mongol II. It declined hugely when deserted by state. A study of the history of urban development of Tabriz shows a lot of peaks and troughs in city life. These rapid changes, in their scale and threshold, were related to the will of states.

Analysing the urban form of Tabriz in the pre-modern era through the theoretical / hypothetical framework of this research reveals the city of Tabriz as being the seat of state. In this regard, state had a key role in structuring the urban spaces and study the origin of them and culture and architecture of their homelands, since most of them interred and ruled from out of that, were very useful and sometimes vital for interpretation of these changes.

As mentioned above, the design and construction of Sahib al-Amr Square (see figure 5.11) and bazaar in bridge (see figure 5.12), in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, were based on the desire

and will of the Turkmen states for commemorating their splendour. These spaces were not a social production. The gradual appropriation of the open space of this square (see Figure 5.33) is a prime example of the occupation, encroachment and, eventually, popular conquest of spaces built primarily to visually express power.

Figures (5.31 and 5.32) shows the present situation of the square which its open spaces is converted by shops. The main historic bodies of the square are seen in the figures.

Figure (5.31): North view of Sahib al-Amr Square.

This historic square is occupied gradually by the shopkeepers through the past centuries. The old North body of the square, Mosque of Hassan Padishah, one of the main historic elements of the square, is seen behind the shops.

Source: The author






Figure (5.32): East view of Sahib al-Amr Square.

Four ranges of shops have occupied the open spaces of the square. The entrance of the Akbarieh *Madrasseh* (school), one of the main historic elements of the square, in the end of the picture is seen.

Source: The author



Such a strong example reinforces that an analysis of that for urban public spaces in Iran based on the socio-spatial approach is not enough and these spaces crucially emerge through the influence of state. This approach and historic review of urban development and change in Tabriz indicate this *city as seat of state* in pre-modern era. The modern Daraei Street shows how the desires of modern state have merely continued the active disruption by the state at the fabric of the city.



a) The historic Aq-qoyunlu square of Sahib al-Amr, 15<sup>th</sup> century and its connection to bazaar through continuing bazaar on the bridge.

b) The citizens appropriate gradually the open spaces of the square for private use and begin to violate the orthogonal square pattern, 18<sup>th</sup> century.

c) Ultimate converted plan of the square and the building of bazaar on the bridge is disappeared, 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Figure (5.33 a, b and c): Encroachments on the Sahib al-Amr Square, Tabriz.

Source: Author based on the Sardari (1997) and Sahab Geographical and Drafting Institute (1992).



### 5.5.2. The Modern development of Tabriz; Change as Spatial Segregation

The history of Tabriz in the modern era had many ups and downs. As Katouzian (1981) mentions, this city was centre of Constitutional Revolution against the traditional and historic Iranian despotism. This revolution, as Foran (1993) mentions, forced the country to modernise. It was defeated by the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) which was baseless from a social and political point of view. For continuation, this dictatorship needed a social and ideological base and, in the first Pahlavi period, found it in nationalism. Its strategy was writ in urban development based on the restoration of ancient and magnificent Iran.

After disgraceful failing of first Pahlavi and his nationalism at the hand of the Allies in the Second World War his son came to power. He declared a new ideology which was in fashion, up to-date and echoed the will of a triumphant West: the modernising of Iran. In the case of urban development he interfered on a large scale in the urban fabrics for this reason. Figure 5.34, a map of a part of the old fabric of Tabriz and modern interference upon it shows a traditional fabric with a specific social life a duality, not a unity, of form. Azimi (1995) in this regard says that despite the newly added urban elements, the traditional spatial organisation in central and old parts of Tabriz had not been changed much compared to the spatial structural changes which have occurred in the Modern Era.

The interpretation of urban form of Tabriz in modern era was guided in this chapter by a theoretical/ hypothetical framework that links social and spatial segregation (in modern Tabriz) with a pseudo-modernist state (in Iran). Stratification in the society and the abandonment of the main urban pattern by those who subscribed to the pseudo-modern culture of state made serious changes in the urban form of Tabriz. New social class in new and different urban forms (see figure 5.35) implicit on their culture and readings into the



urban developments. Experience of Tabriz in forming urban spaces indicates that space is political and relational in philosophic point of view.

Urban form is structured by state and urban spaces, such as street, square and so on, in parallel of its policies is conceptualised. This matter is examined in the next chapter by surveying Tabriz's citizen's readings into the urban development.



Figure (5. 34): Map of a part of the old fabric of Tabriz and modern interference.

Source: Gita Shenasi (1993)





Figure (5. 35): Map of modern fabric of Tabriz, *Kuy-i Vali-Ahd* (Vali-i - Asr) quarter. Socially and spatially it is different and even segregated from the traditional fabric and culture of the city.

Source: Gita Shenasi (1993)

# CHAPTER SIX

## READINGS OF TABRIZ'S CITIZENS INTO THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT



# 6

## READINGS OF TABRIZ'S CITIZENS INTO THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT

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### Introduction to Chapter Six

#### 6.1. Methodological Review of Survey

##### 6.1.1. PCT and Classification of People's Constructs

##### 6.1.2. The Method of PCT in Practice

##### 6.1.3. Mass Questionnairng

#### 6.2. The Survey (Questionnaire)

##### 6.2.1. Surveying: Phase I

###### 6.2.1.1. Interview

###### 6.2.1.2. Construct Elicitation, Rating and Laddering

###### 6.2.1.3. Analysis

##### 6.2.2. Surveying: Phase II

###### 6.2.2.1. Questionnaire

###### 6.2.2.2. The Characteristics of Interviewers

###### 6.2.2.3. The Characteristics of Respondents

#### 6.3. Dimensions and Attributes of Urban Development

##### 6.3.1. Urban Spaces

###### 6.3.1.1. Streets

###### 6.3.1.2. Squares

###### 6.3.1.3. Districts

##### 6.3.2. City Authorities

###### 6.3.2.1. Activities

###### 6.3.2.2. Public Relations

###### 6.3.2.3. Tendencies

##### 6.3.3. People's Attitudes

###### 6.3.3.1. Urban Culture

###### 6.3.3.2. Environmental Behaviour

###### 6.3.3.3. Paying City Costs

#### 6.4. Correlation between Constructs

##### 6.4.1. Correlation between Dimensions of Urban Spaces and city authorities' Tendencies

###### 6.4.1.1. Correlation between Street Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

###### 6.4.1.2. Correlation between Square Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

###### 6.4.1.3. Correlation between District Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

##### 6.4.2. Correlation between Rates of Citizen's Attitudes and City Authorities' Activities

#### 6.5. Conclusion

##### 6.5.1. State and Urban Spaces

##### 6.5.2. State and Citizens' Attitudes

##### 6.5.3. State, People and Urban Development

## Introduction to Chapter Six

This chapter, as a groundwork for a deep structure understanding, is dedicated to defining the main cause of structuring the social formation and urban forming in Iran.

The author's experience, and the source of the concerns of this research, is that people have problems in interaction and communication with the urban spaces, and are inattentive about their environment quality and its development. On the other hand, in the most of the Iranian cities, the city authorities complain of people's behaviour, their attitudes towards the city affairs, their encroachments into 'public' spaces, ... and they believe that these are major problems in managing city affairs. But, as Lindheim (1968) believes, the behaviour of most urban systems is governed by the dynamic structure of the system, and outcomes are latent in the dynamic structure of the system that exist or are adopted: they will inexorably emerge, and establishing whether the people's attitudes are outcomes of the state attitude is the aim of this research. This survey contributes to testing research hypothesis by eliciting people's perception of urban spaces, city authorities and citizen's attitudes.

As mentioned in chapter two, the common models and views on urban studies are not sufficient for analysing the evolution of Iranian cities and their current problems. Holt-Jensen (1988) says that the model does not explain the factors that produce the present situation: "Even if we succeed in fitting the model to some data and so establish some correlation between data sets, we have not shown what actually produces this correlation. Causes are not associated with correlation and regularities, these are *surface appearances*. We need to look for the mechanisms within *deep structures*" (ibid.; 111).

### 6.1. Methodological Review of Survey

There are two main methods for research, quantitative methods and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods and techniques are used in experimental investigations to analyse quantifiable information (data that can be measured, tested and manipulated in such forms as equations, charts and computer programs). Qualitative methods employ in-depth surveying by observation and open ended interviewing. Bryman (1988) introduce the quantitative research as a rational and linear process and qualitative research as a participatory, unstructured and flexible process of survey. At the end the thrust of research, as Sayer says: "must be towards the discovery of order" (Sayer, 1985: 161).

The term 'qualitative methods' is sometimes incorrectly taken to mean that no quantification is involved but can involve making observations and counting, mapping, charting and analysing. Evidence is gathered, not simply intuited. Another inaccurate perception is that the uses of qualitative and quantitative methods are mutually exclusive - that there are some adversarial elements between the two approaches and that a practitioner must therefore be either a quantitative or a qualitative methodologist. Not only are the methods not mutually exclusive but, when properly used, they are mutually reinforcing and complementary (Dandekar 1988: 75).

Distinctions between quantitative and qualitative methods are not always simple. Whether a method is regarded as qualitative or quantitative depends not simply on what is done (the particular investigative techniques used), but also on aspects of the problem that the method is designed to help examine (Dandekar 1988: 80).

Whether a method is categorised as quantitative or qualitative can also depend on the proportion of the total system being studied about which the investigator seeks



information. For example, a set of interviews may be categorised as qualitative or quantitative depending on the way in which the interviews are structured; the nature of the information sought; the interviewer; the number of interviews; and the number of individuals interviewed relative to the total population being studied. The size and nature of the sample population interviewed determines whether the findings can be considered statistically significant and representative of the total population and therefore whether the interviews are conducted to elicit quantitative or qualitative information.

The qualitative technique of 'Repertory Grid Test', which is used in the first phase of this research, is based on the George Kelly's 'Personal Construct Theory'. It is basically an interview technique in which the interviewee is not given pre-structured answers to choose from (see Aspinall, 1992). The technique allows for the classification of the subjects' responses regarding their assessment of various aspects of the environment. This happens without any kind of pre-designed format, so that the sequential and open nature of the questionnaire technique itself lets the structure and classification of these responses emerge spontaneously. The subject is simply asked to make preferences from his initial response, one preference leading onto another. The relationships between these sequential responses will indicate an order or structure which represents the significance of these responses, which Kelly calls '*constructs*'.

The author elicits the constructs of six people's perceptions and evaluations of urban spaces. These then became the basis for designing the questions of the second phase of the survey at a larger scale and involving 312 persons. These are explained in forthcoming sections of this chapter.

### 6.1.1. PCT and people's Construct Classification

The use of Personal Construct Theory (PCT) was seen as a possible solution to the problem of obtaining the underpinning attributes and dimensions of perception of the built environment. From its beginnings in the domain of clinical psychology the use of PCT has spread into many areas, "market research, quality control, design, attitude surveys, training-needs analysis, negotiation, counselling, team building and more" (Stewart, 1981).

Personal Construct Psychology was introduced by the American psychologist, George Alexander Kelly in 1955 (see Aspinall, 1992). According to Kelly, whatever the world may actually be, people can come to grips with it only by placing their own interpretations upon what they see. Kelly suggested that people have mental filters, which he calls *constructs*, through which they perceive and construe the world. In this way, people build for themselves a representational model of the world which enables them to plan a course of behaviour (Kelly 1955). This model is developed and evaluated over time as constructions of reality are tested and modified to allow for better understanding and prediction.

The idea of a person struggling to impose meaning on experience is central to Kelly's thinking. We make sense of situations by imposing a structure on them (Aspinall 1992).

The fundamental postulate on which PCT is based is that a persons' processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events (Kelly, 1963). This was given not as an ultimate statement of truth, but in an attempt to make our theoretical position provocative, and hence fertile rather than legalistic (Kelly, 1963). Kelly believed that man looks through transparent patterns of templates which he

creates and then attempts to fit over the realities of which the world is composed (Kelly, 1963). The patterns Kelly called *constructs* as they are ways of construing the world (Harvey, 1995: 64).

George Kelly (1955) argues that it is not possible to say that constructs are essences derived by the mind from an available 'reality'. They are imposed upon events, not abstracted from them. There is only one place they come from; that is the person who is to use them. In other words the human is prone to put a personal meaning into the environment, and then perceive it as he or she wants to. The important fact is that this is not a fixed or unchangeable process. We can perceive new things and therefore change. In this sense we improve our understanding from and of the world. In this process we are continually adapting ourselves with our surroundings.

Elements as well as events in the environment, do not carry their own meanings (see Kelly 1955; Aspinall 1992). Their meanings are only completed when they are perceived by people. People, on the other hand, perceive 'things' based on their cognitive stored information. This stored information, Barati (1997) believes, is for the most part what is known as *local cultural knowledge*.

Environmental cognition work using PCT and its associated Repertory Grid Test began in the early seventies with work on eliciting environmental images (Harrison et al., 1971). The Repertory Grid Test (RGT) is a way of formalising conversation. When talking we can understand what is important to the person, his assessment of people, places, events and the relationships between them. The test assigns mathematical values to the relationships between constructs (Harvey, 1995: 68).

### 6.1.2. The Method of PCT in Practice

Well established methods have evolved for the elicitation of a person's construct system. This test is closely linked and derived from a coherent body of psychological theory. Harrison *et al.* (1976) also argue that the grid test is highly flexible and can be used to study any kind of perception. The suggestion is then that PCT and its associated interview technique is able to provide a comprehensive framework for the integrated study of environmental cognition and behaviour.

#### 1) The Standard Interview, Elicitation of Elements:

Elements selected will be examples from the field of study. There are three main approaches to the procedure for obtaining elements: the interviewee can be supplied with a set devised by the researcher for their research strategy, the interviewee can provide their own element set or a set can be established in discussion. This is achieved by asking for pairs which are appropriate - an element you like and one you do not like, a typical element and an atypical one, a successful element and unsuccessful one (Aspinall *et al.*, 1988).

#### 2) Construct Elicitation:

The standard approach to construct elicitation is by the use of triads of elements or a qualifying statement added to the standard question from the point of or in terms of the purpose of the study. Three elements are considered and the question asked is, "In what important way are two of them alike and thereby different from the third". This is then recorded, and the subject is asked in what way the third element differs from the other two, and thus a bipolar construct is gained. As many triads can be presented as is thought appropriate. Again certain points should be remembered during construct elicitation. Constructs should be used which are applicable to the entire element set.



Constructs which place nearly all elements at one pole should be avoided as they are not very discriminating (for more details see Aspinall et al., 1988).

### **3) Laddering the Constructs:**

The constructs in our minds are not a random collection of potential discriminators, but are in an hierarchical relationship to each other. Laddering is the name given to movement up or down the hierarchy (Aspinall et al., 1988: 14). The laddering procedure was first described by Hinkle (1965) as a method for establishing position in the construct hierarchy by the elicitation of either superordinate (constructs of a higher order of abstraction) or subordinate constructs. To obtain superordinate constructs, the subject is asked why they prefer one particular end. This gives rise to a further construct, to which the same question can be asked, thus ascending the hierarchy. To gain subordinate constructs, the contrast between the two poles of the construct must be explored (Harvey, 1995: 71).

#### **6.1.3. Mass Questionnairing**

Mass questionnairing with pre-structured questions is a method of surveying at a large scale and for the collection of great volumes of information in various ways. Statistical methods and techniques are used in this approach. Rycus says that "Statistical methods are used to make inferences about measurable characteristics of a large group based on measurements from a representative sample of the group" (Rycus 1988: 94). Researchers can also use statistics in a much more fundamental way to draw inferences from the results of an experiment as that they do not want to simply report the information and scores of subjects but "want to use the data to test our original prediction - to decide whether the independent variable is having the effect we supposed" (Miller, 1984: 48).



6.2. The Survey

The survey has been designed in two phases. In the first phase, a PCT test was used on a six persons for eliciting construct systems that related to perception of urban development and, in the second phase, the assessment of the first phase and theoretical studies is generalised by mass questionnairing for which 312 valid questionnaires out of 340 ones were returned. This questionnaire contains both methods of quantitative and qualitative research and was devised in a mixed way - that is, some questions are open ended and others left more specific and closed to allow for statistical testing.

6.2.1. Surveying: Phase I

The aim and process of the first phase of survey are as follows:

- Use of PCT in the context of describing the attributes that an individual uses in perceiving of the quality of the built environment by making some interviews.
- Use of a small study to appraise the constructs used. These are to be found by a deep study of the small sample.
- Use of PCT for designing an appropriate questionnaire for a larger scale sample (mass questionnairing).

6.2.1.1. Interview

A group of six people were interviewed. They were four men and two women. Table (6.1) shows the general characteristics of the interviewees:

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Educational Status</i>	<i>Occupation</i>
1	Male	61	Primary	Merchant
2	Male	40	Higher Education	Governmental Staff
3	Female	25	Secondary	Teacher
4	Male	24	Higher Education	Post Graduate Student
5	Female	35	Higher Education	Teacher
6	Male	34	Higher Education	Architect

Table (6.1): General Characteristics of Respondents in the First Phase of Survey.

The first step of the program is element elicitation. It was decided that a set of ten urban elements would provide an adequate set to work with. For this reason the following questions, which refer to the city of Tabriz, were asked:

1. Can you think of a building that you particularly like?
2. Can you think of a building that you do not like?
3. Can you think of a square that you particularly like?
4. Can you think of a square that you do not like?
5. Can you think of a district where you would like to live?
6. Can you think of a district where you would not like to live?
7. Can you think of a street that you particularly like?
8. Can you think of a street that you do not like?
9. Can you think of an urban public amenities (park, shopping centre and etc.) where you would like to go frequently?
10. Can you think of an urban public amenities where you would not like to go frequently?

#### **6.2.1.2. Element Elicitation:**

Table (6.2) shows the desirable (liked) and undesirable (disliked) urban elements of Tabriz mentioned by the six interviewees in the first phase survey. The frequency of responses shows the repetition of each element by different interviewees.

Total interviewees: six persons		
<i>Subjects</i>	<i>Elements</i>	
	<i>Like</i>	<i>Dislike</i>
<b>Buildings</b>	Eskan 2 Poets' Mausoleum 1 Shahrdary 2 Government palace 1	Bahman cinema 2 Khanehsazi 1 Benabieh 1 Industrial administration 1 Yad hospital 1
<b>Squares</b>	Shahrdary 3 Shohada 2 Shariati 1	Terminal 3 Abbasi 2 Daraie 1
<b>Districts</b>	Vali-ye-asr 2 Abrasan 2 Shahryar 1 Golbad 1	Manbe 2 Maralan 2 Davachi 1 Hokm-abad 1
<b>Streets</b>	Emam 3 29-Bahman 2 Vali-asr 1	Gajil 3 Azadi 1 Gare-aghaj 2
<b>Urban public amenities</b>	El-Goli 3 Bazaar 2 Bagh-golestan 1	Pasage 4 Gajil 1 Dizel-abad 1

Table (6.2): Number of responses on people's favourite urban elements.

**Buildings:** The Eskan Building and Shahrdary (Municipality) Building (figures 5.23 and 5.24) are repeated two times as favourite buildings by total six interviewees (see table 6.2). Eskan is a private new shopping centre built in 1992 in a post modern style of architecture and the Shahrdary erected in 1918 is an important and as symbol of modern era of Tabriz (see chapter five) located in the centre of city. The Bahman Cinema is mentioned two times as being a disliked building. This cinema is erected in about 1970 in a modern style. The dislike of some interviewees may relate to the situation in the untidy and bad reputation space of Pasage, and bad preservation of this building.

**Squares:** Shahrdary Square is indicated three times as a favoured square (see table 6.2). This square is located in the centre and close to important spaces of the city. The Shahrdary is situated in the south west corner of the square. Terminal Square,

mentioned three times as a disliked square, is a new and stylish square but it is located near the bad quarter (former ghetto of adulteresses) of the city, so the perception of the interviewees may be distorted by its past.

**Districts:** Vali-asr District (figures 5.28, 5.29, 5.31 and 5.32) and Abrasan District are mentioned two times as favourite districts (see table 6.2). These two districts are segregated and far from the old, historic zone of the city. They are built in the modern style and house the upper classes of society. Manbe District and Maralan District are mentioned two times as disliked districts. These two districts are in the new part of the city and contain some ghettos where that lower class people live.

**Streets:** Emam Street is mentioned three times as a favourite street (see table 6.2). It is the main, historic and the longest street of the city that the main square - Shahrday square - is located on it. Gajil Street is mentioned three times as disliked district. It is one of the old streets of the city and it is close to the bad quarter (former ghetto of adulteresses) and Terminal Square.

**Urban public amenities:** El-Goli (figures 5.18 and 5.19), the largest park of the city, is mentioned two times as a favourite space of the city is one of the most visited parks of the country built in a historic-modern style (see table 6.2). Pasage, an old zone of shops, cinemas, and coffee-houses is mentioned four times as a disliked space. This zone was the centre of the selling of alcoholic liquors (which is forbidden in Islamic law) and saloons before the Islamic Revolution and nowadays is the centre of drug smugglers.

### 6.2.1.3. Construct Elicitation, Rating and Laddering:

The construct elicitation mode follows the Kelly Repertory Grid Test formula by presenting to the interviewees groups of three elements (triads) of 10 elements which are elicited in the beginning of interview, and asking the respondent to classify these into two different poles. Then they are asked to indicate why two are similar to each other and dissimilar to the third and this differentiation is taken as the first construct. This process is repeated until five initial constructs are obtained.

The program then starts with constructs, and a rating sequence on a seven point scale, its poles being the two poles of the construct, is used for rating all units in the element set in this way. Then the respondent is asked which pole is preferred and why. The reason is given as the first pole of a new construct, the respondent being asked to complete the second pole. They are then asked to rate all elements on the new construct before being asked for this new construct and which pole they prefer and the sequence starts again. When the respondent is unable to find any further new differentiating factor or ten constructs have been obtained, the process starts afresh with the next initial construct.

### 6.2.1.4. Analysis:

The initial results of this study strongly support the theoretical background of the research. Table (6.3) shows some of the constructs which were expressed by interviewees. Among all the contradiction between **Governmental** as a pole and **National** (in its Iranian concept - see Chapter Four) as its contrast, which is repeated eight times in various aspects, is very important. The constructs gained by laddering, show that the state in the city of Tabriz supports the high social classes. The other significant point is that there are close interrelations between some desirable concepts such as **Efficiency, Privacy, Beauty,**



**Convenience** and **Progress** are in the concept of the **State** pole, but on the contrary the undesirable concepts are in the **National** and **Private** side.

<i>Constructs</i>	
<i>Pole</i> .....	<i>Contrast</i>
Good-natured .....	Ill-natured
People's satisfaction .....	People's dissatisfaction
Governmental .....	National
Progress .....	Backward
Public .....	Private
Owning .....	Out of owning
More investment .....	Less investment
Good situation .....	Bad situation
High culture and elite .....	Lower classes
Convenience .....	Inconvenience
Governmental possession .....	National possession
Efficiency .....	Inefficiency
Good designer .....	Bad designer
Modern .....	Old
Comfortable .....	Uncomfortable
Favoured by elite .....	Favoured by commons
Privacy .....	Crowd
Quiet .....	Noisy
Good management .....	Bad management
Symbol .....	Non-symbol
Beauty .....	Ugliness
Governmental support .....	Lack of governmental support
Proper facilities .....	Improper facilities

Table (6.3): Some of the common constructs gained in the Phase I Interview (with 6 persons).

Favourite elements		Non-favourite elements	
Subject	Mean rates	Subject	Mean rates
E1: Buildings	2.1	E2: Buildings	4.7
E3: Squares	3.2	E4: Squares	4.0
E5: Districts	2.3	E6: Districts	5.4
E7: Streets	3.4	E8: Streets	4.4
E9: Public amenities	2.4	E10: Public amenities	6.1

Table (6.4): The mean of responses on rating Favourite and Non-favourite Elements of five urban subjects with elicited constructs on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 is very desirable).

Comparisons between desirable and undesirable elements chosen by respondents, on rating with the elicited constructs on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 is very desirable), specify that elements related to buildings, districts and urban spaces (parks, shopping centres and so on) are conceivable for them, but the other elements related to squares and streets are unfamiliar to them. Diagram (6.1) indicates that people are confused by squares and streets which are main physical structure of European-styled cities (see Krier, 1979 and French, 1983). Hence it appears that the interviewees had problems in defining these urban significant elements.




Diagram (6.1): The Comparison between the mean responses on rating Favourite and Non-favourite Elements of five urban subjects with elicited constructs on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 is very desirable).

According to these findings, the new and the modern districts in Tabriz planned by the city administration, which seems to achieve socio-spatial segregation, are mentioned as favoured spatial references. These spaces won desirable responses on the rating with elicited constructs and, referring to the chapter four, this supports the second hypothesis of the research.

Tavassoli (1991) believes that the shape and the function of the squares and streets in Iranian townscapes differ from the European ones. This matter is one of the most important subjects of the second phase surveying of this research.

6.2.2. Surveying: Phase II (Mass Questionnairing)

In order to test the research hypothesis, and based on the results of the first phase of surveying, the following mixed (open-ended and fixed questions) questionnaire was designed to assess the people's and the state's roles in the urban development and evolution of Tabriz. Assessment of people's readings into the urban development was done using three dimensions: **Urban spaces, people's attitudes and city authorities.** The attributes for these dimensions were designed as follows:




Diagram (6.2): Components of People's Readings to Urban Development.

The aim of the questionnaire is to find out people's feeling about their urban spaces, attitudes of the authorities and citizens' and behaviour on city affairs. It also attempts to find out their view on people's participation in managing of city affairs.

### 6.2.2.1. Questionnaire

The questionnaire has four parts:

- A. General information about respondents;
- B. Seven open-ended questions ask for their views and reasons about three main foci of this research (urban spaces, people's attitudes and city authorities);
- C. Twelve questions in which people are asked to evaluate on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 7 is most desirable) their views about the city of Tabriz; and
- D. Nine questions in which the people are asked to evaluate their agreement and disagreement with certain statements. The details of the questionnaire are as follows:

#### A. General information about respondents:

- Occupation
- Age
- Gender
- Education
- Length of residence
- Address (district)

#### B. The respondents' views over the topics:

1. Have you ever been involved in an opinion poll about the city matters? Y/N  
If yes, please specify:
2. Have you ever objected to the performance of city authorities? Y/N  
If yes, please specify. If no, what was the reason?
3. Have you ever been appreciative of your city authorities? Y/N  
If yes, please specify. If no, what was the reason?
4. Where do city governors concentrate their investment and work? Why? Give two reasons:
5. Mention three most important reasons for distinction of a city district:
6. Mention the main street of city, give three reasons for that:

7. Mention the main square of city, give three reasons for that:

**C. Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 ( where 7 is most desirable ) your view on the following issues about the city of Tabriz:**

8. State investments in the city.
9. People's participation in paying of city costs.
10. People's participation in maintenance and cleanliness of the city.
11. The preservation of historic monuments.
12. The expansion of the recreational spaces and parks.
13. The expansion of the streets and squares.
14. The expansion of the public amenities (libraries, art galleries and etc.).
15. The development of the public transportation.
16. The city sewage system.
17. The traffic system.
18. The urban culture of the people of Tabriz.
19. The efficiency of city authorities and their staff.

**D. Please indicate your agreement and disagreement (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree) on the following statements:**

20. The state has been responsible for the city and public spaces so far.
21. The taxes must be increased for improvement and more development of the city.
22. The state has enough revenues to do its civic duties.
23. The state realises the city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs.
24. It should be allowed to destroy the traditional spaces for renovation the city
25. The city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city.
26. State respects the people ideas on city managing and developing.
27. People prefer their interest for well-being of the city.
28. Innovation and expansion of streets and squares have disturbed the city structure.



6.2.2.2. The Characteristics of Interviewers

In phase II of the survey, to facilitate in interviewing citizens of Tabriz on a large scale involving at least 340 people in different districts of city, six interviewers co-operated with the researcher. Table (6.5) shows the general characteristics of interviewers. All of them were undergraduate students in the field of Social Science and Community Planning, were in the last year of their course and had prior experience in interviewing.

The main districts of the city were divide into six areas and each interviewer carried out the survey in one area under the researcher’s supervision.

<i>Interviewer</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Field of Study</i>
<b>Rahim Bagheri</b>	M	30	Social Science and Community Planning
<b>Farnaz Farsadi</b>	F	24	Social Science and Community Planning
<b>Khadijeh Yeghaneh</b>	F	23	Social Science and Community Planning
<b>Fariba Abedi</b>	F	22	Social Science and Community Planning
<b>Housain Kasbkar</b>	M	22	Social Science and Community Planning
<b>Jamal Mehrzad</b>	M	21	Social Science and Community Planning

Table (6.5): General Characteristics of Interviewers.

6.2.2.3. The Characteristics of Respondents

The interviewers carried out the survey by interviewing people to fill in the questionnaires under the supervision of the researcher. Respondents were selected randomly from different ages, sex, occupations and districts. The sum of over twenty-years old population of the city is about 350,000 and the sum of valid questionnaires is 312. The survey could therefore be considered as statistically reliable.

**Gender:** The sex distribution in this survey was 59 female and 253 male persons (see table 6.6). In spite of attention of the researcher and selecting half of interviewers from the female sex (see table 6.5), the distribution of interviewees among two sex are not in equilibrium. It is because of the nature of society and these numbers indicate the females presence in the society, actively.

**Age:** Table (6.6) shows the different age groups of respondents. They are grouped into three different ages. The first group are between 20 and 34 years old; the second group between 35 and 59 years old; and the third group 60 years old and over.

Age Group	Female	Male	Total	Percentage
20 - 34	24	79	103	33%
35 - 59	35	135	170	54.5%
60 and Over	---	39	39	12.5%
Total	59	253	312	100%
Percentage	18.5%	81.1%	100%	

Table (6.6): Different Age Groups of Respondents

**Education:** Respondents' education status are categorised in three main groups. The first is those who have only primary education, the second is those who have a secondary education diploma, and the third who have higher education diploma or are currently in higher education in. Table (6.7) indicates the number of females and males in different educational groups. 73 percent of females and 31 percent of males are higher educated. These figures show that the active females in the society are mostly educated but the active males gender consist of different groups and they occupy different class of job in the society.

<i>Educational Status</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<b>Primary</b>	1	69	70	22.4%
<b>Secondary</b>	15	105	120	38.5%
<b>Higher Education</b>	43	79	122	39.1%

Table (6.7): Different Educational Status Groups of Respondents.

**Occupation:** 27 different occupations have been represented in the results. Therefore, the occupations were grouped for a general understanding in five groups. The first group concerns people who are employed by the government. The second group consists of the self employed. The third group are students. The fourth group consists of retired people and the last group includes jobless people. Table (6.8) shows the number of females and males involved in the survey in different occupation groups.

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
<b>Gov/Staff</b>	38	37	78	24%
<b>Self Employed</b>	10	159	169	54.2%
<b>Student</b>	7	12	19	6.1%
<b>Retired</b>	2	27	29	9.3%
<b>Jobless</b>	2	18	20	6.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table(6.8): Different Occupation Groups of Respondents.

### 6.3. Components and Attributes of Urban Development

A city is not merely buildings, roads, squares, services or utilities; a city is a complex series of relations between people themselves and between people and urban spaces. Neisser (1976) believes that these relationships are integrated in a holistic physical, social and cultural form. People's relationships with their environment, whether the site, climate and materials (the physical aspects), or the socio/cultural values, build the visible image of a place, where all these aspects and variables are in fact one

phenomenon. This phenomenon in this research, is studied in three dimensions: urban spaces, city authorities and citizen's attitudes; and some attributes and criteria of these dimensions for inclusion in urban development.

The main process involved in analysing people's responses and attitudes - the topic raised in the questionnaire - is to compile and give order to the mass of information gathered in the cases of components and attributes of urban development.

### **6.3.1. Urban Spaces**

Urban space is generally represented by three broad categories: the street, the park, and the square (see Krier, 1979; Tavassoli, 1992 and French, 1983: 11). Krier (1979) says that the two main elements of the physical composition of the urban spatial phenomenon are street and square. These two elements and the other one, district - which is a significant element of Iranian cities (see chapter three) - are the attributes of urban spaces used in this research. The frequency of any response is considered to be an indication of its importance.

#### **6.3.1.1. Streets**

The first phase of survey indicated that people have problem in recognising the concepts of *streets*. Table (6.4) and diagram (6.1) indicate that the difference of the mean rates of the favourite street, 3.4, with the non-favourite street, 4.4, is only one scale out of the seven scales. It means that they are confused and can not specify clearly between desirable and undesirable streets. Therefore, asking them to state such preferences clearly could be meaningless. So the research concentrated instead on defining the concepts of streets through the clear one, that is the main streets. For this reason in the second phase of survey - mass questionnairing, asked people to mention the main street

of city with giving at least three reasons. According to people’s responses, table (6.9) represents the frequency of main streets’ names and the reasons given.

**Main Street:** Table (6.9) shows the Emam Khomeini Street (figures 6.1 and 6.2) took the first place as the interviewees' 'main street', getting 292 answers or more than 94 percent of total answers. This consensus of people on the most important and main street of the city also shows that the reasons for their selection were many.



Figure (6.1): Emam Khomeini Street in the modern extended part of the city.



Figure (6.2): Emam Khomeini Street in the historic part of the city.

Total questionnaire: 312

Street name	Freq.	Reason	Freq.
Emam Khomeini St.	292	The main street of city with other streets branching out	234
		Location of main city services	166
		It is axial and connects East and West of the city	134
		Being historic	125
		High traffic	48
		Concentration of commercial zones	41
		This is the first street of the city	34
		Residence of rich people	17
Azadi St.	10	It has little traffic trouble	7
		The main street of city with other streets branching out	7
		It is axial and connects East and West of the city	6
		High traffic	3
Jomhuri St.	4	Being historic	3
		Concentration of commercial zones	3
3 other streets	4		
Total	310		882

Table (6.9): Main street name and three reasons



**Reasons:** Table (6.10) shows the frequency and percent of answers as reasons (at least three) for mentioning the main street of the city. The most important reason for the main street was being a main artery of the city with many other streets branching out from it. This reason was repeated 245 times, or 27.8 percent of the total responses. The location of main city services and being long are the other reasons respectively.

Total valid questionnaire: 312

<i>Reasons for Main City Street</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
The main street of city with other streets branching out of it	245	27.8
Location of main city services	172	19.5
It is axial and connects East and West of the city	141	16.0
Being historic	129	14.6
High traffic	56	6.3
Concentration of commercial zones	47	5.3
This is the first street of the city as historic	34	3.9
Residence of rich people	18	2.0
It has little traffic	16	1.8
Beauty and attraction	4	0.5
Other reasons	20	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table (6.10): Frequency of main city street reasons.

**Dimensions:** Table (6.11) indicates the total numbers of responses categorised into dimensions. At the top of the list is the *functional dimension*, with a frequency of 543 or more than 61.6 percent of the total responses. The other important dimensions, *historical dimension*, with 160 mentions or about 18.1 percent, and *spatial dimensions* with 141 mentions or 16 percent of total responses are the next top numbers respectively. Other dimensions with lesser frequencies are not mentioned here.

Dimensions of Street					
Functional		Historical		Spatial	
Long	245	Historic	160	Axial	141
Services	172			Rich people	18
Traffic	72				
Commercial	47				
<b>543</b>		<b>160</b>		<b>141</b>	<b>18</b>
				<b>20</b>	<b>882</b>

Table (6.11): The number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces attributes - streets.

### 6.3.1.2. Squares

The first phase of this survey indicated that people, although they live in a metropolis city, had no specific criteria for judging the desirable and undesirable squares, showing similar confusion over the concepts of streets. Diagram (6.1) shows the comparison between the mean of responses on rating favourite and non-favourite elements (the liked and the disliked squares) of squares with elicited constructs. In this diagram, and shown in table (6.4), the mean of rates of desirable squares and undesirable ones are very close together. This demonstrates that people feel uncertainty concerning the roles of squares in their urban life. In the understanding that of the above hesitation is according to conceptual aspects, the interviewees were asked to mention the main square of the city and give three reasons for their choice.

Total questionnaire: 312

<i>Square name</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Freq.</i>
<b>Shahrdary Sq.</b>	229	Centrality	133
		Being historic	130
		Location of municipality building	122
		Location of important activities and administrations	74
		Closer to bazaar and activity centres	52
		Location in the main street	49
		Location of commercial and recreational centres	17
		High traffic	12
		City symbol	11
<b>Shohada Sq.</b>	42	Location of important activities and administrations	28
		Closing to bazaar and activity centres	23
		Centrality	15
		Being historic	11
		Large scale	10
		Main bus stations	9
<b>Azadi Sq.</b>	11	Large scale	7
		Good accesses and high streets	5
		Location of commercial and recreational centres	5
		High traffic	3
<b>Sahib al-Amr Sq.</b>	4	Being historic	4
		Location of commercial centres	2
<b>Namaz Sq.</b>	4	Being historic	4
		Closer to bazaar	2
<b>9 other Sq.</b>	17		
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>		<b>873</b>

Table (6.12): Main square name and three reason.

**Main Square:** Table (6.12) represents the frequency of main squares' names and the reasons given. The Shahrday Square (figure 6.3) takes the first place by getting 229 answers or more than 74.8 percent of the total answers, and Shohada Square with 42 answers or about 13 percent of the total answers, takes the second place. This consensus of people on the most important and main squares of the city also shows that the reasons for this selection are considerable.



Figure (6.3): Shahrday Square, Tabriz. The building of municipality (*Shahrdari*) as the main element of the square is the main view of the figure.

Source: The author

**Reasons:** Table (6.13) shows the frequency and percent of mentioning the main square of city. The most important reasons were: centrality, antiquity and location of municipal building, these factors having been repeated 154, 153 and 129 times respectively. These three reasons account for about 50 percent of the total responses. Location of main city services, being closer to the bazaar and location on the 'main street' of the city are the other next important reasons.

Total valid questionnaire: 312

<i>Reason for Main City Square</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Centrality	154	17.6
Being historic	153	17.5
Locations of municipality building	129	14.8
Location of important activities and administrations	109	12.5
Closer to bazaar and activity centres	85	9.7
Location in the main street	56	6.4
Location of commercial and recreational centres	31	3.6
High traffic	29	3.3
Large scale	29	3.3
Main bus stations	17	1.9
Beauty and attraction	14	1.6
City symbol	13	1.5
Good accesses and high streets	9	1.0
Other reasons	45	5.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>873</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table (6.13): Frequency of main city square reasons.

**Dimensions:** Table (6.14) indicates the total number of responses categorised under dimensions. At the top of the list is the *functional dimension* with a frequency of 517 or more than 59.2 percent of the total responses. The other important dimensions, *spatial dimension*, with 153 mentions or 17.5 percent, *historical dimension*, with 153 mentions or 17.5 percent and *socio-cultural dimension*, with 19 mentions or less than 2.2 percent of the total responses are the next top numbers respectively. Other dimensions with lesser frequencies are not mentioned here.

Dimensions of Squares									
Functional		Spatial		Historical		Socio-Cultural		other	Total
Municipality Build.	129	Centrality	153	Historic	153	Symbol	13		
Activities	109								
Main Street	56								
Traffic	38								
Largeness	29								
517		153		153		19		31	873

Table (6.14): Number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces attributes - squares.



### 6.3.1.3. Districts

The first phase of the survey indicates that the concept of district for interviewees, as opposed to the concept of street or square, is strong in people's minds. Diagram (6.1) shows the comparison between the mean of responses on rating favourite and non-favourite elements of districts with their elicited constructs. In this figure, and table (6.4), the mean rates of desirable districts and undesirable ones are very different. It means that people were familiar with and had a positive attitude to these spaces. Therefore the interviewees were asked to mention three most important reasons for their distinction of a city district.

**Reasons:** Table (6.15) represents the frequency and percent of answers as reasons for distinguishing a district. The most important reasons were: the tendency of influential and rich people to reside there; seeking and participation of residents; receiving special attention from the state; and being close to the city centre the above factors being repeated 179, 167, 127 and 119 times respectively. These four reasons account for more than 69 percent of the total responses. Being historic, high culture and having proper facilities were the next other important reasons in decreasing order.

<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Tendency of influential and rich people to reside there	179	20.9
Seeking and participation of residents	167	19.5
Special attention and will of state	127	14.8
Closing to downtown	119	13.9
Being historic	77	9.0
High culture and educated residents	46	5.4
Having proper facilities	35	4.1
Having good urban structure and urban facilities	22	2.6
Residence of educated and high ranking officers	14	1.6
New districts	13	1.5
Low density	10	1.2
Geographic situation	9	1.0
Other reasons	54	6.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>858</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table (6.15): Three most important reasons for distinction of a city-district.



**Dimensions:** Table (6.16) indicates the total number of responses categorised into dimensions. At the top of the list there is *political dimension* with a frequency of 493 or 57.5 percent of the total responses. The other important dimensions, *functional dimension* with 182 number or about 21.2 percent, *historical dimension* with 81 number or about 9.4 percent, and *socio-cultural dimension* with 52 number or 6.1 percent of the total responses were the next top numbers respectively. Other dimensions with lesser frequencies are not mentioned here.

Dimensions of Districts												
Political		Functional		Historical		Socio-Cultural		Spatial		Other		Total
Influence and Rich	179	Closing	122	Historic	81	High Culture	47	Situation	9			
Participating	167	Facilities	35									
State Will	127	Density	14									
493		182		81		52		12				
											38	858

Table (6.16): The Number of Responses with the Dimensions of Urban Spaces Attributes - Districts.

6.3.2. City Authorities

State and city authorities, mostly municipal staff and directors, have had the most important role in the development of Iranian cities. People’s readings in this regard are categorised into three aspects, city manager’s activities, public relations and tendencies in this survey.

6.3.2.1 Activities

To find out people’s view on city authorities’ deeds and performances, the interviewers asked the interviewees to rate five important actions that city authorities have done or are doing, in the city.

**Performance:** Table (6.17) shows the frequency and mean of responses rates to the city authorities activities on a scale of one to seven, where seven is the most desirable. State investment in the city with a mean rate of 4.96, performance on expansion of the streets and squares with a mean rate of 4.88 and expansion of the recreational spaces and parks with a mean rate of 4.36 are the most desirable deeds of city authorities. Managing of city traffic system and developing the public spaces with means rate of 3.79 and 3.69 are desirable performance respectively.

Total questionnaire: 312

Total questionnaire: 312

Activities	Total	Rating							Mean of Rates
		Slightly desirable.....Very desirable							
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
State investment in the city	312	8	8	26	48	118	66	38	4.96
Expansion of the streets and squares	310	8	17	30	49	89	80	37	4.88
Expansion of recreational spaces	309	22	39	36	38	88	56	30	4.36
Expansion of the public spaces	306	26	54	62	63	58	34	9	3.69
Developing public transportation	312	42	46	34	61	81	40	8	3.79
City traffic system	309	30	41	50	68	81	32	7	3.82
Total	1862	136	205	238	327	515	308	129	4.24

Table (6.17): Responses on rating of people's views to the city authorities activities on a scale of 1 to 7.

**Dimension:** Table (6.17) indicates that the mean of total rates of desirability over deeds done by city authorities is about 4.24, which shows a positive response. This indicates that, from the citizens' point of view, the activities of authorities in physical developing of city are respectable. Therefore, the city authorities are, in every way *responsible* in their duties for physical developing of city.

6.3.2.2. Public Relation

One of the most important attributes and criteria for deliberating the kind of relations between citizens and city authorities is their manner of communicating with each other in various aspects. Opinion polls by authorities, objection and appreciation of the city authorities and staff's performance by citizens are the common procedures that ensure these relations.

**Opinion Poll:** Polling by the authorities in Tabriz, as can be said of all the Iranian cities, of people's opinions on city affairs and plans is uncommon. Table (6.18) indicates that 291 responses (93.6 percent) out of 312 interviewees indicate no previous experience of an opinion poll and only 20 persons (6.4 percent) of total responses, who are from governmental employees, mentioned any kind of polls, albeit that these were very limited and only circulated among authorities.

Case	Total	Total questionnaire: 312	
		Response Yes	No
Opinion poll on Plans (by authorities)	312	20	291
Objection of the managers actions (by people)	311	69	242
Appreciation of the managers actions (by people)	305	96	209

Table (6.18): Number of responses on three kind of relations between citizens and city authorities

**Objection:** When people were asked whether they had ever objected on the performance of city authorities or not, 69 answers out of 311 given answers said yes. These interviewees were then asked specify the cases. Analysing the responses specified that most of these respondents were governmental employees or had a close relationship

to municipal staff. Table (6.18) shows that majority of interviewees, 242 respondents, or more than 77.8 percent of them, had not made any objection against the actions of city authorities. The answers for the reason of this indicate the relation and opinion of people about authorities.

Table (6.19) shows that 108 or 44.6 percent of responses mentioned "*there were no cases for me to object to*" and 30 or 12.4 percent of them mentioned "*they are very busy and have no time to do such things*". Otherwise, more than 57 percent of responses were conservative and the respondents avoided answering directly and clearly. The other reasons, "*it is not useful*", "*they [city authorities] are not available*" and "*I do not know them [city authorities]*" with 68, 24 and 6 answers respectively, are the other reasons. This indicates that 40.5 percent of the respondents clearly seek no kind of relation with the city authorities.

Total questionnaire: 312

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
There were no cases	108	44.6
It is not useful	68	28.1
I am very busy	30	12.4
City authorities are not available	24	9.9
I do not know the city authorities	6	2.5
Other cases	6	2.5
Total	242	100.0

Table (6.19): Frequency and percent of reasons for people, not to object over the performance of city authorities.

**Appreciation:** For indicating whether they have ever appreciated the city authorities' performance or not, 96 answers out of 305 total answers were yes, and, in specifying the cases, most respondents believed that they should appreciate and thank the workers and staff, but they had little other means by which to do properly. Table (6.18) shows that a majority of interviewees, 209 respondents or more than 68.5 percent of them, had never

communicated their appreciation over the performance of city authorities, for reasons similar to those for not objecting.

Table (6.20) shows that 62 responses, or 29.7 percent of them, clearly answered that the respondents had never approved of the city authorities' actions. 59 or 28.2 percent answered "*there were no cases*", followed by "*they [city managers] are not available*", "*I am very busy*" and "*I do not know them [city managers]*" by 36, 30 and 9 responses are respectively. These figures indicate that more than 64 percent of the interviewees had problems in their relations to the authorities.

Total questionnaire: 312

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
<b>I do not approve their actions</b>	62	29.7
<b>There were no cases</b>	59	28.2
<b>They(city managers) are not available</b>	36	17.2
<b>I am very busy</b>	30	14.4
<b>I do not know them(city managers)</b>	9	4.3
<b>Other cases</b>	13	6.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table (6.20): Frequency and percent of reasons for 'non-appreciation' by people over the performance of city authorities

**Dimension:** As mentioned above, tables (6.18), (6.19) and (6.20) indicate that, in the view of people, city authorities do not respect the idea of citizens and in this regard they are perceived to be *irresponsible*.

### 6.3.2.3. Tendencies

The first phase of survey indicated that the state and city authorities have vital roles in city developing and their support is very important. To find out people's view on city authorities tendencies in performance in the city, interviewees were asked to indicate places in which city governors concentrate their investment and work, and to give two reasons for their answers.



**Investment Place:** Table (6.21) represents the frequency of city areas in which, according to people's responses, city authorities invest more and the reasons given for these answers. The *upper class areas* takes the first place, receiving 79 answers or more than 26 percent of the total answers, and *new districts*, with 47 answers or about 15.5 percent of the total answers, takes the second place.

<i>More investment places</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Freq.</i>
<b>Upper class areas</b>	79	26.0	Participation of residents	21
			Residence of rich people	20
			According city master plan	15
			To be profitable for state	13
			Paying more taxes	13
			High culture of residents	12
			For beautification of city	10
			Residence of high-ranking authorities	10
			Objections of residents	8
<b>New districts</b>	47	15.5	According city master plan	34
			Lack of housing	21
			Requirements and needs of districts	6
			For beautification of city	5
			Residence of rich people	3
<b>Equal</b>	43	14.1	Requirements and needs of districts	19
			According city master plan	10
			Lack of housing	4
<b>Commercial areas</b>	24	7.9	To be profitable for state	10
			For beautification of city	11
			High traffic	7
<b>Vali-Asr District</b>	21	6.9	Residence of rich people	13
			High culture of residents	5
			Residence of high-ranking authorities	3
<b>City centre</b>	19	6.3	For beautification of city	13
			Location of commercial and urban facilities	5
<b>Azadi Square</b>	18	5.9	Residence of rich people	6
			Location of commercial and urban facilities	6
			For beautification of city	4
<b>City entrances</b>	10	3.3	For beautification of city	8
<b>Other cases</b>	43	14.1		
<b>Total</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>100.0</b>		<b>555</b>

Table (6.21): City areas in which city authorities are seen to invest more and reasons for these choices.

**Reasons:** Table (6.22) shows the frequency and percent of reasons given for mentioning the places in the city in which governors invest more. The most important reasons were: "according to the city master plan", "for the beautification of the city", "residence of rich people" and "requirements and needs of districts", these being mentioned 82, 60, 50 and 41 times respectively. These four reasons account for about 42 percent of the

total responses. “*to be profitable for state*”, “*lack of housing*”, “*location of commercial and urban facilities*”, “*participation of district residents*” and “*high traffic*” are the next important reasons, with 35, 34, 27, 25 and 25 frequency respectively.

<i>Reasons</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
According to the city master plan	82	14.8
For beautification of city	60	10.8
Residence of rich people	50	9.0
Requirements and needs of districts	41	7.4
To be profitable for state	35	6.3
Lack of housing	34	6.1
Location of commercial and urban facilities	27	4.9
Participation of district residents	25	4.5
High traffic	25	4.5
Residence of high ranking officers	21	3.8
High culture	20	3.6
They pay more taxes	17	3.1
Supporting of poor	15	2.7
Deprivation of this area in relation to other areas	15	2.7
Historic and cultural situations	15	2.7
Objection of people	12	2.2
High density	11	2.0
Residence of powerful and influential people	8	1.4
Other cases	42	7.6
Total	555	100.0

Table(6.22): Reasons of city governors' concentrations of investment in the city:

**Dimensions:** Table (6.23) indicates the total number of responses and categorised into describing the city authorities' tendencies dimensions. At the top of the list of is the *functional dimension*, with 263 frequency, or more than 47.4 percent of the total responses. The other important dimensions, *political dimension* with 116 mentions or 20.9 percent, *aesthetic dimension* with 60 mentions or 10.8 percent, *economic dimension* with 56 mentions or about 10.1 percent, and *socio-cultural dimension* with 20 mentions or 3.6 percent of the total responses are the next top numbers respectively. Other dimensions with lesser frequencies are not mentioned here.

As table (6.22) shows the frequency of the reason of '*according to the city master plan*' for investing of city governors is mentioned 82 times. If it is mentioned as a functional dimension the total frequencies of this dimension will be 263 (table 6.23) and the most

repeated one in its attribute. But, if it is mentioned as a political dimension (master plans are provided by state and without people participation, see Chapter Four) the total frequencies of the political dimension will be 198 and the functional one 181. So the most important dimension of attribute of city authorities' tendencies is called as functional-political (diagram 6.3).

Dimensions						Total
Functional	Political	Aesthetic	Economic	Socio-Cultural	Other	
Master Plan Housing Requirements Traffic Urban Facilities Poverty Density	Upper Class Participation Objection Influences	Beautification	State Profit Taxes Ground Value	Culture		
263	116	60	56	20	40	555

Table (6.23): Number of responses with the dimensions of city authorities tendencies

### 6.3.3. Citizen’s Attitudes

Witte (1989: 363) says that a person's attitude is a reaction system or evaluator that depends on beliefs and the framework upon which this evaluation is based on. This basis of ones evaluations, is formed through the years, in the family and society. The main element of *attitude* is the reaction stimulated by this evaluation.

As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, the main focus of this research is the citizens' lack of understanding of and communication with urban spaces. In this section, the citizens' attitudes towards the built environment in three aspects: urban culture; environmental behaviour; and paying city costs are surveyed.

#### 6.3.3.1. Urban Culture

As mentioned in chapter five, the city of Tabriz is one of the most historic and populous metropolis cities of Iran and, at the present time, is the fourth largest city following

Tehran, the capital, Mashhad and Esfahan in the country. Citizens of a city with such a record should feel a strong urban culture in but, as mentioned above, there are significant shortcomings people’s interests in city affairs.

**People's Interests:** Table (6.24) shows the frequency and percent of agreement or disagreement with the statement that “people prefer their interests over the well-being of the city”. As the table indicates, about 65.2 percent of respondents agree with this statement and only 27.6 percent of them disagree with it.

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
People prefer their interests over the well-being of the city	83	105	24	61	20
Total	188		24	81	
Percent	%65.2		%8.2	%27.6	

Table (6.24): The number of responses on agreement and disagreement with people preferring their Interest for well-being of the city

**Urbanity:** Table (6.25) shows the frequency and mean rates of the respondents' evaluation of urban culture of citizens, on a scale of one to seven, where seven is the most desirable. The mean of rates is 2.54, which indicates a low desirability for the existing urban culture among people.

**Dimension:** Table (6.24) indicates that in view of respondents, the citizens prefer their private and individual interests over the well-being of the city and table (6.25) also indicates that, in their view, the citizens' desirability of the urban culture is very low too. In other words, people are *irresponsible* in their urban duties.

	Total	Rating							Mean of Rates
		Slightly desirable..... 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Urban Culture of People	311	100	78	44	55	24	8	2	2.54

Table (6.25): Number of responses on rating of peoples view and favourite with people urbanity vulture, on a scale of 1 to 7.



### 6.3.3.2. Environmental Behaviour

People's behaviour in the city and their participation in the maintenance and cleanliness of urban spaces is surveyed in this part. Table (6.26) shows the frequency and mean rates of answers on rating of their views people's participation in the maintenance and cleanness of city on a scale of one to seven, where seven is the most desirable. The mean rate is 2.57, which indicates low desirability for participation in the maintenance and cleanness of the city. In other words, people are *irresponsible* on their environment behaviour.

	Total	Rating							Mean of Rates
		Slightly desirable.....	1	2	3	4	5	Very desirable	
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7
People's participation in maintenance and cleanliness of the city	312	105	79	40	39	33	13	3	2.57

Table (6.26): Number of responses on rating of people's views and favourites with people's participation in maintenance and cleanliness of the city on a scale of 1 to 7.

### 6.3.3.3. Paying City Costs

One of the most important attributes of citizen's attitude to the city is their participation in paying of city costs. Table (6.27) shows the frequency and mean rates of answers on rating of their views and evaluation with the paying of city costs on a scale of one to seven. The mean rate is 4.01, which indicates desirability of people's participation in paying city costs.

		Rating							
	Total	Slightly desirable.....Very desirable							Mean of Rates
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
People's participation In paying of city-costs	312	22	47	46	63	73	47	14	4.01

Table (6.27): Responses on rating of peoples' view and evaluation with the paying of city-costs on a scale of 1 to 7.



**Dimension:** In contrast the two other attributes of urban culture (see table: 6.25) and environmental behaviour (see table: 6.26), table (6.27) indicates that, in the view of respondents, the participation of citizens in paying of city-costs rate is desirable. In other words, people are *responsible* in financially supporting and developing the city's well-being.

#### 6.4. Correlation between Constructs

Correlation is used to elicit the association between two variables. That is, it does not assess whether one variable causes another, but simply whether they vary together (McCloughan, 1997). The Pearson  $r$  is the most commonly used measure of correlation. It represents the strength of the linear relationship between two variables and can only be properly applied in cases where both variables are measured on an interval or ratio scale (Miller, 1984).

To find out the association between constructs of people's readings into and attitudes of urban development in Tabriz, the correlation between dimensions of attributes of these constructs are examined. To specify the extent of association between variables, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) are used. The numbers used to express the extent of these connections are called *correlation coefficients*.

##### 6.4.1. Correlation between Dimensions of Urban Spaces and City Authorities' Tendencies

Correlation between variables that conducted for the dimensions of urban spaces and city authorities' tendencies had some significant outcomes. Urban spaces - streets, squares and districts - developing are the main objective of the city authorities and they have fulfilled a lot of projects in the city. The correlation between these actions

tendencies and people's interpretation in this regard could help to understanding the implication of city authorities tendencies on people's concepts.

#### 6.4.1.1. Correlation between Street Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

Streets are the arteries, the lifelines of a city (French, 1983: 14) so vital for a city. Table (6.28) shows the association of state will and tendencies (dimensions of city authorities investment patterns in Tabriz) in people's concept of street (dimensions of reasons for choice of street).

Table (6.28): Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities investment patterns with dimensions of reasons for choice of street.

<i>Street Dimensions</i>	<i>Dimensions of City Authorities' Tendencies</i>						
	Functional	Historical	Political	Socio-Cultural	Economic	Aesthetic	Total
Functional	556	16	168	31	90	104	965
Historical	115	18	65	10	31	35	274
Spatial	80	7	56	10	34	37	224
Political	10	2	25	2	4	2	45
Total	761	43	314	53	159	178	1508

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	97.98859	15	.00000

Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.283

Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 3 OF 24 ( 12.5%)

Statistic	Value	Approximate Significance
Phi	.25491	.00000 *1
Cramer's V	.14717	.00000 *1

\*1 Pearson chi-square probability

(Calculated 02 Jan 00 on SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0)

### 6.4.1.2. Correlation between Square Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

It is possible to associate the political factor with a specific kind of square - the civic centre - but, more significantly, one can learn to recognise the political nature of a society - or a particular government - by its respect for and usage of public spaces. The Greeks used public spaces wisely, as a basic tenet of their understanding of government, while the Persians of classic times disregarded them. Imperial Rome used open space in a larger, more formal way (French, 1983: 17). Table (6.29) shows the association of state will and tendencies (dimensions of city authorities' investment patterns in Tabriz) with people's concept of square (dimensions of reasons for choice of square).

Table (6.29): Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities' investment patterns with dimensions of reasons for choice of square.

<i>Square Dimensions</i>	<i>Dimensions of City Authorities' Tendencies</i>						
	Functional	Historical	Political	Socio-Cultural	Economic	Aesthetic	Total
Functional	537	14	158	31	90	81	911
Historical	104	16	61	8	32	43	264
Spatial	103	11	64	10	28	39	255
Socio-Cultural	21	1	14	4	5	6	51
Total	765	42	297	53	155	169	1481

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	68.79779	15	.00000

Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.446

Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 24 ( 8.3%)

Statistic	Value	Approximate Significance
Phi	.21553	.00000 *1
Cramer's V	.12444	.00000 *1

\*1 Pearson chi-square probability

(Calculated 02 Jan 00 on SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0)

### 6.4.1.3. Correlation between District Dimensions and City Authorities' Tendencies

The physical form of a community is one of the highest cultural expressions of the society, and as such it translates the social structure of the lifestyle and values into buildings and spaces, into the physical vessel in which the community lives and evolves (Lozano, 1990: 241).

Table (6.30): Correlation of the dimensions of city authorities' investment patterns with dimensions of reasons for concept of district.

<i>District Dimensions</i>	<i>Dimensions of City Authorities' Tendencies</i>						
	Functional	Historical	Political	Socio-Cultural	Economic	Aesthetic	Total
Functional	177	6	54	9	34	46	326
Historical	66	6	22	3	12	19	128
Spatial	10		6			1	17
Political	407	25	195	31	100	95	853
Socio-Cultural	52	3	18	4	6	8	91
Total	712	40	295	47	152	169	1415

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
-----	-----	----	-----
Pearson	23.71210	20	.25519

Minimum Expected Frequency = .481

Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 = 9 OF 30 ( 30.0%)

Statistic	Value	Approximate Significance
-----	-----	-----
Phi	.12945	.25519 *1
Cramer's V	.06473	.25519 *1

\*1 Pearson chi-square probability

(Calculated 02 Jan 00 on SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.0)

### 6.4.2. Correlation between Rates of Citizens' Attitudes and City Authorities' Activities

A correlation between variables of two constructs, citizens' attitudes and city authorities' activities, is conducted to assess the association between people's rating of these variables. Table (6.31) shows the result of the Pearson correlation test, with mean rates of variables adopted on a scale of 100 from table (6.17).

Table (6.31): Correlation (Pearson Coefficient) of attributes of citizens' attitudes whit attributes of city authorities' activities in Tabriz.

<i>Rates of city Authorities' Activities</i>	<i>Rates of Citizens' Attitudes (behaviours) in Tabriz</i>		
	Urban Culture MR= 36/100	Environmental Behaviour MR= 37/100	Paying City Costs MR= 57/100
Investment in the City . MR= 71/100	r.1518 P=.007 ++	r.0857 P=.131	r.1203 P=.034 ++
Expansion of the Parks . MR= 62/100	r.1111 P=.052	r.0923 P=.105	r.0381 P=.505
Expansion of Public Spaces . MR= 49/100	r.1613 P=.005 ++	r.1806 P=.002 ++	r.1779 P=.002 ++
Expansion of the Streets and Squares MR= 70/100	r.0586 P=.304	r-.0084 P=.883	r.1105 P=.052 ++
Managing City Traffic System . MR= 55/100	r.1212 P=.033 ++	r.0945 P=.097	r.1447 P=.011 ++
Developing the Public Transportation MR= 54/100	r.2165 P=.000 +++	r.2079 P=.000 +++	r.1176 P=.038 ++

MR= Mean Rates out of 100 (see table: 6.16). of which 100 is the most desirable

r = Pearson Correlation Coefficient

P = Significant

++ = (Significant < .05) = (Correlation is meaningful)

+++ = (Significant < .01) = (Correlation is highly meaningful)

++++ = (Significant < .001) = (Correlation is extremely meaningful)

The rating of city authorities' activities, in table (6.31), for urban culture correlates significantly with:

- Investment in the city,  $r = .1518$  ( $N=311$ ) ++  $P = .007$ ;
- Expansion of public spaces,  $r = .1613$  ( $N=305$ ) ++  $P = .005$ ;
- Managing city traffic system,  $r = .1212$  ( $N=308$ ) ++  $P = .033$ ; and



- Developing the public transportation,  $r = .2165$  ( $N=311$ ) + + +  $P = .000$ .

The rating of city authorities' activities, in table (6.31), for environmental behaviour correlates significantly only with:

- Expansion of public spaces,  $r = .1806$  ( $N=306$ ) + +  $P = .002$ ; and
- Developing the public transportation,  $r = .2079$  ( $N=312$ ) + + +  $P = .000$ .

The rating of city authorities' activities, in table (6.31), for paying city cost correlates significantly with:

- Investment in the city,  $r = .1203$  ( $N=312$ ) +  $P = .034$ ;
- Expansion of public spaces,  $r = .1779$  ( $N=306$ ) + +  $P = .002$ ;
- Expansion of the streets and squares,  $r = .1105$  ( $N=310$ ) +  $P = .052$ ;
- Managing city traffic system,  $r = .1447$  ( $N=309$ ) + +  $P = .011$ ; and
- Developing the public transportation,  $r = .1176$  ( $N=312$ ) +  $P = .038$ .

#### **6.4.3. Correlation between Rates of Citizens' Attitudes and City Authorities' Public Relations**

A correlation between variables of two constructs, citizens' attitudes and city authorities' public relations is conducted to assess their relation with people's ratings of these variables. Table (6.32) shows the result of the Spearman correlation test, agreement and disagreement of people with the statement - city authorities' respecting citizen's ideas in city affair, by mean rates of variables of citizens' attitude - urban culture, environmental behaviour and paying city costs, adopted in a scale of 100.

Table (6.32): Correlation (Spearman Coefficient) of attributes of citizens' attitudes with attribute of city authorities' public relations in Tabriz.

<i>Rates of City Authorities' Public Relations</i>	<i>Rates of Citizens' Attitudes (behaviours) in Tabriz</i>		
	Urban Culture MR= 36/100	Environmental Behaviour MR= 37/100	Paying City Costs MR= 57/100
Respecting Citizens' Ideas	s.2447 P=.000 +++	s.1754 P=.003 ++	s.0484 P=.418

MR= Mean Rate out of 100 (see table: 6.16, that rates are out of 7)

s = Spearman Correlation Coefficient

P = Significant

+= (Significant < .05) = (Correlation is meaningful)

++ = (Significant < .01) = (Correlation is highly meaningful)

+++ = (Significant < .001) = (Correlation is extremely meaningful)

The rating of city authorities' public relations, in table (6.32), for urban culture correlates extremely significantly with:

- Respecting citizen's ideas on the city affair,  $s = .2447$  ( $N=282$ ) +++  $P = .000$  and
- Environmental behaviour,  $s = .1754$  ( $N=283$ ) ++  $P = .003$ .

There are no significant correlation between the people's agreement or disagreement of city authorities' public relations in the case of respecting citizen's ideas in city affairs and the rates of citizen's attitude in the case of paying city costs.

## 6.5. Conclusion

The self regulation of an urban system is an integral part of a community's behaviour, involving different actors and factors (Lozano, 1990: 76). The concepts of state (*dawlat*), people (*mellat*) and city (*shahr*) in Iran, compared to their meanings in English-speaking countries, as mentioned earlier (see chapter three), are very specific. The state's (*dawlat*) historic mode of ruling in Iran was despotic, in the sense of having unlimited rights over persons (*mellat*) and property (*shahr*) and, as a term, *dawlat* is opposed to *mellat* and it is not a representation of the nation or the public, either as a

term or as a concept, as it is in Western countries. In this chapter the interactions of the three important components of urban development - *dawlat* (city managers), *mellat* (people's attitude) and *shahr* (urban spaces) - are examined in Tabriz. A general syntheses and conclusion of this examination follows:

### 6.5.1. State and Urban Spaces

According to people's responses in the first phase survey (see 6.2.1.) and the second phase of survey (see 6.3.1.), their concepts of urban spaces are very specific. Tables (6.33 and 6.34) show that the images of *streets* and *squares* are functional and the correlation between dimensions of reasons for concepts of these urban spaces with those dimensions of city authorities (see table 6.3), and their investment patterns (see tables 6.28 and 6.29) were extremely significant.

Dimensions	Urban Spaces					
	Streets		Squares		Districts	
<b>Functional</b>	Long	245	Municipality Build	129	Closing	122
	Services	172	Activities	109	Facilities	35
	Traffic	72	Main Street	56	Density	14
	Commercial	47	Traffic	38		
			Bigness	29		
<b>1242</b>	<b>543</b>		<b>517</b>		<b>182</b>	
<b>Political</b>	Rich People	18			Influential People	179
					Participating	167
					State Attention	127
<b>511</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>493</b>	
<b>Historical</b>	Historic	160	Historic	153	Historic	81
<b>394</b>	<b>160</b>		<b>153</b>		<b>81</b>	
<b>Spatial</b>	Axial	141	Centrality	153	Situation	9
<b>306</b>	<b>141</b>		<b>153</b>		<b>12</b>	
<b>Socio-Cultural</b>			Symbol	13	High Culture	47
<b>71</b>	<b>0</b>		<b>19</b>		<b>52</b>	
Other	89	20	31		38	
<b>Total</b>	<b>2613</b>	<b>882</b>	<b>873</b>		<b>858</b>	

Table (6.33): The number of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces' components

Urban Spaces	Dimensions						
	Functional	Political	Historical	Spatial	Socio-cultural	Other	Total
<b>Streets</b>	(543) 61.6%	(18) 2.0%	(160) 18.1%	(141) 16.0%	0	(20) 2.3%	(882) 100%
<b>Squares</b>	(517) 59.2%	0	(153) 17.5%	(153) 17.5%	(19) 2.2%	(31) 3.6%	(873) 100%
<b>Districts- Mahalleh</b>	(182) 21.2%	(493) 57.5%	(81) 9.4%	(12) 1.4%	(52) 6.1%	(38) 4.4%	(858) 100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>(1242)</b> <b>47.5%</b>	<b>(511)</b> <b>19.6%</b>	<b>(394)</b> <b>15.1%</b>	<b>(306)</b> <b>11.7%</b>	<b>(71)</b> <b>2.7%</b>	<b>(89)</b> <b>3.4%</b>	<b>(2613)</b> <b>100%</b>

Table(6.34): The number and percent of responses with the dimensions of urban spaces' components

Table (6.30) shows that there is no significant correlation between dimensions of reasons for the people's concepts of *district* by dimensions of city authorities reasons for investment, but tables (6.33 and 6.34) show that the image of *district* for people is *political* and, in the case of semantic analysis, it can be said that there is significant relation between *district*, as a political concept, and *state*, as a political power. Table (6.35) shows that the majority of people, 67.3 percent of them, believe that the urban spaces belong to the *state*.

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
State was the owner and responsible of the city and public spaces	67	135	17	67	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>202</b>		<b>17</b>	<b>81</b>	
<b>Percent</b>	<b>67.3%</b>		<b>5.7%</b>	<b>27.0%</b>	

Table (6.35): The number of responses on agreement and disagreement with the statement that urban spaces belong to the state

The strong association between concepts of urban spaces with state tendencies on one hand, and that these spaces are seen to belong to the state, on the other, indicate that the **concepts of urban spaces are strongly influence by the state.**

### 6.5.2. State and Citizens' Attitudes

**City Authorities Activities and Citizens' Attitudes:** Table (6.17) shows that people generally appreciate the performance of the city authorities of Tabriz and that the authorities act in a responsible way when dealing with their duties and development of the city. The relation between the variables representing citizens attitudes and city authorities activities (see table: 6.31) indicates a significant correlation between the rates for "urban culture" and the "paying city costs" by most of the "city authorities activities" variables rates, but for rates of "environmental behaviour" variables, these correlation are not as significant as the "urban culture" and the "paying city costs" variables. By other means, for "environmental behaviour" by "city authorities activities" there is a less important relation.

Because of high and desirable rates of "city authorities activities" (71, 70, 62, 55, 54, and 49 out of 100, see table: 6.31) and high rates of "paying city costs" (57/100), the significant correlation between these variables, and lack of acceptable correlation for "environmental behaviour", with a low desirable rate (37/100), were anticipated. But for "urban culture", with a low desirable rate (36/100), the significant correlation by "city authorities activities" variables with above high rates was not anticipated by researcher.

**City Authorities' Public Relations and Citizens Attitudes:** In contrast to desirable rates of "city authorities activities", tables (6.18, 6.19 and 6.20) show that the responses to three kind of relations between citizens and city authorities are almost entirely negative, indicating that they have problems relating and communicating with the authorities. Furthermore, almost all people suggested that they were against any kind of communication with city authorities.



Table (6.32) shows that there is a significant correlation between attributes of "citizens' attitudes", extremely significant for rates of "urban culture" and highly significant ones for rates of "environmental behaviour", by "city authorities public relation", for respecting citizens' ideas, and there is no significant relation between "citizen's paying city costs" and "city authorities public relations", for "respecting citizen's ideas".

Because of the low and undesirable mean rates of two attributes of "citizen's attitude" - "urban culture" (36/100) and "environmental behaviour" (37/100) - and low rates of attributes of "city authorities respecting citizen's ideas in city affairs" (tables 6.18, 6.19 and 6.20) the significant correlation between these variables, and lack of correlation for "citizen's paying city costs" with high desirable rate (57/100) were anticipated by researcher.

Therefore, the relation of attributes of state, city authorities, and attributes of citizens' attitudes, for desirable deeds of city authorities, had result of willing financial support by the citizens in paying city costs and, in contrast, the weak public relations and lack of respect for citizens' ideas by the state. This has resulted in a weak urban culture and undesirable environmental behaviour on the behalf of citizens.

### **6.5.3. State, People and Urban Development**

According to correlation between dimensions of attributes of constructs of people's readings and attitudes to urban development in Tabriz, (tables: 6.28, 6.29, 6.30, 6.31, and 6.32), the following (diagram: 6.3) relations between them can be proposed:




Diagram (6.3): Relations between dimensions of constructs attributes of people’s reading and attitudes to urban development.

Diagram (6.3) shows the correlation between city authorities' tendencies and concepts of urban spaces, street, square and district, between city authorities’ public relations and citizens' attitudes for urban culture and environmental behaviour, and between city authorities' activities and citizens' attitudes towards paying city costs.

These correlation and other findings in this research indicate the influence of state on perception of people for the concepts of urban spaces and people’s attitude and behaviour in the city. **As it is the state that forms the urban spaces, these reflect their concepts, and it is the attitude of state to people which forms the people’s attitude to city affairs. The city is seen to belong to the state, not the people. These are the results of the isolation of people from the processes of urban development.**

Tables (6.36 and 6.37) show the people's view over these trends. Table (6.36) shows the frequency and percent of answers on agreement and disagreement with the statement that "The state realises city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs". As the table indicates, about 79 percent of respondents disagreed and only 15 percent of them agreed.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>
The state realise city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs	9	37	18	140	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>240</b>	
<b>Percent</b>	<b>15.0%</b>		<b>6.0%</b>	<b>79.0%</b>	

Table (6.36): Number of responses on agreement and disagreement with the state realises city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs.

Table (6.37) shows the frequency and percent of answers agreeing or disagreeing with the statement: "The city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city". This table indicates that about 95.5 percent of respondents agreed and only 2.9 percent of them disagreed.

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly disagree</i>
The city affair would be better if the people participate in managing of the city	205	92	5	5	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>297</b>		<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>	
<b>Percent</b>	<b>95.5%</b>		<b>1.6%</b>	<b>2.9%</b>	

Table (6.37): Number of responses on agreement and disagreement with the city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city.


These tables (6.36 and 6.37) indicate the necessity of reforms on these trends, the matter which is origin by the Islamic Revolution (1979) and emphasised by the Constitutional Law, and more recently, in February 1999, by the election of more than 150,000 representatives of rural and urban councils, the first and the important step was taken.

## CONCLUSION

# CONCLUSION

Findings of the Appendix of the Study  
Other Studies and their Change in Use  
Research Methods and their Character  
Case Study Options  
Final Words  
The City of Seattle as Social and Cultural

# CONCLUSION





# CONCLUSION

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## Findings of the Approach of the Study:

Urban Spaces concepts and Change in Iran

## Research Methodological Outcomes

## Case Study Outcomes

## Final Words:

The City (*Shahr*) as Social and Civil Life

## Conclusion

The main purpose of the study was to define a theoretical analysis of state influences on structuring and forming urban spaces in Iran and examining people's perceptions and attitudes to urban spaces. This task was done through formulating a conceptual and analytical model of space and its production processes that focused on linkages to other objective, social and ideological concepts. The author's conceptualisation of space in a dynamic urban settlement was as a *socio-spatial construct* that is not independent from either substantive nor epistemological influences. The special historic concept of the state in Iran and political attributes of the cities was intended to fuse of some paradigms to outline an approach to investigating the meanings and changes of urban spaces in Iran. This fusion lead to a new theoretical approach, the *state-oriented socio-spatial structure* of urban form in Iran.

## Findings of the Approach of the Study:

### Urban Spaces Concepts and Changes in Iran

The ancient Iranian civilisation (Persia) emerged by establishing a state and forming new settlements, urban communities. The state was the pinnacle of the system of society, above all the social classes without relating to them. Wealth and religion were related to power, the despotic state. The concepts of the country, state and city were closely bound with the city as the centre of the realm and founded by the state to be its seat of power.

By the start of the Islamic period (after 642 AD) and the founding of the Islamic state, Persian urbanisation concepts and policies became the bases for establishing new cities, Baghdad, Kufa and so on, as the state's power centres. They needed urban centres as an organisational device of ruling.

Islam teaches dependency of society on state as sources of power, wealth and security. The gathering of people in the cities, the enormous extension of the courts of Islamic Empires and the centralisation of wealth from the territory to the state, seated in the city, caused the medieval Islamic city, as opposed to the European city, to be an enormous and densely populated phenomenon, but one without any evident organisation and structure of its own. This last characteristic originated from the absence of social organisation and social classes. A complex, unplanned network of accesses and a compacted morphology were the predominant typologies and characteristics of the Islamic cities.

The structure of pre-modern Iranian society was made up of three distinct but interacting modes of production - a *pastoral nomadic* mode of production in the tribal sector, a *peasant crop-sharing* mode of production in the rural agricultural economy, and a *petty commodity* mode of production in urban areas. These all operated beneath the super-social structure of the state that prevented the formation of a class consciousness and state-wide socio-political classes. The communities, whether tribal, rural or urban, poor and rich, were almost all tied together through tribal lineage, religious sects, regional organisations and paternalistic sentiments.

The pre-modern urban pattern of Iranian city was a conglomeration of residential units abutted onto one another and enclosing their courtyard spaces. Countless winding cul-de-sacs and fewer through-roads bordered these inward looking houses. There were no major differences between the image of the urban areas and rural settlements. Physically the city was a big village. It was presence of state that applied the concept of city to a settlement.

The despotic way of government continued up to the end of the Qajar time, that is, about one hundred years ago, when the Constitutional Revolution began in 1906 which created a fundamental transformation in Iranian history. The Constitutional Revolution signalled the end of the Middle Ages in Iran and, for the first time, a constitution was written, the parliament and a court of justice were founded and state as executive power subjected to the law and put under the supervision of the parliament. Many organisations appeared, among them were labour unions, communities, the early political parties, the city councils (*anjumans*) and the municipalities. The Constitutional Revolution paved the way for the modernisation of Iran.

According to the Constitution a constituent assembly transferred the royal title to the Prime Minister, Reza Khan Pahlavi in 1925, and his son, Mohammad Reza, succeeded him in 1941. The Pahlavi sovereignty had no notion of being under supervising of the society or that their sovereignty was in any way a sub-system of it. They distorted the modernism to adapt to their state, i.e. promoted pseudo-modernism. As a social base they fabricated a modern class by splitting the homogenised society, and urban segregation was its socio-spatial outcome. People had no sense of belonging to so-called modern urban public spaces imposed by state. Carelessness and irresponsibility of people can be understood by this contradiction between them and state.

The decline of the dominion and control of the system of state over society after the Constitutional Revolution, the increase of security and subjectivity of authority to law, and the imposition of modernist city master plans and building regulations caused a discontinuity in historic Iranian spatial patterns. Prevailing extroverted patterns in the cities replaced the inward looking courtyard housing forms. Some detached new towns were built beyond the outskirts of main cities, and these reinforced social division in the

cities when the new class and state enticements led to movement towards these well equipped modern parts.

A classification of the urban forms, state and city concepts based on the historic periods is presented in table (1). The historic outcome of the urban form, state and city concepts was people's alienation of urban development processes.







Period	Urban Form	State Concept	City Concept
Ancient Era  Until 7 <sup>th</sup> Century AD	Citadel  	Identity of a Unified Country	Centre of a Region
Middle Ages (Islamic Era)  7 <sup>th</sup> - 19 <sup>th</sup> Century	Coherent Community of Groups  	A System above the Society	Seat of Power/ Seat of State
Modern Era  20 <sup>th</sup> Century	Spatial Segregation  	A Separate and Opposed System to Society	Seat of Pseudo-Modernism

Table (1): Classification of the urban forms, state and city concepts based on the historic periods in Iran:

In Ancient Era, city was a citadel. The Shah or his representative settled in the core and the other elite and armies of the state (based on the cast system) settled in the second ring. Ordinary people settled around the city wall.

In Middle Ages, Islamic Period, the cast system demolished and common people came to the city and settled in different groups beside together.

In Modern Era, a time of unwallled cities, the modern pro-state group moved to the newly equipped quarters.

-  People's residences
-  State's indirect presence
-  State's direct presence or high influence



## Research Methodological Outcomes

The task of the study was to investigate the concept of state and structuring the urban spaces in Iran. The 'public' city space in Iran was the creation of the 'state' that historically was opposed to people. This contradiction implied that no standard approach to investigating urban forming in the special case of Iran is adequate. A city's empirical, social and descriptive qualities are generated by its history and in the case of Iran, this is as the creation of a hugely centralised, despotic power base. Throughout each generation and regime, the 'state' has felt the need to manifest itself in the form of new cities, creating temporal as well as social discontinuities and this immediately calls for a methodology that develops tools of spatial description beyond those that are currently practised in urban analysis.

A qualitative-comparative research strategy, with a case-oriented approach for conceptualising and analysing the connections between state and urban forms was used in this study. A combination of deductive methods (for identifying the subject and comparing the theoretical frameworks), inductive methods (for making new analyses and specifying the hypothesis) and groundwork (a mixed method for evaluating the hypothesis) structured the research.

Through the comparison of urban patterns introduced by the aggressive states and the life styles of their origin homeland, by comparing the historic changes in terms of the both internal and external dimensions, the author has found similarities that specify the roots and reasons of these new patterns. Discontinuity of urban forms during the next period of rule, and the stagnation of the prevalent patterns under different states of different origin are explained through the comparing of their similar mode of ruling.

Every theory and approach in each specific discipline does not necessarily express the exact realities, but an abstractive framework by which one can arrange various and complex facts and analyse their relations. According to this research approach and its consequences, cities were centres for politico-economic powers of the state. The city from the beginning was seen as an organisational phenomenon required by the ruling powers. State has an important role in social transformation and change in Iran as well as structuring the society and its built environment. In the modern era increasing interference of state in urban spaces destroyed the traditional urban patterns. Through this methodological synthesis the *pre-modern Iranian city as seat of state* and *spatial segregation in the modern city* can be asserted.

The research outcomes applied in the case study, city of Tabriz were tools towards understanding that spatial changes are based either on historic social changes or as historic devices for enforcing rules, but that in Iran it has always been the latter.

Applying a mixed survey method for defining the subject of the study through the case study was the second achievement of this research in the domain of methodology. In first step, phase one, the Personal Construct Technique (PCT) was used for eliciting the people's constructs in urban spaces. In the next step, based on the result of the first phase, a questionnaire was designed for use in large scale with mixed open-ended and closed questions and two sub-sections using a semantic differential technique. The elicited constructs by PCT and limit sample were emphasised in the second phase and mass examining. This shows that the constructs elicited by PCT in a limit scale (6 persons) can be generalised in the large community (312 persons in this case).

## Case Study Outcomes

The research outcomes revealed that, according to people's responses in the survey, their concepts of urban spaces, streets and squares are functional and the majority of them, 67.3 percent, believe that the urban spaces belong to the *state*. There are also strong association between concepts of urban spaces with state tendencies and desirable rates for "city authorities activities". In contrast, the responses to three kind of relations between citizens and city authorities are almost entirely negative; almost all people suggested that they were against any kind of communication with city authorities. Therefore, the relation of attributes of state, city authorities, and attributes of citizens' attitudes, for desirable deeds of city authorities, had the result of willing financial support by the citizens in paying city costs but, in contrast, the weak public relations and lack of respect for citizens' ideas by the state has resulted in a weak urban culture and undesirable environmental behaviour on the behalf of citizens.

The survey revealed that people's attitudes to urban spaces are strongly influenced by state and indicated the superiority of the political dimension of urban spaces in Iranian cities. The concept of state as a despotic system historically separated and opposed to society, still prevailed in the attitudes of citizens and is the most important factor in lack of sense of commitment to these spaces.

Table (6.37) shows the frequency and percent of answers agreeing or disagreeing with the statement: "The city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city". This table indicates that about 95.5 percent of respondents agreed and only 2.9 percent of them disagreed.

These figures concur with the theoretical understanding that place is a social construct and with the historical review of Iranian urbanisation to reinforce an image of an intense and historic alienation between people and their city spaces. This suggests that the lack of participation in city affairs has deep roots that go far into people's attitudes and into the structuring of society itself. Any intention to initiate and promote tradition of participation would need to address these powerful underlying factors. It would need to create a cultural context in which participation would become meaningful. It would need to address the question 'how can people be made to feel that they belong to their city spaces?' by first asking 'how can people be made to feel that they belong to their political system?'. Far, as long as a despotic, centralised model of state applies, people will feel no responsibility for any space that is not privately their own, for these public spaces will always be seen to belong to the untouchable, unlistening super-echelon of the state.

## **Final Words:**

### **The City (*Shahr*) as Social and Civil Life**

Governance has traditionally been equated with what *governments* do, with the machinery of the 'state'. In Iran the traditional states were on the top of the society and monopolised all law and freedoms, and society had no right but through the will of state. This was the root of the irresponsibility of people to urban public spaces. In healthy social ecosystems, there is a direct relationship between the rights of the people and social responsible and duties. Social responsibility without civil rights is meaningless and vice versa (Honary, 1998).

Human life is conceived as being lived in social relations and cultures within which relations with the natural world are framed. Enhancing the quality of life is not just a



matter of material welfare. It is also spiritual and emotional, and involves discourses about rights and responsibilities (Healey, 1997: 184). Popper (1945: 130) mentions that if freedom is lost, everything is lost, including "planning to development". For why should plans for the welfare of the people be carried out if the people have no power to enforce them? If we give too much power to the state, then freedom is lost, and that is the end of social development.

The plans for city development should be the result of the experience of interaction between different parties in intervention with the environment. Lozano defines this: system as a group of parts whose interaction facilitates the performance of the parts into an organised whole with characteristic overall responses or as a set of interrelated worlds and activities linked together to accomplish a desired end (Lozano 1990: 74). In such situations, planning activity becomes an effort in shaping or framing the webs of relations through people give value and take actions with respect to the spaces with which they have some relation.

The outcomes of this research emphasise the complex interactions between the activities of formal government bodies, economic activity and social life interlinked through social networks and cultural assumptions and practices which cut across formal organisations. It argues that one can not separate the activity of governance from the flow of economic and social life. There can be no social stability and real development in Iran unless the government set out comprehensive legitimate 'citizens rights' in terms of the responsibilities of people as well as governmental bodies in areas such as citizenship, decision-making, city management etc. Built forms should respond to social life and provide opportunities for its continuation and evolution. If, at long last, Iran is to achieve a normal social and economic system within a genuinely progressive cultural



framework of its own, the authority should begin to change its basic practical policies, from a centralist political system to a system of mutual responsibility between state and people.

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# APPENDIX

(Questionnaire)

## QUESTIONNAIRE

No.:

This survey in city of Tabriz forms part of a research on assessment of people and state role in urban development and evolution in modern Iran. We would be grateful if you would complete this questionnaire carefully.

- Edinburgh College of Art, Heriot-Watt University, U.K.

- College of Art, Tarbiat Modarres University, Iran.

1. What is your job?
2. How old you are?
3. What is your sex?
4. Your education:
5. How many years have you been resident in Tabriz?
6. Which district do you live in?
7. Have you ever been involved in an opinion poll about the city matters? Yes/No  
If yes, please specify:
8. Have you ever objected to the performance of city authorities? Yes/No  
If yes, please specify:  
If no, what is the reason?
9. Have you ever been appreciated of your city authorities? Yes/No  
If yes, please specify:  
If no, what is the reason?
10. Where do city governors concentrate their investment and work?  
Why? Give two reasons:  
- Area:  
- Reasons: a):  
                  b):
11. Mention three most important reasons for distinction of a city-district:  
a):  
b):  
c):



12. Mention the main street of city, give three reasons for that:

Name of the main street:

Reasons a):

b):

c):

13. Mention the main square of city, give three reasons for that:

Name of the main square:

Reasons a):

b):

c):

Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 7 is most desirable) your view on the following issues/statements about city of Tabriz.

Statement	Rating						
	Slightly desirable.....	.....very desirable					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
State investment in the city							
People participation in paying of city-costs							
People participation in maintenance and cleanliness of the city							
The preserving of historic monuments							
The expansion of the recreational spaces and parks							
The expansion of the streets and squares							
The xpansion of the public amenities (libraries,.....)							
The development of the public transportation							
The city sewage system							
The trafic system							
The urban culture of the people of Tabriz							
The efficiency of city authorities and their staffs							

Please indicate your agreement and disagreement (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree) on the following statements:

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree
The state has been responsible for the city and public spaces so far.					
The taxes must be increased for improvement and more development of the city.					
The state has enough revenues to do its civic duties.					
The state realises the city well-being better than people do, and people should not interfere in the city affairs.					
It should be allowed to destroy the traditional spaces for renovation the city.					
The city affairs would be better if the people participate in managing of the city.					
State respects the people ideas on city managing and developing.					
People prefer their interest for well-being of the city.					
Innovation and expansion of streets and squars have disturbed the city structure.					